G. R. No. L-22092. October 29, 1966
ANTONIO MAGALLANES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HEIRS OF LEON SARITA, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On October 23, 1934 Paulino Magallanes filed, with the
Bureau of Lands, Sales Application No. 19302 for a piece of public land located
in Cabasagan, Lala, Lanao, containing an area of approximately 100 hectares. The
application having been approved, public auction was conducted and the land was
awarded to Paulino Magallanes who was the highest bidder. In 1951 Paulino Magallanes died. Antonio
Magallanes, his son, purchased from his co-heirs their
right to the land.
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Lands
surveyed the land applied for and subdivided it into Lots Nos. 807, 808, and
809. Lot No. 809 comprising 61.2089 hectares was allotted to Paulino Magallanes.
On October 22,
1951 the
Director of Lands issued to Antonio Magallanes an
order denominated “Succession and Issuance of Patent”, the dispositive part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the survey of the
land having been executed and there being no adverse claim still pending
determination, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that patent be issued to Antonio Magallanes, x x x“
A month later Leon Sarita, thru Ireneo Sarita, filed B.L. Conflict No. 215(N) claiming one-half of
Lot No. 809 and alleging that said Lot was originally applied for by one Vicente
Constantino who sold his right thereon to Paulino Magallanes and Leon Sarita; that the two vendees agreed to divide the land
equally between them, that is, the eastern half to Leon Sarita and the western portion to Paulino Magallanes; and that since
1934 they have been in possession of their respective
portions.
Upon notice of Sarita’s claim, Antonio Magallanes
instituted an action to quiet title over Lot No. 809, in the Court of First
Instance of Lanao, docketed
as Civil Case No. 347-R. Said action resulted in a judgment in Antonio
Magallanes1 favor (Appendix B to Appellant’s brief) but an appeal was taken
therefrom to the Court of Appeals and is pending
decision therein.
On July
10, 1954
the Director of Lands gave due course to Leon Sarita’s
claim. Antonio Magallanes appealed such action to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who on June
17, 1955
sustained the decision of the Director of Lands. On October 11,
1955
Antonio Magallanes came to the Supreme Court on a
petition for certiorari. We however dismissed the petition without prejudice to
the filing of the proper action in the Court of First
Instance.
Accordingly, on February 27,
1956
Antonio Magallanes commenced an action for prohibition
against the Director of Lands and Leon Sarita. After
answer, the petition for prohibition was amended to include the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as party respondent and to annex some
documents. No further answer was filed by respondents who also failed to appear
during the hearing of the case. The court then declared them in default and
allowed Antonio Magallanes to present his
evidence.
On October 29,
1958 the
trial court rendered the following judgment granting the petition for
prohibition:
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing
considerations, petitioner ANTONIO MAGALLANES is hereby declared the absolute
owner and possessor of the land under Sales Application No. 19302, Lot 809,
Pls-13, in Cabasagan,
Municipality of Kolambugan (now
Municipality of Lala), Lanao. It is further declared that respondent Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had acted without
and in excess of their authority and jurisdiction in issuing the decision on
June 6, 1953, giving one-half to Leon Sarita of the
land of Antonio Magallanes in S.A. No. 19302, Lot 809,
Pls-13 (Exhibit ‘M’ ), and in denying the motion for reconsideration and new
trial on July 10, 1954 (Exhibit ‘P’-), and in affirming the decision dated July
17, 1955 (Exhibit ‘R’); and that said decisions are hereby declared NULL and
VOID and of no force and effect. And, lastly, the respondents are hereby
prohibited and enjoined from giving due course to the said
decisions.”
Leon Sarita appealed to the Court of Appeals but said court
dismissed the appeal for failure to timely pay the docketing fee. The judgment
having become final and executory, Antonio Magallanes moved for execution. Whereupon, the court issued
an order dated February 27,
1963
granting the motion for execution and ordered the issuance of a writ of
possession. This writ was served on the heirs of Leon Sarita but said heirs were reportedly still in possession of
the land litigated. On June 18,
1963
Antonio Magallanes charged said heirs for contempt of
court.
In the meantime, Leon Sarita moved to quash the writ of execution. His motion was
denied. On motion for reconsideration, the court set aside the writ of
possession by its order dated June 20,
1963. On
June 28,
1963 said
court denied the motion to hold Leon Sarita’s heirs in
contempt of court. On July 22,
1963 the
court also denied the motion to reconsider the two aforesaid orders. Antonio
Magallanes thereupon appealed “to this Court on
questions purely of law.
The questions are: (1) Could Leon
Sarita be heard to complain
against the issuance of the writ of possession considering that he was
previously adjudged in default? (2) Was it proper for the court to issue a writ
of possession? (3) Were the heirs of Leon Sarita in
contempt of court in continuing their possession over the land involved despite
the service of the writ of possession?
Default
An answer filed before the amendment stands as
answer to the amended complaint.[1]Accordingly, Leon Sarita‘ s answer to the original petition for prohibition
stood as his answer to the amended petition. His failure to present a new answer
would not put him in default. Default in the Court of First Instance arises only
upon failure to answer on time[2]not
merely for failure to appear during the hearing.
[3] Sarita therefore did not lose his standing in court. Consequently,
he had the right to appear in court and file a motion to quash the writ of
possession.
Writ of
Possession
Predicated on the judgment declaring Antonio Magallanes “absolute owner and possessor of the land”, the
lower court issued the writ of possession. We are faced with the question
whether or not the lower court acted properly in issuing a writ of possession
for the purpose of enforcing the aforesaid judgment.
Regardless of the lower court’s pronouncement on
the ownership of the land under litigation, the judgment itself would not
justify the issuance of a writ of possession. Such writ may only be issued where
an action is for the recovery of possession over real property.[4] The case brought by Antonio Magallanes in the Court of First Instance of Lanao was for prohibition, to forbid the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from, to quote the
prayer:
“x x x accepting and giving due course to the sales application
of respondent Leon Sarita, from giving force and
effect or executing their decisions, Annex ‘E’ and ‘J’, from further proceeding
in land conflict B. L. No. 215(N) and DANR No. 947 which are beyond their
respective jurisdictions or in excess and/or abuse of their
jurisdiction;”
A judgment in a special civil action for
prohibition is enforced, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 67 and Section 9, Rule 39,
of the Rules of Court, by serving a certified copy of the judgment upon the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person concerned. Chief Justice Moran
has this to say on the point:
“The execution of a final judgment in these special
actions is similar to the execution of special judgments as provided in Rule 39,
section 9. As a matter of fact, the judgments rendered in these special civil
actions are classified as special under sec. 9 of Rule 39, because they require
the doing of an act other than the payment of money or the sale or delivery of
real or personal property. x x x“[5]
The procedure of execution is such because the
function of prohibition is to prevent a power from being exercised without or in
excess of jurisdiction.[6]An execution,
.e.g., writ of possession, contrary to the procedure set forth in Section 9 of
Rule 67 abovementioned and for a purpose foreign to the stated function, would
be void. The writ of possession in question suffers from the same
fate.
Contempt
For alleged disobedience to the writ of possession
mentioned above, the heirs of Leon Sarita were charged
for contempt. The court however denied the motion for contempt. We see no error
in the court’s action. Needless to say, said heirs could not be bound by a void
writ (Caluag v. Pecson, 82
Phil. 8).
WHEREFORE, the order of June 20, 1963 setting aside the writ
of possession; the order of June 28, 1963 denying the motion to hold the heirs
of Leon Sarita in contempt of court; and, the order of
July 22, 1963 denying the motion to reconsider the two aforementioned orders,
are hereby affirmed. With costs against
petitioner-appellant.
SO
ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez
and Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Barrera, J., on leave.
[1] Section 3, Rule 9, now Section 3, Rule 11, Rules
of Court.
[2] Section 6, Rule 35, now Section 1, Rule 18, Rules
of Court Evangelista v. Soriano, 92 Phil. 190,
193.
[3]
Rosario, et al. v. Alonso, et al., G.R. No. L-17330,
June 29, 1963.
[4] Manlapas v. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298.
[5] Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Edition, Vol.
2, p. 198.
[6] Go Hap v. Rosales, 69 Phil.
343.