THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE, REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER, ATTY. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUSTICE ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, CHAIRMAN, NINETEENTH (19TH) …

Chavez Miranda Aseoche versus Dicdican

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche, through its founding partner Attorney Francisco Chavez, against Justice Isaias Dicdican, Chairman of the Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals stationed in Cebu City. The complaint charges the Justice with violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct — the canon that commands a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities — by allegedly taking part in a case after he had voluntarily inhibited himself from it. The case matters because it is a clean lesson on two things every reviewee must hold: the burden of proof in administrative proceedings against magistrates, and the rule that an administrative complaint is not the remedy for an allegedly wrong judicial order.

Procedural History

The matter began as an administrative complaint, not as an ordinary civil action, so it traveled directly to the Supreme Court through the Office of the Court Administrator. The complaint arose from incidents in a special civil action for certiorari pending before the Court of Appeals in Cebu City. The complainant first sought the Justice's inhibition; the Justice voluntarily inhibited himself. When the Justice's name later appeared as a signatory of a resolution of the Court of Appeals, the complainant filed a manifestation and motion, and later a reiterative motion, asking him to maintain his inhibition. From these events the administrative complaint was born, and the Supreme Court resolved it in this decision.

Facts

A student, Ma. Krissyl Asparen, sued St. Mary Mazzarello School and Sister Maria Pacencia Bandalan in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, seeking nullification of disciplinary sanctions and damages, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and injunction. The trial court, through Judge Elumba, issued a writ of preliminary injunction lifting the disciplinary sanctions. The school then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which issued a temporary restraining order penned by Justice Dicdican, preventing enforcement of the trial court's order and writ.

The complainant and the student then sought the Justice's inhibition, arguing that during his private practice he had represented religious organizations and institutions, and that the petitioner school is run by a religious organization while petitioner Sister Bandalan is a nun of that organization. In a resolution dated 1 April 2005, the Justice admitted on record that he had once served as counsel of religious organizations but denied that this affected his impartiality. He nonetheless voluntarily inhibited himself to disabuse the minds of the student and the complainant of any suspicion.

Despite the inhibition, the Justice's name later appeared as one of the signatories of a resolution dated 21 November 2006 admitting the petitioner school's memorandum and deeming the petition submitted for decision. The complainant filed motions asking him to maintain his inhibition. The Justice answered that he never participated again after his inhibition, that the case file was no longer with him, and that the assailed resolution was actually signed by Justices Barza, Baltazar-Padilla, and Gonzales-Sison. Records showed the case was reraffled after his inhibition, reassigned to Justice Lanzanas, then to Justice Barza after a reorganization, with Justice Sison designated as third member. A court stenographer had mistakenly included the Justice's name as a signatory, and she sent him a letter of apology.

Issues

• Whether or not the complainant proved, by competent evidence, that Justice Dicdican violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and showed bias and partiality.
• Whether or not an administrative complaint is the proper remedy for a party aggrieved by the orders of a magistrate.

Applicable Provisions

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

This is the standard the complaint invokes, and the Court measures the Justice's conduct against it.

Rule 2.01 of the same Code provides:

A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

This rule supplies the test of impartiality that the complainant says was breached.

Rule 2.03 of the same Code provides:

A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

This rule addresses the alleged influence of the Justice's former ties to religious organizations.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the complaint is devoid of merit. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant, and if he fails to show the facts satisfactorily, the respondent need not prove his defense. The Court stressed that even in administrative cases, evidence against a magistrate for a grave offense must be competent and derived from direct knowledge, and that the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails absent contrary evidence. The complainant offered only naked allegations, conjecture, and speculation. The Justice, on the other hand, adequately explained that after his voluntary inhibition he no longer participated, and that his perceived participation was a typographical mistake, confirmed by the stenographer's letter of apology.

On the second issue, the Court reiterated that a party's remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate, lies with the proper reviewing court, not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint. Where some other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.

Doctrine

First, in administrative proceedings against a magistrate, the burden of proof rests on the complainant; bare allegations, conjecture, and speculation cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Second, evidence against a magistrate for a grave offense must be competent and derived from direct knowledge. Third, an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for a party aggrieved by judicial orders; the remedy is with the reviewing court. These rules tie directly to Canon 2 and its Rules 2.01 and 2.03, which set the standard of impartiality but demand proof before a magistrate may be disciplined.

Disposition

The administrative complaint against Justice Isaias Dicdican was dismissed for lack of merit.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the burden of proving impropriety rests on the complainant, and the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails over bare speculation. Examiners use this case to test the burden of proof in administrative complaints against judges and the rule that a wrong judicial order is corrected by appeal or certiorari, not by an administrative charge.