THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Director of Lands versus Borromeo Bros. Estate

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the Director of Lands against the Court of Appeals and Borromeo Bros. Estate, Incorporated, arising from an original proceeding for confirmation and registration of title over a parcel of land fronting the sea in the coastal town of San Isidro, Leyte. The central question is deceptively simple but doctrinally rich: was the land formed by the action of the sea, in which case it belongs to the public domain, or by the deposits of soil and sedimentary matter carried by river currents, in which case it belongs by accretion to the riparian owner? The case matters because it fixes the rule on the conclusiveness of an appellate court's factual findings, on the riparian owner's right to accretion under the Civil Code, and on the vanishing effect of an amended pleading as a judicial admission.

Procedural History

In October 1956, Borromeo Bros. Estate, Incorporated filed in the Court of First Instance of Leyte an original proceeding for confirmation and registration of title over a parcel of about 130,537 square meters. The Director of Lands and the Municipality of San Isidro both opposed, each asserting that the land was part of the public domain. After hearing, the trial court denied the application and declared the land public land formed by the action of the sea and not of any river. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court, sustained the applicant's contention on the origin of the land, declared it private land, and decreed its registration in the applicant's name. The Director of Lands then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

The applicant originally alleged that the land had been formed by alluvium deposited by the action of the sea. After presenting its evidence, however, it sought and was allowed to amend its application to allege that the land had instead been formed from accretions of soil and sediment carried from higher places by the currents of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Rivers, which overflowed their banks during the rainy season. The applicant also claimed open, public, continuous, and adverse possession for twenty years before the filing of the application.

The Director of Lands and the Municipality of San Isidro opposed. The Director asserted that the land was part of the public domain and that the applicant had no sufficient title. The Municipality added that the land was classified as Timber Block-J, Leyte Project No. 40, that it was occupied by other parties who had waived their claims in favor of the Municipality, and that the Municipality needed it for municipal expansion.

At trial, the Director's evidence tended to show that the two rivers were mere irrigation canals, had no intrinsic water sources, and dried up in summer. The applicant's evidence, however, was more persuasive. A bridge foreman of the Bureau of Public Highways testified that the Si-ong was more than seven meters deep and the Sinubdan more than three meters deep, and that there was a source of water under the Filemon Bridge. The applicant's overseer testified that both rivers flowed continuously the whole year and that no mangrove trees grew within the land itself. Photographs showed rice, coconut trees, and bamboo groves growing on the land.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the land was formed by the action of rivers rather than by the action of the sea.
• Whether or not the applicant was bound by the averment in its original application that the land was formed by the action of the sea, as a judicial admission.

Applicable Provisions

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

This is the provision under which the private respondent, as riparian owner, claims the land formed by the river currents.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on how the land came into existence is a question of fact, not of law, and is therefore beyond the province of the Supreme Court to review, save in certain exceptional circumstances. Even so, because the appellate finding conflicted with that of the trial court, the Court reviewed the record and found no sound basis for ascribing any error to the Court of Appeals in its appreciation of the evidence. The Court rejected the Director's argument that accretion, being by definition imperceptible, could not account for more than thirteen hectares built up within six years. The age of the rivers had never been established, so the process could have started much earlier than 1930; and even granting that it started only in 1930, the land could have grown to thirteen hectares in the twenty years that followed until 1956. The Court therefore found no error in the ruling that the land was formed by accretion through the action of river currents and belonged to the private respondent as riparian owner pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly overruled the contention that the averment in the original application was binding as a judicial admission. Pleadings that have been amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings, and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may be utilized against the pleader as extra-judicial admissions, they must, to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. It did not appear that the original application, or the particular averment, was offered or received in evidence for the petitioner in the trial court.

Doctrine

First, the finding of the Court of Appeals on the origin of land, being a question of fact, is generally conclusive on the Supreme Court and is not reviewable save in exceptional circumstances. Second, under Article 457 of the Civil Code, the riparian owner is entitled to the accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters; the imperceptibility of accretion does not bar a claim where the process may have begun long before the period suggested by a witness. Third, an amended pleading disappears from the record and ceases to be a judicial admission; it may be used only as an extra-judicial admission, and only if formally offered in evidence.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, without pronouncement as to costs, and the land was registered in the name of Borromeo Bros. Estate, Incorporated.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: an amended pleading vanishes from the record and is no longer a judicial admission, and accretion under Article 457 belongs to the riparian owner. Examiners like to use this case on the riparian owner's right to accretion and on the rule that amended pleadings cease to be judicial admissions.