DOMINGO T. LAO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE MOYA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND LAO KANG SUY, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction has been instituted by the petitioner Domingo Lao
in order to set aside the pre-trial order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued on April 13, 1964 and its subsequent orders of January 25, 1965;
April 2, 1965, and May 3, 1965, all of which authorized the sale of the Hacienda
Mapaya, located in Occidental Mindoro
and owned by petitioner, which had been the object of attachment.

The records disclose that on August 7, 1963, respondent Lao Kang Suy
sued petitioner in the lower court demanding a total sum of P138,000, with a
prayer for preliminary attachment.  Upon
the filing of a bond of P140,000, Hacienda Mapaya was
attached.

Subsequently, petitioner filed his answer and at his instance,
coupled with the filing of the necessary counter-bond, the attachment was
ordered lifted.

On November 20, 1963,
respondent amended his complaint by raising the total sum demanded to
P419,670.81.  The court then, by order
dated December 18, 1963,
directed petitioner to post an additional counter-bond of P330,000.  A motion to reconsider was filed but
denied.  A second motion to reconsider
followed.  On December 24, 1963, petitioner filed his answer
to the amended complaint with a counterclaim. 
Respondent filed his reply.

On April 13, 1964,
a pre-trial was conducted with both parties, assisted by respective counsel,
attending.  The pre-trial order reported
the result of the conference as follows:

“At the pre-trial today, the plaintiff assisted by its
counsel, Atty. Roxas, and the defendant, assisted by
its counsel, Atty. Alcaraz in collaboration with
Atty. Reyes, agreed:

“1.  That the defendant will sell the property in Mapaya, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
covered by TCT 517 in his name within four (4) months from today for not less
than one million pesos.

“2.  That out of the proceeds of the sale, the
plaintiff will deposit in this court a sum equal to the amounts claimed in the
amended complaint in addition to the other obligations for which the plaintiff
is liable as surety of the defendant, namely, the defendant’s indebtedness to
the Philippine National Bank, Paramount Insurance, Commercial Insurance
Company, and the Development Bank of the Philippines.

“3.  That the amount to be deposited in court shall
be applied to the payment of the obligations due the Philippine National Bank,
Development Bank of the Philippines, Paramount Insurance, and Commercial Insurance
Company, and the excess shall be paid to the plaintiff in discharge of what,
after proper accounting may be found due him but nothing herein should be
construed as an admission on his part that the contract between him and the
defendant is one of partnership, the nature of which agreement shall be decided
after the presentation of evidence by both parties.

“4.  That should the writ of preliminary attachment
be reinstated the plaintiff will agree to its dissolution and the sale of the
aforementioned property by the plaintiff provided that the sums mentioned in
the preceding paragraph are first deposited in court.

“5.  That should the defendant fail to sell the
property within the period of four (4) months, the plaintiff may offer it for
sale for at least one million pesos.

“6.  That the trial be postponed to August 14, 1964, at 8:30 a.m.

“The parties are enjoined to abide by this order.”

xx                  xx                     xx                     xx

At the stated hearing of August
14, 1964, the court, by order of even date, extended the period
stated in the pre-trial order for petitioner to sell the Hacienda for another
four (4) months upon agreement of respective parties’ counsel.  The court also reaffirmed the tenor of the
pre-trial order.

Upon the lapse of the extension given, petitioner allegedly
sought for another extension but respondent objected.  In the course of the discussion, respondent
learned of a supposed sale made by petitioner of the Hacienda to the Land
Authority for P3,503,162.57 on August
2, 1963.  The court then
ordered the parties to go together to the Land Authority Office to check the
status of the alleged sale.

The parties were never able to check the alleged sale together as
directed by the court.  On December 21, 1964, the first date
set, petitioner failed to show up.  His
counsel explained that he was sick.  On
the following day set, December 28,
1964, respondent failed to appear due, it is claimed, to a
misunderstanding.  Both parties rendered
their respective report/manifestations on these incidents to the lower court.

On January 5, 1965,
respondent moved for authority to sell the Hacienda pursuant to the pre-trial
order.  Over petitioner’s opposition, the
lower court, on January 25, 1965,
granted respondent’s petition.  On February 3, 1965, respondent followed
up with a “Petition for Approval of Sale Proposition” wherein
Independent Investment Co., Inc., was offered as prospective buyer of the
Hacienda Mapaya.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order of January 25, 1965 on February 4, 1965.  Respondent countered with a “Petition
for Permission to Enter, Inspect and Determine the Property Offered for Sale”.  On February
20, 1965, both motions were withdrawn by the parties respectively
in view of the reattachment of Hacienda Mapaya on February 12, 1965 when respondent
posted an additional bond of P330,000.

Subsequently, respondent filed a manifestation asking for the resolution
of his motion dated February 3, 1965.  Petitioner in turn moved for the striking out
of said manifestation and for the dismissal of the case for failure to
prosecute.  The court, on April 2, 1965, issued an order
authorizing respondent to offer Hacienda Mapaya for
sale to Independent Investment Co., Inc., for at least P1,000,000.00.

Respondent then submitted a copy of the document of absolute sale
of Hacienda Mapaya to Independent Investment Co.,
Inc., with a request for its approval. 
On April 20, 1965,
petitioner moved to set aside the negotiations and order for the sale of the
Hacienda.

Resolving the motion, the lower court issued an order dated May
3, 1965, denying the same; requiring petitioner and his counsel to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt; ordering petitioner to execute a
deed of sale of the Hacienda Mapaya to Independent
Investment Co., Inc., for P1,000,000.00, and providing that if petitioner fails
to do so within 10 days, the Clerk of Court should execute the same.

Petitioner immediately took this recourse.  The petition was given due course, respondent
required to answer and preliminary injunction was issued.

Petitioner submits, in support of the petition, that the pre-trial
order is invalid and does not bind him because it did not faithfully and
truthfully reflect what actually transpired in the pre-trial conference.  According to petitioner, contrary to all
that is stated in the pre-trial order, what he actually did was to disclose
to Judge Moya, the trial judge, in the strictest
confidence, that he had already sold Hacienda Mapaya
to the Land Authority for P3,503,162.57 on August 2, 1963 and was just awaiting payment of said
amount.

If this were true, We cannot understand why petitioner did not
complain or question the lack of veracity of the pre-trial order in the
proceedings immediately subsequent thereto. 
He could not have failed to understand the import of the order.  The terms thereof were very clear.  But Instead of complaining, particularly when
the four months’ period stated in the order expired, petitioner even asked for
an extension.  Implicit herein is acquiescence
to the order.  And in at least two
subsequent instances, petitioner even expressly manifested his conformity to
said order.^[1]
This belated attack, therefore, leveled against the pre-trial order of April 13, 1964, can no longer be
entertained.

Moreover, petitioner’s factual premise upon which he would have
Us set aside the pre-trial order which contains no patent defect is, at the
very most, disputed.  Respondent insists
that the pre-trial order merely reflected the working amicable settlement
agreed upon by the parties.  We are more
inclined to accept this stand for petitioner certainly would not have acted the
way he did in the proceedings immediately subsequent to the issuance of the
order unless there was really an understanding between the parties.  The trial Judge also denied that petitioner
ever told him of a completed sale already.^[2]
Under this setting, We cannot see our way clear to granting petitioner the relief
he seeks especially considering that the questioned pre-trial order has the
presumption of veracity in its favor^[3]
whereas petitioner has nothing but his bare allegations to support his claim.

Finally, petitioner cannot complain of injustice nor of undue
deprivation of his property.  The
subsequent orders authorizing the sale of the Hacienda were only pursuant to
the terms of the pre-trial order which was the result of a conference wherein
he and his counsel were present and participated.  Petitioner has only himself to blame for the
resulting prejudice – if any – to him. 
And contrary to his assertion, there is no final adjudication yet.  The pre-trial order has not, with finality,
determined just how much, if any, petitioner actually owes respondent.  Precisely, paragraph 3 of the pre-trial order
provides for an accounting first of respondent’s claim.  And during the trial petitioner could still
substantiate his counterclaims against respondent and possibly defeat the
latter’s right to collect.

WHEREFORE, the petition, for lack of merit, is hereby
dismissed and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued is revoked and set
aside.  Costs against petitioner Domingo
Lao.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., did not take part.

^[1] First,
in the “Opposition to Petition for Authority to Sell” dated Jan. 14,
1965 wherein petitioner admitted having “x x x acceded to the terms of the Order dated April 13, 1964 on
the sale of the property and the deposit of the amount sufficient to cover the
loans with the DBP, the PNB, and others in an effort to demonstrate to this
Honorable Court his good faith and to quiet the unfounded fear of the plaintiff
that during the pendency of this case, he may dispose
of his property. x x x”
(Rollo, p. 139) and second, in the
“Motion for Reconsideration” of Feb. 7, 1965 wherein petitioner
stated “that the arrangement for the sale of Hacienda Mapaya
was entered into between the parties in the pre-trial conference last April 13,
1964 to allay the fears of the plaintiff that defendant may dispose of his property
during the pendency of the above-entitled case.”
(Rollo, p. 147).

^[2]
Order of May 3, 1965, Rollo, p. 177.

^[3]
Since Sec. 4 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court requires the trial court, after
the pre-trial, to “make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, x x x and the
agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered”, it is
presumed, pursuant to Sec. 5(m) of Rule 131, that this duty was regularly and
faithfully discharged in the absence of competent proof to the contrary.