G.R. No. L-22088. June 30, 1964
(With Resolution of July 30, 1964)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
City Police Department, filed on July 19, 1963, in their behalf and for
the benefit of others similarly situated, a petition for prohibition
and injunction against the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, the
Mayor, Acting Chief of Police, Treasurer, and Auditor, all of Caloocan
City, before the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging therein
that said Acting Commissioner of Civil Service re-examined on his own
accord on various dates the official status of said petitioners and
ordered them to take qualifying examinations for the rank which they
respectively held, and that having refused to take the required
examination, the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service in a letter dated
June 21, 1963, addressed to his co-respondent city mayor, terminated
“effective immediately” the services of the petitioners, transmitting
copies of said letter to the city treasurer and city auditor of
Caloocan City. The petition also alleges that the chief of police of
Caloocan City took cognizance of the termination of petitioners’
services. Petitioners prayed that a judgment be rendered declaring that
their demotion in status, rank and salary, as well as the termination
of their services are illegal, while enjoining the respondent Acting
Commissioner of Civil Service from compelling the petitioners to take
the qualifying examination and respondents Caloocan City officials from
carrying out the order of said Commissioner in effecting the
termination of petitioners’ services and stoppage of their salaries as
a consequence thereof. Petitioners likewise prayed that a preliminary
preventive injunction be issued enjoining petitioners’ re-examination
of status, rank and salary, or taking the required qualifying
examination, as well as a preliminary mandatory injunction directing
all respondents to restore petitioners to the positions they were
respectively holding and to pay them their salaries as if there had
been no interruption in the payment thereof.
On July 25, 1963, the court a quo issued an order directing
respondents to show cause why the injunction prayed for should not be
issued. Counsel for both petitioners and respondents having waived the
presentation of evidence and submitted the petition for resolution on
the basis of the complaint and its annexes, the court a quo issued an
order on August 5, 1963 whereby, upon the filing of the requisite bond,
it enjoined respondent’ Commissioner of Civil Service during the
pendency of the case and until further orders from the court from
continuing the re-examination of petitioners’ status, rank and salary
and the enforcement of his directive requiring them to take entrance or
qualifying examination, as well as the reduction of their salaries
ami/or the termination of their services. It also ordered all the
respondents to restore petitioners to their respective positions and
pay them all their salaries as if there had been no interruption in the
payment thereof.
On August 8, 1963, the court a quo motu proprio, modified the above
order by eliminating the portion of the dispositive part pertaining to
the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction against all the
respondent Caloocan city officials on the ground that the acts therein
directed to be performed would have to be effected outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the court which under the law it cannot do.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
interposed the present petition for certiorari.
The main purpose of this petition is to have the court a quo
reinstate in full its order of August 5, 1963 which grants not only the
petition for preliminary preventive injunction but also the petition
for preliminary mandatory injunction both against respondent Acting
Commissioner of Civil Service and against all the officials of Caloocan
City who are respondents herein with a view to the immediate
restoration of petitioners to the positions they were respectively
holding and the payment of their salaries as if there had been no
interruption in their payment. In other words, what petitioners seek to
accomplish in this petition is the nullification of the order of the
court a quo of August 9, 1963 which modified its original order of
August, 5, 1963 by eliminating the mandatory directive against
respondent officials of Caloocan City on the ground that said court had
no power nor authority to make said directive effective beyond its
territorial jurisdiction.
The dispositive part of the order of August 5, 1963, reads:
“WHEREFORE, upon filing a bond in the sum of
10,000.00 subject to the approval of the Court, the Acting:
Commissioner of Civil Service is hereby enjoined, during the pendency
of this action and until further orders from this Court, from
continuing the ‘re-examination’ of petitioners’ status, rank and
salary, and enforcing his directive requiring the petitioners to take
entrance and qualifying examinations as well as the deduction and
reimbursements of salaries effected by said ‘re-examination’ and/or
termination of employment while the respondents Abelardo Subido, in his
capacity as Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, Macario B. Asistio,
in his capacity as Mayor, Dominador M. Danan, in his capacity as Acting
Chief of Police, the City Treasurer and City Auditor, alt of Caloocan
City, are further directed to restore petitioners to the service, in
their respective positions and to pay them all their salaries as if
there had been no interruption in the payment thereof.”
And the dispositive portion of the order of August 9, 1963 also reads:
“WHEREFORE, upon filing a bond in the sum of P1.000,
subject to the approval of the Court, the Acting Commissioner is hereby
enjoined, during the pendency of this action and until further orders
from this Court, from continuing the ‘re-examination’ of petitioners’
status, runk and salary, and enforcing his directive requiring the
petitioners to take entrance and qualifying examinations as well as the
deductions and reimbursements of salaries effected by said
‘re-examinations’ and/or termination of employment.”
It may thus be seen that the main issue raised herein refers to the
power or authority of the court a quo to enforce its mandatory
directive beyond its territorial jurisdiction for which reason it
amended its original order of August 5, 1963 by eliminating therein the
portion pertaining to the directive against respondent officials of
Caloocan City. But as it appears the court a quo maintained its
mandatory directive against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service
who was required to restore petitioners to the positions they were
respectively holding and to pay them their salaries as if there was no
interruption in the payment thereof, even if it eliminated a similar
directive against his co-respondents the mayor, the chief of police,
the city treasurer, and the city auditor, all of Caloocan City. Since
the latter officers of Caloocan City gave notice to petitioners’
termination of their services merely in obedience to the directive
given to them by respondent Civil Service Commissioner in the several
letters sent to them involving the re-examination of the official
status of petitioners and requiring them to take the qualifying
examination if they wanted to retain their positions, a directive which
responds officials of Caloocan City acquiesced in by terminating their
services, this Court is of the view that a mandatory directive against
respondent city officials of Caloocan City is unnecessary thereby
making practically ineffective and superfluous the elimination of such
directive made by the court a quo in its original order of August 5,
1963. Respondent Civil Service Commissioner having been ordered to
restore petitioners to the positions they were respectively holding who
were separated because of his directive to his co-respondents, this
official has no other alternative than to recall or hold in abeyance
the letters of re-examination and termination of service he had
addressed to his co-respondents and to order petitioners reinstatement
in the meantime pending the disposition of the main case on the merits.
We, therefore, see no reason in further passing upon the issue raised
herein as already pointed out.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. No costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
July 30, 1964
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Respondents seek to clarify our decision rendered on June 30, 1964
declaring unnecessary the mandatory directive against respondent
officials of Caloocan City prayed for herein for the reasons expressed
in said decision.
On August 5, 1903, respondent judge issued an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, upon filing a bond in the sum of
P10.000, subject to the approval of the Court, the Acting Commissioner
of Civil Service is hereby enjoined, during the pendency of this action
and until further orders from this Court, from continuing the
‘re-examination’ of petitioners’ status, rank and salary, and enforcing
his directive requiring the petitioners to take entrance and qualifying
examinations as well as the deduction and reimbursements of salaries
effected by said ‘re-examination’ and/or termination of employment
while the respondents Abelardo Subido, in his capacity as Acting
Commissioner of Civil Service, Macario B. Asistio, in his capacity as
Mayor, Dominador M. Danan, in his capacity ui Acting Chief of Police,
the City Treasurer and City Auditor, all of Caloocan City, are further
directed to restore petitioners to the service, in their respective
positions and to pay them all their salaries as if there had been no
interruption in the payment thereof.”
In the instant petition, petitioners state in paragraph 4 that on
August 9, 1963 respondent judge, motu proprio, modified his previous
order of August 5, 1963 by eliminating the portion of its dispositive
part pertaining to the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondent Caloocan City officials. This statement implies that
the respondent judge left intact his mandatory directive against
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to restore petitioners to
their respective positions and to pay them all their salaries as if
there had been no interruption in the payment thereof. It is for this
reason that this Court declared that the relief sought for in the
petition is unnecessary because its purpose could be accomplished by
enforcing merely the directive issued against said Commissioner of
Civil Service.
It, however, appears that in issuing the amendatory order of August
9,1963 premised on the ground that he has no authority to issue a
directive which has to be effected outside of his territorial
jurisdiction, respondent judge did not merely eliminate the mandatory
directive against respondent Caloocan City officials but likewise that
issued against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service contrary to the
main purpose behind the amendment of his order of August 5, 1963.
We believe, however, that the elimination of the mandatory directive
against respondent Commissioner of Civil Service from the dispositive
part of the amendatory order of August 9, 1963 is merely due to an
oversight considering the main purpose that prompted him to amend its
order of August 5,1963 as may be seen frotn the following portion of
his amendatory order of August 9, 1963:
“In the dispositive part of the order dated August
6, 1963, this Court directed the respondents Mayor, Acting Chief of
Police, Trearurer and Auditor, all of Culoocan City, to restore the
petitioners to the service in their respective positions and to pay
them all their salaries as if there had been no interruption in the
payment thereof.“The above-named respondents are officials
of Caloocan City and the acts they were directed to perform would be
effected outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In the
case, however, of Acosta versus Alvendia, et. al., 109 Phil., 1017, the
Supreme Court held in effect that the authority of Courts of First
Instance to control or restrain arts by means of the writ of
preliminary injunction is limited to acts which are being committed
within the territorial boundaries of the respective provinces and
districts.
Accordingly, the portion of the dispositive part of the order dated
August 5, 1963 pertaining to the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction againrt the officials of Caloocan City is not in order and
should, therefore, be eliminated.”
It thus appears that the main purpose of the amendatory order is
merely to eliminate the mandatory directive against respondent Caloocan
City officials because, as the same order states, “the portion of the
dispositive part of the order dated August 5, 1963 pertaining to the
issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction against the officials
of Caloocan City is not in order and should, therefore, be eliminated.”
However, in the dispositive portion of said order there appears
eliminated not only the mandatory directive against the Caloocan City
officials but also that against respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service. Hence, as already stated, the elimination of the directive
against the latter official is merely due to an oversight This flaw
should be here corrected.
Wherefore, the petition for certicrari is hereby granted o.s regards
the portion of respondent Judge’s order of August 0, 1963 which
eliminates the mandatory directive against respondent Commissioner of
Civil Service in the sense that such mandatory directive as it appears
in the order of August 5, 1963 is hereby deemed restored. The petition
is dismissed with regard to the prayer for relief against the Caloocan
City officials. No costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.