G.R. No. L-7767. October 26, 1955
JEAN V. PLUMELET, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MORALES SHIPPING CO., INC., RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
BENGZON, J.:
P14,200 with legal interest, made by the Manila court of first instance in favor
of herein respondent and against Jean V. Plumelet.
According to the appellate court,
On May 31, 1948 the Morales Shipping Co., Inc., a corporation engaged in
coastwise shipping employed Jean V. Plumelet as an agent to secure cargo for its
vessels, “upon condition that the bills Of lading were to be in the name of
appellee as carrier. On or about June 11 of the same year appellant informed the
manager of appellee that he had secured cargo from the Bureau of Public Works,
consigned to the district engineer of Marinduque, at Boac, to be loaded on board
the MV San Vicente. Pursuant to his request, the said vessel was docked
alongside Muelle de la Industria on the following day, at 7:00 a.m., and was
actually loaded with cargo consisting of bridge spans and parts, the loading of
which was accomplished within the agreed period of 24 hours. The stipulated
freight was the sum of P4,500. The evidence discloses that appellant made the
contract with the Bureau of Public Works in his own name, without disclosing his
principal nor the fact that the vessel on which the cargo was to be loaded
belonged to appellant. It also appears that the corresponding bill of lading
issued in the name of appellant made it appear that the latter was the owner of
the vessel on which the cargo was to be loaded. Due to these circumstances,
appellee demanded from appellant, as a measure of self-protection, that the
freight be paid in advance, that is, before the sailing of the vessel.
Appellant, however, was unable to make payment as demanded and asked that he be
given time to raise the necessary money. For this reason the cargo in question
remained on board from June 12, 1948 to July 21, of the same year, during which
time appellant unsuccessfully tried to raise the needed money. He finally gave
up and was constrained to unload the cargo from the vessel on the last mentioned
date.”
The record shows that on June 17, 1948 the respondent wrote herein petitioner
demanding payment of the freight plus demurrage for four days, and indicating
its unwillingness to unload the cargo unless payment was made. (Annex B of
complaint.) It also shows that on June 18, 1948 respondent wrote to the Bureau
of Public Works, the letter Exhibit I saying partly:
“The vessel San Vicente has been alongside the Muelle de la Industria, since
8:00 a.m. on Friday the 12th of June, and was completely loaded by you by Monday
evening June 14, but has been delayed until now pending some sensible agieement
between the Bureau and ourselves. Unfortunately, in the meantime we will have to
retain a lien upon this cargo.”
On July 1, 1948, said shipping corporation filed its complaint which, as
amended, sought to recover from Plumelet on three causes of action: (a)
value of freightage, P4,500; (b) demurrage for delaying the ship’s
departure at the rate of P400 per day, or a total of P14,200 and (c)
damages in the amount of P12,000 for its inability to accept cargo for shipment
offered by the Atlantic Gulf & Refining Co.
After due hearing, the Manila court found the first and third claims to be
unjustified, and dismissed the same. However, on the second cause of action,
demurrage, it rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount demanded, with
legal interest from July 1, 1948.
Plumelet appealed to the Court of Appeals; the Morales Shipping Co., Inc. did
not; wherefore only one question was submitted to the appellate Court:
Plumelet’s liability for demurrage.
Articles 652, 656, 689 and 691 of the Code of Commerce speak of demurrage: an
amount stipulated in the charter party to be paid to the shipowner for any delay
in the sailing of his ship. It is payable by the charterer or shipper.
But Plumelet was not the charterer nor shipper. He was an agent of
the shipowner, as was expressly found by the Court of Appeals. Hence, demurrage
is not by law chargeable to him.
It is alleged however that being responsible for the delay of the vessel’s
departure, he is liable for damages. Admitting for the moment, that he must pay
damages, such damages have to be proven.
“Except where the law authorizes the imposition of punitive or exemplary
damages, a party claiming damages must establish by competent evidence the
amount of such damages, and courts cannot give judgment for a greater amount
than that actually proven.” (Marker vs. Garcia, 5 Phil., 657; Sanz
vs. Lavin, 6 Phil., 299; Rubio vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 39.)“The Civil Code has made no provision for nominal nor punitive damages.”
(Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil., 284.)
The amount of demurrage stipulated or supposed to be stipulated between
shipowner and shipper may rot be legally charged to Plumelet, for the simple
reason that he had not agreed to pay it. The courts below held
erroneously that such rate of demurrage was chargeable to him.
But, was he responsible for the delay? As stated at the beginning, because
the freightage had not been paid in advance, Plumelet was given by the shipowner
time to raise the necessary money. There is no finding that Plumelet, as agent,
had been instructed previously by his principal to collect the freight charges
in advance.[1] In fact the Court of
Appeals impliedly found that no such instruction had been given, when it said
“if such agreement was not a part of the original contract, appellant accepted
the condition when the demand therefor was made * * * and then asked for time to
look for money”. Now, supposing this acceptance (by petitioner) was a question
of fact[2] on which we are concluded by
the appellate court’s statement, still we find it difficult to conclude that he
also agreed that in case he failed to get money, he would pay
damages—and at the rate of demurrage at that. And as no period was fixed
within which Plumelet should produce the money (and the freight kept aboard
pending production of the money), when he finally gave up, it was a case of
damages without legal wrong, loss without injury.[3] Damages both to the shipowner and
to Plumelet (who lost his commission) for which no recovery can be had by
either. Morales Shipping Co. can allege no wrong, because it had agreed
to give Plumelet time to look for money— and the latter looked for it. In fact
as petitioner contends, it “assumed the risks of petitioner failing to raise
money for advance freightage.”
The resultant juridical situation is the same as if Plumelet, having
previously been instructed to require freight in advance, found no shippers
willing to advance. Obviously the agent on commission basis will not be
responsible to his principal for damages if he fails to find business for such
principal.
It might be argued that as the period was not fixed (for producing the
money), a reasonable time must be understood. Granted
arguendo. Four days would not be an unreasonable period. At the end of
it the shipping company could have unloaded when the freightage was not
forthcoming—and then sailed. But it chose to retain the cargo and wait. It even
gave notice to Plumelet in its letter Annex B, that it would not unload
it, unless demurrage was paid for the four days. Now then, it being clear
that said shipping company had no right to damage for the four days (reasonable
time to look for money), the retention of the cargo[3a]—and delay of vessel’s departure—was no
longer imputable to Plumelet, since he had not prevented—could not have
prevented—the shipowner from unloading it, and sailing, and such retention took
place because the shipowner asserted erroneously[4] that it had a right to demurrage.
Apparently the respondent’s case rests on this implicit proposition: had
Plumelet not issued the bill of lading in his own name [5]—instead of the shipowner—the Morales
Shipping Company would not have demanded payment in advance “as a matter of
self-protection”, and no delay would have happened. However it may be asked:
protection against what? Evidently not against failure or refusal of the Bureau
of Public Works to pay the freight. Most probably against the possibility of
said Bureau’s directly paying to Plumelet, and the latter’s pocketing the whole
amount. Yet that contingency could easily have been remedied, without advance
payment: After ascertaining from the Bureau that the freightage had not been
advanced, Morales Shipping Company could have undertaken the trip to Boac, after
notifying the Bureau, and the General Auditing Office, in writing that it was
transporting the cargo, that it was the owner of the vessel, that Plumelet was
merely its agent and that payment should be made directly to it—and not to
Plumelet. Morales Shipping would have run no risk, because the law preserved its
lien on the goods loaded and transported; and Morales Shipping Company actually
knew that law. (See Annex B of complaint.)
Let it not be argued, in this connection, that inasmuch as Plumelet as agent
had not disclosed the principal, the latter had no claim against, and therefore
could not have directly addressed the Bureau; because the vessel belonged to
Morales Shipping Company and it could claim against the shipper, under article
1717 of the Civil Code, especially after the latter had been advised of such
ownership. And in fact said shipping company communicated with the Bureau on the
shipment.
Wherefore the shipowner’s demand for prepayment seems to be an unwarranted
precaution, and the delay should not be chargeable to Plumelet. Unless the
latter expressly or impliedly agreed to pay for it—which he did not.
Neither may Plumelet be made responsible on account of his having made the
contract in his own name instead of the principal’s; because supposing he was
actually instructed [6] to make the
contract (bill of lading) in the name of the shipping company,[7] the latter waived such
irregularity when it agreed to carry the cargo, provided freightage was
advanced. Obviously both parties hoped that Plumelet could persuade the shipper
to advance the freightage or could secure money somewhere else; but he failed,
after trying.[8] Damnum absque
injuria as explained hereinbefore.
Looking at the matter from the angle most favorable to plaintiff, the most
that may be said is that Plumelet promised to produce the money, not only to
try; i.e., he made an absolute promise to pay.[9] But then he will be liable for damages
only if he defaulted. And he could not have defaulted because no
deadline had been fixed. And supposing he defaulted, the only amount of damages
recoverable for the delay would be legal interest of P4,500 it being the rule in
this jurisdiction that “in the absence of fraud or stipulation, the only damages
collectible for non-payment of money are limited to interest—legal
interest”.[10]
For the reasons herein explained, the decision under review is reversed and
the petitioner absolved from liability. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
[1] Freightage need not be prepaid,
because shipowner may retain cargo at port of destination, until freightage is
paid.
[2] Might be a question of law.
[3] Damnum absque injuria.
See 17 C. J., 1125; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil., 542.
[3a] Even if Plumelet owed demurrage,
cargo could not be legally retained, because he did not own it.
[4] Not to say, out of cupidity.
[5] This is debatable, the bill of
lading Exhibit G being authority to “L.C.T. San Vicente M, Captain J. V.
Plumelet” to transport the goods; and the receipt being signed by “J. Loderico
(captain).” Loderico was probably captain of San Vicente, and the bill could be
considered issued in the name of the vessel and of shipowner. (Cf. Wing Kee
vs. Monangahela, 44 Phil., 464.)
[6] Ordinarily an agent may contract
either in his own name or in that of the principal.
[7] The letter of Annex A, the
shipping company authorizing him to look for cargoes did not so
specify. True its letter Annex B says “we authorized you to negotiate
cargoes * * * in our name”. But that letter was issued June 17, after the
cargoes had already been loaded (and the contract presumably signed) on June 12.
[8] It is probable that upon receipt
of the shipowner’s letter Exhibit I, the Bureau of Public Works became doubly
reluctant to advance the freightage to Plumelet.
[9] He was absolved on the first cause
of action to recover this amount, however; and respondent did not appeal.
[10] Sun Life vs. Rueda
Hermanos, 37 Phil., 844; Lopez vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil., 98; Tin Fian
vs. Tan, 14 Phil., 126.