THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO RAMOS Y ANTONIO, ELADIO CALUYA Y VINUYA, SIXTO GABORNE Y LLUADER, EDUARDO SUBLECHERO Y CABUAT AND JOHN DOE ALIAS “…

People versus Gaborne

The Case

This is a criminal case for robbery with homicide, a capital offense, in which one of several accused, Sixto Gaborne, was sentenced to death after he pleaded guilty at arraignment without any evidence having been offered at all. From his place of detention he wrote a handwritten letter to the Department of Public Information, later referred to the Department of Justice and then endorsed to the Supreme Court, asking how he could be given a new trial, a panibagong paglilitis, because from the moment of his apprehension in Caloocan in December 1967 until the termination of his case in March 1970, all he did was sign his name whenever asked and obey orders, with no opportunity ever afforded him to be heard by a court of justice. The case matters because it is a leading application of the rule that a plea of guilty to a capital offense may not be accepted automatically; the trial court must first satisfy itself, by the steps laid down in the Court's prior decisions, that the accused fully understood the consequences of his plea.

Procedural History

Sixto Gaborne was arraigned before the lower court on January 9, 1968, assisted by counsel de oficio, and after the information was read to him he pleaded guilty. The trial court held the promulgation of sentence in abeyance until further notice. On March 5, 1970, the lower court rendered its decision sentencing him to death, treating his plea of guilty as admitting the crime and the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and superior strength alleged in the information. Gaborne then sent a handwritten letter seeking help for a new trial, which was referred to the Department of Public Information, then to the Department of Justice, and finally endorsed to the Supreme Court. In a resolution of June 11, 1974, the Court referred the matter for comment to his counsel de oficio and to the Solicitor General's Office. Counsel de oficio stressed that Gaborne was not clearly and fully informed of the nature of the offense charged nor fully advised of the consequences of his plea of guilty, so that the plea should be set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. The Solicitor General commented only that Gaborne could no longer avail of his right to testify in his own behalf after he had pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The Court then resolved the matter in this decision.

Facts

Sixto Gaborne was apprehended by the police force in Caloocan in December 1967. He was charged, together with several others, with robbery with homicide, a capital offense. The information alleged that the accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, at nighttime purposely sought to ensure the success of the crime committed and took advantage of their superior strength.

On January 9, 1968, Gaborne was arraigned and, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty after the information was read to him. The trial court merely held the promulgation of sentence in abeyance until further notice. No evidence was offered at all. On March 5, 1970, the lower court rendered its decision sentencing him to death, on the view that his plea of guilty admitted the commission of the crime as well as the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and superior strength alleged in the information.

From his apprehension in December 1967 to the termination of his case in March 1970, Gaborne claimed that all he did was sign his name whenever asked and obey orders, and that he was never given the chance to narrate his side before the court. He sought a new trial through a handwritten letter that eventually reached the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not a plea of guilty to a capital offense may be accepted by the trial court without first satisfying itself that the accused fully understood the nature of the offense charged and the consequences of his plea.
• Whether or not Sixto Gaborne is entitled to a new trial where the records show that no such care and circumspection attended the acceptance of his plea of guilty.

Applicable Provisions

The decision refers to the right of the accused to testify in his own behalf under the Revised Rules of Court, which the Solicitor General invoked against Gaborne:

Regarding his claim that he was not afforded the opportunity to present his side, he could no longer avail of his right to testify as witness in his behalf (Rule 115, Sec. 1, sub-section (d), Revised Rules of Court) after he had pleaded guilty to the crime upon being arraigned.

This bears on the case because the Court did not allow that procedural point to defeat the higher requirement of due process before a plea of guilty to a capital offense is accepted.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the acceptance of a plea of guilty to a capital offense demands care and circumspection. The order of the lower court of January 9, 1968 spoke for itself:

When this case was called for arraignment, the accused, Sixto Gaborne y Lluader, appeared assisted by Atty. Cecilio de la Merced, counsel de oficio, and after the information was read to him, voluntarily and spontaneously pleaded guilty to the crime charged. [In view thereof], let the promulgation of sentence be held in abeyance until further notice.

The Court stressed that the dire consequence of a plea of guilty is such that there must be a showing of a full understanding of what is entailed before there can be automatic acceptance of such a declaration. It is not enough, a circumstance not shown here, that counsel de oficio had performed his work diligently and well. It is even more imperative that the trial court, entrusted by the State with such a grave responsibility, should by the steps indicated in the Court's decisions satisfy itself that there was a full realization of the fate that awaits the person on the dock. Only then may a valid sentence be meted out, and only then is the law deemed complied with.

On the second issue, the Court found merit in the plea for a new trial. It relied on its consistent rulings from People versus Apduhan onward, reiterated in People versus Andaya, People versus Bacong, People versus Villafuerte, and People versus Daquioag, that there be due observance of the fundamental requirements of due process before a plea of guilty is accorded acceptance. Since that element was lacking in Gaborne's case, the Court granted him a new trial.

Doctrine

A plea of guilty to a capital offense cannot be accepted automatically. The trial court must first satisfy itself, by the steps laid down in Apduhan and the cases after it, that the accused fully understood the nature of the offense charged and the consequences of his plea. The diligence of counsel de oficio does not excuse the trial court from this duty, which rests on the State. Absent such a showing, the plea must be set aside and a new trial granted, for the constitutional rights of the accused and the accepted canons of procedure so require.

Disposition

The Court set aside the decision of the lower court of March 5, 1970 insofar as it concerned Sixto Gaborne and granted him a new trial, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the dire consequence of a plea of guilty is such that there must be a showing of a full understanding of what is entailed before there can be automatic acceptance of such a declaration. Examiners use this case on the duty of the trial court in accepting a plea of guilty to a capital offense and on the requirements of due process at arraignment.