G.R. No. L-31060. July 29, 1971

WORKMEN’S INSURANCE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. AURORA R. AUGUSTO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 29, 1971 TEEHANKEE, J.:
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TEEHANKEE, J.:


Appeal by certiorari from the resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner’s appeal from an adverse judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila on the ground of non-compliance with the
mandatory requirements of the Rules of Court, specifically, that petitioner’s
record on appeal failed to show and allege that the necessary appeal bond was
timely filed within the reglementary period.

On a complaint filed on October 10, 1966 by respondent Aurora R. Augusto, widow, as plaintiff against petitioner corporation
and others as defendants, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered its
judgment of April 22, 1968 in favor of respondent (plaintiff) and against
therein defendants, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the indemnity
agreement and the real estate mortgage executed by the Plaintiff null and void;
sentencing the said defendants Workmen’s Insurance Company, Inc., Constancio T. Villamar and Pedro
S. Antonino to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the
amount of P1,000.00 for having caused the latter to suffer and endure mental
suffering as a consequence of their joint fraudulent acts; and the amount of
P1,000.00 for attorney’s fees, for having compelled plaintiff to engage counsel
to protect her rights, plus the cost of this action.  The preliminary writ of injunction heretofore
issued is made permanent.  The defendant
sheriff of Manila is absolved.  The counterclaim of the defendant Workmen’s
Insurance Company, Inc. is dismissed.”

Respondent corporation interposed its appeal to the appellate
court from the adverse judgment.  On
November 4, 1968, the printed record on appeal as presented to and approved by
the lower court was submitted, but before petitioner could present its
appellant’s brief, respondent, as appellee, filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the record on appeal had failed
to comply with the explicit amendatory requirement provided in Rule 41, section
6 of the Revised Rules of Court that the record on appeal must state “such
data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time
.”

The appellate court, finding that “the situation that
confronts us is one where there is no mention in the notice of appeal or in
any other pleading as reproduced in the record on appeal of appellant that the
latter filed within the reglementary period an appeal
bond
“, which is one of the essential conditions for the perfection of
an appeal, under sections 3 and 9 of Rule 41, ordered the dismissal of the
appeal, per its majority resolution of August 29, 1969,[1]
on the strength of the Court’s early jurisprudence on the intent and scope of
the new amendment introduced in the cited rule since the Revised Rules of Court
took effect on January 1, 1964.[2]

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
appealed to this Court on certiorari, averring that the appellate court
gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reinstate the appeal.

The Court sustains the dismissal of the appeal.  With particular reference to the
non-statement in the record on appeal of the date of filing of the appeal bond
so as to show in the record on appeal per se that it was timely filed,
the Court has squarely recently ruled in Reyes vs. Carrasco,[3]
that “the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal x x x for failure of petitioner’s
record on appeal to state that he had posted an appeal bond and the date on
which he had done so, the filing of said bond within the reglementary
period being one of the essential conditions for the perfection of an appeal,
pursuant to Secs. 3 and 9, of Rule 41.”  Ten other cases were jointly decided with
said case, all stressing the need of strict compliance with the requirement of
Rule 41, section 6 that the record on appeal include the necessary data that
will show that the appeal was perfected on time.

The Court reaffirms the ruling of Reyes in de Guia vs. Court of Appeals,[4]
promulgated this month as well as in the case at bar.  As stated by Justice Reyes in de Guia:  “This
Court notes with regret that although these requirements on the contents of a
record on appeal have been in effect since 1964, there are still lawyers and
litigants who do not comply with the same: 
either they have not perused the Revised Rules, or choose not to comply
therewith.  Liberality in this regard is
by now unwarranted, and would be unjust to numerous litigants or counsel who
exercise diligence in observing the Rules of Court.”

For as Justice Reyes also observed for the Court in Bello vs. Fernando,[5]
“the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.”[6]
It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business.[7]
For petitioner to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the
statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons
such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof
must be shown, in order to warrant the Court’s suspension of the Rules.[8]
No such reasons have been shown to exist in this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed and the petition is dismissed. 
With costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Ruiz Castro, JJ., on official leave.


[1]
Justices Cañizares, Perez and Muñoz
Palma comprised the majority of the special division of five justices, with
Justices Lucero and Gatmaitan dissenting.

[2]
Citing Gov’t. vs. Antonio, L-23736, Oct. 19, 1965; DBP vs. Santos, L-26387,
Sept. 27, 1966; Araneta vs. Madrigal &
Co., L-26227-28, Oct. 25, 1966 and Jocson vs.
Robles, 65 O.G. 5846.

[3]
38 SCRA 296 (March 31, 1971).

[4]
L-33101.

[5]
4 SCRA 135 (Jan. 30, 1962).

[6]
Citing Aguila vs. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898;
Santiago vs. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397.

[7]
Alvero vs. de la Rosa, 76 Phil. 434.

[8]
Ronquillo vs. Marasigan,
5 SCRA 304 (May 31, 1962) and cases cited.