G.R. No. L-26437. March 13, 1968
RAQUEL G. DOCE, PETITIONER, VS. BRANCH II OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF QUEZON AND ARACELI TORRECHANTE, RESPONDENTS.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Respondent Araceli Torrechante filed on July 21, 1964 a complaint
for libel against petitioner Raquel Doce before the Municipal Court of Real,
Quezon Province. Attached to the
complaint were the affidavits of respondent and her witness, one Dionisio Destojo. According to respondent, also annexed to the
complaint was a photostatic copy of the letter[1]
sent by petitioner to her which was the basis of the complaint.
The complaint was amended on August 4, 1964, with the further allegation that Torrechante suffered
moral damages on account of the libelous letter sent by petitioner. On August 12, 1964, Judge Cabungcal, the
Municipal Judge at Real, was allowed by the Court of First Instance to
inhibit himself from the case.
Accordingly, Judge Juntereal of the Municipality of Infanta, Quezon, was designated to hear the case
at the Municipality of Real in place of Judge Cabungcal.
On October 28, 1964, Judge Juntereal issued a warrant of arrest
for petitioner. The officer’s return
shows that this was served on petitioner on December 16, 1964.[2]
She was not detained however, because of the bail bond admittedly prepared and
filed by her even as early as July 24, 1964
yet.[3]
On April 23, 1965, the case was called for the second stage of
the preliminary investigation.
Petitioner appeared without counsel and she asked for postponement which
was granted. On December 4, 1965,
petitioner filed a manifestation requesting that the preliminary investigation
which had been reset to December 11, 1965 be conducted in Lucena City where she
resides instead of at the
Municipality of Real.
Petitioner apparently failed to show up at Real on December 11,
1965 for the municipal court subsequently issued an order, dated January 13,
1966, stating that petitioner’s manifestation was an implied waiver of her
right to the preliminary investigation and ruling “x x x that
there is a prima-facie case
against the accused.”[4]
The case was then forwarded to the Court of First Instance.
On February 21, 1966, the provincial fiscal filed the information
for libel against petitioner
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon sitting at Lucena City. Petitioner was then able to secure
postponements of the first two dates set for the arraignment, which was ‘finally
reset on June 21, 1966. On this latter
date, without being arraigned, petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that there had neither been a preliminary examination nor investigation in the case.
The court a quo denied the motion, by its order dated June 22, 1966, ruling
that it had jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and “x x x that a
preliminary investigation had been previously
conducted in accordance with established procedure.[5]
When her motion for reconsideration failed, petitioner instituted the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
It is petitioner’s principal submission that the court a quo did
not acquire jurisdiction to try her for the offense Charged because: (1) the warrant of arrest was
defectively issued, and (2) there was
no preliminary investigation.
There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of arrest was
irregularly issued. Section 87 of the Judiciary Act as amended by
Republic Act 3828[6] requires that the Municipal Judge
issuing the same, personally examine
under oath the witnesses, and by searching questions
and answers which are to be reduced to writing.
Here, instead of searching questions and answers, we have only the affidavits of respondent and her one
witness. Moreover, said affidavits were
sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the
warrant of arrest.
However, the giving of bail bond by petitioner constitutes a
waiver of the irregularity attending
her arrest.[7]
Besides, by her other personal appearances before the municipal court and the
court a quo, petitioner
voluntarily submitted herself to the court’s Jurisdiction. Hence, the absence of preliminary examination
becomes moot already, the court having acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner and could therefore proceed with the preliminary investigation
proper.
Now, it was petitioner’s fault that no full dress preliminary investigation proper as
contemplated in Rule 112, Section 10, of the Rules of Court was conducted. She was aware that it had been set on
December 11, 1965, but apparently, petitioner failed to show up in court. She must have assumed that her
request-manifestation of December 4, 1965
would be granted. Following the ordinary
course of Judicial procedure, it must be presumed that the criminal case was
called for preliminary
investigation on December 11, 1965. Since petitioner did not show up, the court
considered this as waiver on her part.
There was nothing more left for the court to do but forward the records
of the case to the Court of First Instance upon finding the existence of prima
facie case against the accused.
Since petitioner had already been afforded the opportunity for
preliminary investigation proper and considering further that the municipal
judge, herself had already found a prima facie, case for libel,[8]
there was no more need for the provincial
fiscal to conduct his own preliminary investigation under Section 14 of Rule 112. Anyway, petitioner’s rights could still be
amply protected in the forthcoming trial of the cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition, for lack of merit, is hereby
dismissed. Costs against petitioner
Raquel Doce.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Acting Chief Justice, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
[1]
This is alleged to form part of the records below.
[2]
See back of Annex “D”, Rollo, p. 25.
[3]
Memorandum for Petitioner, Rollo,
pp. 92-93.
[4]
Annex “G” of Petition, Rollo, p. 28.
[5]
Annex “J” of Petition, Rollo:
p. 36.
[6]
Took effect on June 22, 1963.
[7]
U.S. v. Grant, 18 Phil. 122;
Carrington v. Peterson, 4
Phil. 134.
[8]
Note 4, supra