THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GETULIO PANTOJA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This murder case is before
us for review of the sentence of death passed upon the accused by the Court of
First Instance of Quezon.

Late in the night of June
28, 1957, in the Barrio
of Malinao, Atimonan,
Quezon, a group of seven young men serenaded the house, where Estelita Erotes
lived.  Invited to come up, the young men accepted the invitation.  When Wenceslao
Hernandez was seated beside Estelita, an uninvited Philippine Army Sergeant, Getulio
Pantoja, in T-Shirt, came up and asked Hernandez to
allow him to sit beside Estelita, but Hernandez
refused the request.  The time was
about 1:30 A.M., June 29. 
Pantoja said nothing and showed no sign of
anger.  However, he immediately left
and went to his camp about half a
kilometer distant, put on his fatigue uniform, got a rifle, went back to the house and stationed himself on the
stairway.  The time was about 2:00 A.M. 
At this time, the serenaders left the house to go to and serenade another house in the Northern part
of the Barrio.  Pantoja followed the group. 
When the serenaders had walked a distance of
about thirty meters with Pantoja following
them at a distance of about five
meters, Pantoja suddenly shouted “Ano yan? Ano
yan?“.  Turning their heads back they saw Pantoja raise the garand
rifle and aim at them.  Before any
of them could run away, Pantoja fired two
shots in rapid succession.  The first
shot hit Angel Marasigan who instantly fell on his
back.  The second shot hit Wenceslao Hernandez who fell down.  The other serenaders
scampered away for safety.  Pantoja, who had walked nearer, then fired one more shot at the prostrate body of Marasigan and four more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez.

The accused, testifying in his own defense, admitted that the
shots he fired from the garand
rifle killed Marasigan and Hernandez.  The autopsy report attributed the deaths to
internal hemorrhage and the destruction of vital organs.

The lower court found the defendant
guilty of double murder,
that is, of a complex crime, and sentenced him to the penalty of death.

We immediately noted that the lower court erred in finding the
appellant guilty of a complex crime. 
Appel­lant’s brief, however, does not contain an assignment of this
error.  This notwithstanding, we can
consider the error, the case under review being a criminal case.

It is well known to
students of criminal law, as early as thirty-five years ago, that according to
Article 48, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, there
are two classes of complex crimes.  The
first class comprises cases where a single act constitutes two or more
crimes.  The second class covers cases
where one crime is the necessary means for
committing the other.  The case at bar
does not fall under the first class because in this case there were two acts,
two shots, one killing Marasigan, and the other
killing Hernandez.  If there were only
one shot killing both Marasigan and Hernandez,
there would have been a com­plex crime, double murder.  The second class, obviously, does not cover
the case at bar.  We are of the
considered opinion that the appellant is guilty of two separate and distinct murders and that he should suffer
the penalty for each murder.

Appellant contends
that the qualifying circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery did
not exist.  The contention is tenable
with respect to evident premedita­tion because the appellant only had about half an hour (1:30 to 2:00 A.M.) for meditation and
reflection from the time he left
the house, went to his camp, put on his fatigue uniform, got a garand rifle and returned to said house, followed the serenaders a short distance and then fired the two
shots.  The time in the circumstances was
insufficient for full meditation and reflection.  It was insufficient, in the juridical sense, for
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken
to its warning.  The contention is
untenable with respect to treachery.  The
appellant followed the serenaders as they walked,
made no indication that he would shoot, and then sud­denly fired from behind
two shots in rapid succession at Marasigan and
Hernandez from a distance of about five meters. 
Under the circumstances, clearly there was treachery.

Appellant contends that the generic aggravating circumstances of
abuse of public position and ignominy were not present.  The contention is meritorious.  There is nothing to show that the appellant
took advantage of his being a sergeant in the Philippine Army in order to
commit the crimes.  The mere fact that he
was in fatigue uniform and had an army rifle at the time is not suffi­cient to establish that he misused his public position in the
commission of the crimes.  With regard to
ignominy the mere fact that the appellant fired one more shot at the prostrate
body of Marasigan and four more shots at the prostrate
body of Hernandez is not sufficient to show the existence of said aggravating
circumstance.

Appellant contends that he
should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.  The contention is
tenable.  The evidence shows that
immediately after the commission of the murders, the appellant voluntarily
surrendered to his detachment camp commander to whom he also surrendered the garand rifle, and that he was
ordered confined in the stockade.

The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code).  There being one mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, the penalty for
each murder should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The appellant contends that the lower court erred in rejecting
his defense of insanity.  The contention lacks merit.  The legal presumption of sanity is rein­forced
by the evidence showing that when he committed the crimes, appellant was calm
and collected, and did not show any sign of anger.  The fact that he fired four more shots at the
prostrate body of Hernandez, who had refused his request to be allowed to sit
beside Estelita, shows that revenge was in his
heart.  The report of Dr. Cesar Catindig of the V. Luna General Hospital where appellant
was confined for one month by order of the trial court does not show that
appellant was insane.  It merely shows
that he was suffering from
psychoneurotic depressive reaction and psychoneurotic dissociative
reaction.  The report, however,
concludes:

“In the absence of reliable information it could not be
ascertained whether the crime imputed to him was committed when he was in such
a state of mind.”

That part of the judgment
below awarding compensatory damages in the amounts of P6,000 to the heirs of Angel Marasigan
and P6,000 to the heirs of Wenceslao Hernandez should
be modified.  In 1947, when the Project
of Civil Code was drafted, the Code Commission fixed the sum of P3,000 as the minimum amount of compensatory damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict.  The Project of Civil Code was approved by
both Houses of the Congress in 1949 as the New Civil Code of the Philippines,
which took effect in 1950.  In 1948 in the case of People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil.
424, the Supreme Court awarded P6,000 as compensatory damages for death caused
by a crime “con­sidering the difference between the value of the present
currency and that at the time when the law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 was
enacted.” The law referred to was Commonwealth Act No. 284 which took
effect in 1938.  In 1948, the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso was one-third of its pre-war purchasing
power.  In 1950, when the New Civil Code
took effect, the minimum amount of compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict was fixed in Article 2206 of
the Code at P3,000. 
The article repealed by implication
Commonwealth Act No.284.  Hence, from the time the New Civil Code took
effect, the Courts could properly have awarded P9,000
as compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict.  It is common
knowledge that from 1948 to the present (1968), due to economic circumstances
beyond governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso has
declined further such that the rate of exchange now in the free market is
U.S.$1.00 to almost P4.00 Philippine pesos. 
This means that the present purchasing power of the Philippine peso is
one-fourth of its pre-war purchasing power. 
We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the amount of award of
compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
should now be P12,000.

Parenthetically, we should point out that, in proper cases,
besides compensatory damages in the sum of P12,000,
the courts may also award additional sums as further compensatory damages for
loss of earnings and for support.  The
courts may likewise award additional sums as moral damages and as exemplary
damages.  (Arts. 2206 and 2230, New Civil
Code.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the judgment of the court below is hereby modified by:  1. Sentencing the appellant for each murder to
an indeterminate penalty of from 15 years to 20 years; 2. Ordering the
appellant to pay the heirs of Angel Marasigan the sum
of P12,000 as compensatory damages, and to pay the
heirs of Wenceslao Hernandez the sum of P12,000 as
compensatory damages.

Costs
against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.