G.R. No. L-2754. August 31, 1949
FIDEL ABRIOL, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. VICENTE HOMERES, PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF LEYTE, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
OZAETA, J.:
Instance of Leyte denying the appellant’s petition for habeas corpus.
In criminal case No. 1472 of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte the herein petitioner Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was
accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution
had presented its evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense moved to
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused. After hearing the arguments for and against the motion for
dismissal, the court held the proofs sufficient to convict and denied said
motion, whereupon counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the
accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the
defense, contending that the present procedural practice and laws precluded the
defense in criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had presented a
motion for dismissal with or without reservation and after said motion had been
denied, and citing as authority the case of United States vs. De la Cruz, 28
Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the opposition of the
provincial fiscal and, without allowing the accused to present evidence in their
defense, convicted all of them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer
seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.
From that sentence the herein petitioner together with his
coaccused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 7, 1948, the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion and without notice to the appellants as required in
section 8 of Rule 120 and in Baradi vs. People, G. R. No. L-2658, dismissed the
appeal for failure of the appellants to file their brief within the extension of
time granted them.
The present petition for habeas corpus was thereafter presented
by Fidel Abriol against the provincial warden of Leyte, contending that the
sentence entered against him in said criminal case No. 1472 was null and void
because it had been rendered without due process of law. Judge Rodolfo Baltasar,
who heard the petition for habeas corpus, denied it on the ground that, the
Judgment of conviction against the petitioner having become final, “this court
is entirely devoid of jurisdiction over and power to modify or in any way alter
said decision.” From that decision of Judge Baltasar the petitioner has appealed
to this court.
- The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accusedpetitioner
to present proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal
was a palpable error which resultedin denying to the said accused, the due
process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Sights embodied in the Constitution, it
being provided in Article III, section 1 (17), of the Constitution that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
in his behalf. There is no law nor “procedural practice” under which the accused
may ever be denied the right to be heard before being sentenced.Both the fiscal and Judge Moscoso have misunderstood the ruling
of this court in the case of the United States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil. 279. In
that case the accused-appellant assigned as error the denial by the trial court
of the motion for dismissal presented by the defense after the evidence for the
prosecution had been closed, although the court heard the evidence for the
defense before rendering Judgment. In refutation of said assignment of error the
Attorney General cited, the case of United States vs. Abaroa, 3 Phil., 116,
wherein, the following, principle was laid down: “After the prosecution rests,
the court should not dismiss the case on motion for insufficiency of proof but
should require defendant to present evidence on his own behalf.” In that
connection the Court observed that the ruling in the Abaroa case was handed down
in December, 1903, and before the decision in the Kepner case, when the
Government was permitted to appeal from dismissals and final judgments in
criminal cases. Said the Court:“* * * It was then held that the practice of dismissing the
case immediately after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed ought
not to be followed, for when the order of dismissal was appealed from and this
higher court sustained the conviction of the accused on that evidence of the
prosecution he would have been convicted without having been heard in his own
defense, which would work an injustice; and when to avoid this difficulty the
order of dismissal was overruled and the case returned for rehearing, another
difficulty would be encountered, which is that of subjecting the accused a
second time to another trial without action on his part and without need, since
all the evidence could and should have been taken at the trial already held, and
with the additional risk of all the inconveniences of delay. In this state of
affairs the Supreme Court of the United States rendered the decision in the case
of Kepner vs. U. S. (195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil., 669), and since then the
situation assumed and disposed of in United States vs. Abaroa cannot be
considered, for the Government cannot now appeal from an order sustaining the
motion to dismiss presented by the defense after the evidence for the
prosecution has been closed, on the ground of insufficiency thereof.“Even now, after the Kepner case, it is no ground for error
that the Court of First Instance denied the motion for dismissal presented
immediately after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed because the
defense believed it to be insufficient; for the reason that, as in this case,
the court did not hold it to be insufficient—it was under no obligation so to
hold it—and it could continue the trial and take the evidence for the defense in
order to reach the conclusion induced in its opinion by the allegations and the
evidence, or as it did conclude in this case by sentencing the defendant on the
evidence for the prosecution, which it held to be sufficient.” (28 Phil.,
282-283.)Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the
defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the
dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution
has rested terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal
is denied, the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before
entering judgment, regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its
right to present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied. The
reason is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard.in his
defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused has no
evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it, the court has
no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution alone.In the case of People vs. Moro Mamacol (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to
No. 1], 341[1]) the aceused, without
reserving the right to present evidence, moved for the dismissal of the case
after the prosecution had rested. The court denied the motion and, without
allowing the accused to present his evidence, sentenced him to suffer life
imprisonment for the crime of murder of which he was accused. On appeal this
court, although finding that the evidence for the prosecution was sufficient for
eonvlction, set aside the judgment and ordered the case remanded to the lower
court to allow, the accused to present his proofs.In civil cases, where either or both of the parties can appeal,
the ruling is different from that in criminal cases. If the defendant moves for
dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence after the plaintiff has
rested and the court grants the motion, and if on appeal by the plaintiff the
judgment is reversed, the case is terminated then and there; that is to say, it
is not remanded, to the court of origin for the purpose of allowing the
defendant to produce evidence in his defense. “The defendant in offering a
motion to dismiss in effect elects to stand on the insufficiency of the
plaintiff’s case.” (Moody, Aronson & Co. vs. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil., 198;
Demeterio vs. Lopez, 50 Phil., 45; Arroyo vs. Andrea Azur, 43 Off. Gaz., 54.)
However, if the court denies the motion to dismiss, it is not precluded from
receiving evidence for the defendant, and the plaintiff cannot by mandamus
compel it to render judgment without hearing the evidence for the defense.
(Cotaoco vs. Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-2004, May 24, 1949.) - The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas
corpus lies in a case like the present. The general rule is that the function of
a writ of habeas corpus in permitting the petitioner to challenge by collateral
attack the jurisdiction under which the process or judgment by which he is
deprived of his liberty was issued or rendered cannot be distorted by extending
the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting within their jurisdiction. (25
Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus, sec. 13, p. 152.) This principle, however, has been
qualified in the sense that it “is not to be so applied as to destroy
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty.” (Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304
U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461.)Appellant relies upon the case of Schields vs. McMicking, 23
Phil., 526. That case, however, was reversed in McMicking vs. Schields, 238
U.S., 99; 59 Law, ed., 1220; 41 Phil., 971. The petitioner Schields was accused
of theft in the municipal court of Manila on December 1, 1910. There he was duly
arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced. He appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Manila on December 21, 1910. On December 23 he received notice that
the case would be heard at ten o’clock a.m. on the 24th. Tnttien he was
arraigned on the last-mentioned date he asked for time in which to answer the
complaint, which request was denied by the court, who ordered the clerk to enter
on the record that the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the complaint. Thereupon
the petitioner’s attorney also asked for time in which to prepare a defense,
which petition was also denied by the same court. The petitioner’s attorney
excepted to this ruling and asked that the exceptions, together with the
requests of the petitioner which had been denied, be entered on the record.
After the trial, during which the accused presented witnesses in his defense,
the Court of First Instance found him guilty and sentenced him to four months
and one day of arresto mayor. In denying the petitioner’s request for time in
which to prepare his defense, the trial court said:“At the beginning of the trial the defendant asked for further
time to prepare, and invoked certain sections of General Order No. 58, which, in
our judgment, were not applicable to this case. The prosecution did not file a
new complaint in this court. Defendant was tried on the identical complaint
which was presented in the court below as long ago as December 1st. To that
complaint, as the record shows, he pleaded not guilty, and having further
brought this case here on appeal, the presumption is that such plea continued,
and to allow delays for the reiteration of such a plea would be an.empty
formality. The law does not require a vain and useless thing, and the provision
in question must be construed as applying to cases where a new complaint is
filed in this court. But aside from this, we think that the time of trial caused
no prejudice to the accused. As we have seen, the complaint was filed on
December 1st, and the accused had more than three weeks to prepare before the
trial in this court. During this period there were evidently one or more
continuances, and finally, it seems, the defendant had to be called into the
municipal court by a bench warrant. Upon bringing the case here it was incumbent
upon him to follow it up and to be ready and waiting its disposition by this
court. Notice of the trial was sent both to him and to his counsel the day
before, and it was not claimed that defendant could have produced any further
testimony; if the case had been postponed. On the contrary it appears that he
called one witness who did not testify in the court below. After all, the
question in the case is mainly one of law. The principal controversy as to the
facts relates to the question of the alleged permission to take articles, and
this, as we have seen, would not have excused the defendant, even had it been
proved, though he admits that himself and Frandom are the only witnesses on that
point.”This court granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered
the discharge of the petitioner from confinement on the ground that under
section 30 of General Orders No. 58 the accused, on demand, had the right to at
least two days in which to prepare for trial and that the refusal of the time in
which to prepare for trial was equivalent to the refusal of a legal hearing. On
appeal by the respondent Director of Prisons to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the latter reversed the judgment. Said that court:“We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Supreme
Court that the judgment pronounced by the Court of First Instance was void and
without effect. Under the circumstances disclosed denial of the request for time
to answer and to prepare defense was at most matter of error which did not
vitiate the entire proceedings. The cause—admitted to be within the jurisdiction
of the court-stood for trial on appeal. The accused had known for weeks the
nature of the charge against him. He had notice of the hearing, was present in
person and represented by counsel, testified in his own behalf, introduced other
evidence, and seems to have received an impartial hearing. There is nothing to
show that he needed further time for any proper purpose, and there is no
allegation that he desired to offer additional evidence or suffered substantial
injury by being forced into trial. But for the sections in respect of procedure
quoted from General Order No. 58, it could not plausibly be contended that the
conviction was without due process of law. The Court of First Instance placed no
purely fanciful or arbitrary construction upon these sections and certainly they
are not so peculiarly inviolable that a mere misunderstanding of their meaning
or harmless departure from their exact terms would suffice to deprive the
proceedings of lawful effect and enlarge the accused * * *”It will be noted that in said case the fact that the cause
stood for trial on appeal from the municipal court; that the accused had
known for weeks the nature of the charge against him; that he had notice of the
hearing, was present in person and represented by counsel, testified in his own
behalf, introduced other evidence, and seems to have received an impartial
hearing; that there was nothing to show that he needed further time for any
proper purpose; and that there was no allegation that he desired to offer
additional evidence or suffered substantial injury by being forced into
trial—weighed heavily against the pretension of the petitioner that the sentence
entered against him was void for lack of due process of law.There is no analogy between the facts of that case and those of
the present case.A more pertinent and analogous case is that of Johnson vs.
Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461. Johnson was indicted by the grand
jury for feloniously uttering, passing, and possessing counterfeit Federal
Reserve notes. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty, said that he had no
lawyer, and—in response to an inquiry of the court—stated that he was ready for
trial. He did not ask for and was not provided with the assistance of counsel.
He was tried, convicted and sentenced to four and one-half years of
imprisonment. Subsequently he petitioned for habeas corpus. Although the Federal
District Court believed that the petitioner was deprived, in the trial court, of
his constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, it
denied the petition for habeas corpus, holding that the proceedings “were not
sufficient to make the trial void and justify its annulment in a habeas corpus
proceeding, but that they constituted trial errors or irregularities which could
only be corrected on appeal.” The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that
judgment; but the Supreme Court on certiorari reversed it. We quote the
pertinent portions of its ratio decidendi:“The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to
Counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own
ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be
nullified by a determination that an accused’s ignorant failure to claim his
rights removes the protection of the Constitution. True, habeas corpus cannot be
used as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities—not involving the
question of jurisdiction—occurring during the course of trial; and the ‘writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.’ These principles, however,
must be construed and applied so as to preserve—not destroy—constitutional
safeguards of human life and liberty. * * *“Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one
charged with crime to the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this
constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal
court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. When this right
is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary element
of the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to conviction,and sentence. If the
accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not competently and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life
or liberty. A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost ‘in the
course of the proceedings’ due to failure to complete the court—as the Sixth
Amendment requires—by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and
whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is
not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment
of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one
imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. * * * (82 Law. ed.,
1467-1468.)We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which
could be invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to
present evidence in his defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee
to him that right. Such constitutional right is inviolate. No court of justice
under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. If
the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary—as in the
instant case—invokes that right, and the court denies it to him, that court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused
without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and
may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. - There is no doubt that if the petitioner had prosecuted his
appeal to a successful conclusion, the sentence against him would have been set
aside and the case would have been remanded to the trial court to allow him to
present his proofs, as was done in the case of People vs. Mamacol, supra.
We make this observation to show that the petitioner cannot by this habeas
corpus proceeding secure a greater relief than he could have obtained by appeal,
and that in any event he is only entitled to the restoration of the right of
which he has been unlawfully deprived, namely, the right to present evidence in
his defense. Under section 17 of Rule 102, a person who is set at liberty upon a
writ of habeas corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless
by the lawful order or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or
offense. Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons
hereinabove stated, he may be held under the custody of the law by being
detained or admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully
decided. The process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may and should be
resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court’s denial of
his constitutional right to be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution
rested, the proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there.Under the title “Proceedings and Belief” and subtitle “Judgment
and Costs” on the subject of Habeas Corpus, American Jurisprudence says: “After
the hearing, the court should dispose of the petitioner in such manner as the
justice of the case may require; he may be discharged, remanded, or admitted to
bail * * * Even though a petitioner is entitled to be relieved of the particular
restraint under which he is held, he may, if there is sufficient cause for his
detention, be restrained until valid proceedings against him may be taken.”
(Sections 152 and 154.)
Wherefore, in view of the nullity of the sentence under which
the petitioner has been committed to imprisonment by the respondent, the
judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ prayed for is granted. The
respondent shall discharge the petitioner unless within fifteen days from the
promulgation of this decision the provincial fiscal of Leyte should move the
lower court to reset for trial said, criminal case No. 1472 to allow the
petitioner to present his evidence and the trial court to decide said case anew.
Pending such new trial, the petitioner may be admitted to bail.
It is so ordered, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Montemayor, and Torres,
JJ., concur.
[1] 81 Phil., 543.
DISSENTING
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus.
The petitioner was sentenced to prison by the Court of First
Instance of Leyte for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. From this
sentence he appealed to the Court of Appeals; but the appeal was there dismissed
because of his failure to file a brief. And as no steps were taken to have the
appeal reinstated, the sentence was in due time declared final. This was on June
22, 1948. Committed to prison to serve his sentence, petitioner, on December 3,
1948, filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance, and the petition having been denied by that court, the case is now
before us on appeal.
The petitioner challenges the validity of the sentence of
conviction imposed upon him on the ground that his constitutional right was
violated when the lower court, after denying his motion to dismiss for alleged
insufficiency of the prosecution’s proof, refused to allow him to present his
own evidence, holding that his right to do so was waived by his motion for
dismissal. It was, of course, error for the trial court to deny him that right,
and the error would undoubtedly have been corrected had he prosecuted his appeal
to its conclusion. But this he did not do, and the question now is whether,
notwithstanding what has happened, the correction may still be made through
habeas corpus proceedings, whose only purpose in law is to determine whether or
not a person alleged to be illegally detained is entitled to release.
Disregarding the legal purpose of this remedy, the majority of the Court has
granted the writ but has denied liberty to the petitioner, remanding the case to
the court below for further proceedings. Actually, what the majority has done is
to allow the remedy of habeas corpus to perform the functions of an appeal that
is now dead and can no longer be revived. To this I cannot agree.
No rule is better settled than that habeas corpus is not a
corrective remedy. It cannot be used for correcting errors or irregularities of
procedure which are not jurisdictional. (25 Am. Jur. par. 28.) It does not take
the place of an appeal. (Abanilla vs. Villas, 56 Phil., 481.) And even if the
error sought to be corrected may have the effect of voiding a judgment, so long
as the court that rendered that judgment had jurisdiction, habeas corpus may not
be invoked to correct the error. The proper remedy is by appeal or
certiorari.
Thus, in the case of Domingo vs. Director of Prisons, 44 Off.
Gaz. 2201[1], where an attempt was made
through habeas corpus proceedings to invalidate a judgment of conviction
rendered on a plea of guilty when, so it was alleged, no such plea was properly
entered by the accused, this Court, through its Chief Justice, said:
“* * *. The trial court had jurisdiction over the offense and
of the person of the accused, and, therefore, it had jurisdiction to try the
case and render judgment therein. The allegation, if true, that the judgment of
conviction was rendered without a plea of guilty properly entered by the accused
to the lesser offense of homicide, is merely a defect of procedure, not of
jurisdiction, though it may have the effect of voiding the judgment. And this
error of procedure cannot be reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings wherein the
only issue is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to release. And the
petitioner is not entitled to release even if we have power to set aside the
judgment upon the ground aforementioned, for, in such event, the proper
procedure would be to reopen the criminal case and order the trial court to
proceed further as if no judgment has ever been entered therein, that is, it
must arraign the accused for the lesser offense of homicide after the
information is duly amended, then try the case if the accused pleads not guilty,
and the latter in the meantime should remain in confinement if he is not on
bail. But this correction of procedure can be done only in an appeal or in an
action for certiorari wherein the trial court is made respondent and is amenable
to our orders.”
In the present case, there is no question that the lower court
had jurisdiction to try the case against the petitioner for illegal possession
of firearms and to convict him therefor. The court committed a legal error when
it convicted petitioner without allowing him to present his evidence. But the
error, though it made the judgment voidable, was only an error in procedure,
which could have been corrected by appeal. In fact, petitioner took the first
steps to have the error so corrected, except that he later abandoned the appeal
by not presenting a brief. And though notified on June 9, 1948, of the dismissal
of his appeal, he did nothing to have the dismissal reconsidered, and his
petition for habeas corpus was not filed until December 3, 1946, that is, about
six months later, when he had already been serving sentence for sometime. As
said by this Court in the case of Domingo vs. Director of Prisons, supra,
“this passive attitude is an indication of conformity with the proceedings and
that the petition (for habeas corpus) is but an afterthought.”
The accused in a criminal case has the undoubted right to
present evidence on his behalf. But this right may be waived at any stage of the
case, and the waiver may be express or implied. Petitioner in the present case
could have insisted on the preservation of that, right when he appealed to the
Court of Appeals. But since he gave up the appeal and commenced to serve his
sentence, the natural interpretation of his attitude is that he no longer cared
to have the error corrected and go through further trial, thereby impliedly
waiving his right to present evidence if he had any.
The case of Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; 82 Law. ed.,
1461, relied on in the majority opinion is hardly applicable to the present
case. There the accused was denied his constitutional right to have the
assistance of counsel at the trial and the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the recognition of that right was a prerequisite to the court’s
jurisdiction, so that when the right was denied the judgment of conviction was
void as having been rendered without jurisdiction. It is obvious that the denial
of the right to the assistance of counsel in that case was an error which
vitiated the entire proceedings of the trial court and made a new trial
inevitable. Annulment of the whole proceedings taken while the accused had no
legal counsel was, therefore, proper. In the case at bar, as the majority
opinion itself rules, the whole proceedings below did not have to be annuled so
that the case had to be remanded to the trial court for the reception of
defendant’s evidence. The question of jurisdiction is not at all in issue and
seems to have been invoked merely as an excuse to justify recourse to habeas
corpus as a remedy for correcting a procedural mistake.
I therefore vote for the dismissal of this petition and the
confirmance of the judgment below.
BENGZON AND TUASON, JJ.:
We concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Reyes.
[1] 77 Phil., 1053.