CITY OF ILOILO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE PINZON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

In 1945 the City of Iloilo enacted an Ordinance (No. 33, Ser, 1945),
subjecting to “municipal license tax fee” certain businesses or occupations “of
an unwholesome, obnoxious, offensive, unhygienic or dangerous character”. Among
these, “tenement houses (casas vecindad)” were subjected to a flat rate of
P25.00 annually, whether in Iloilo, Jaro, La Paz, Arevalo, Molo or Mandurriao
[Sched. B-l (m)].

In 1946, Ordinance No. 86, Ser. 1946, was enacted, amending the Schedule
B-l-m of City Ordinance No. 33, as follows?

(1) Tenement house (casa de vecindad)—P25 annually.

(2) Tenement house, partly or wholly engaged or dedicated to business in the
following streets: J.M. Basa, Iznart, and Aldeguer, — P12 per apartment.

(3) Tenement house, partly or wholly engaged in business in any other streets
of Iloilo City — P12 per apartment.

On July 12, 1948, the City filed action in the Court of First Instance to
recover from Vicente Pinzon P262.50 plus 20% penalty, as municipal license tax
duo under said Ordinances. The defendant pleaded that Ordinance No, 86, Ser,
1946, was invalid, unconstitutional, and in contravention of the limited power
granted to the plaintiff City in its Charter.

Issues joined, the parties submitted the case on the following stipulation of
facts:

“1. That defendant is the owner of five tenement houses situated (1) house at
Ortiz Street, (2) houses at General Blanco Street, (1) house at corner General
Blanco and C.R. Mapa Streets, and (1) houee at C.R. Mapa Street, all in the city
of Iloilo, Philippines.

2. That defendant, Vicente Pinzon, under Ordinance No. 33, series of 1945, as
amended by Ordinance No. 86, series of 1946, is delinquent in ths payment of his
municipal license tax in the sum of P262.50 including 20% penalty corresponding
to the last quarter of 1946, the whole year of 1947 and the first two quartern
of 1948, now dus and owing to the plaintiff, the City of Iloilo, as provided for
under Ordinance No, 33, Series of 1945, as amended by Ordinance No. 86, series
of 1946, at the rate of P25.00 annually for every tenement house owned and
operated by the defendant, Vicente Pinzon.

3. That defendant is a real estate dealer paying internal revenue taxes in
the City of Iloilo as owner and maintainer of this tenement houses and until now
continues to pay his internal revenue taxes.

4. That both plaintiff and defendant hereby stipulate and agree that
defendant, Vicente Pinzon, is delinquent for municipal license taxes for his
five tenement houses situated in the City of Iloilo, in the sun of P262.50
including 20% penalty corresponding to the last quarter of 1946, the whole year
of 1947, up to and including the first and second quarters of 1948.”

(Rec. on App. pp. 8-9).

The Court of First Instance hold that the ordinance in question was validly
enacted under the general welfare clause and Section 21 (cc) of the city charter
(c.s, 158, as amended), tenement houses or (casas de vecindad) being defined and
Regulated by sections 130 to 144 of the Revised Ordinances for the city of
Iloilo. In view thereof, the Court sentenced defendant Pinzon to pay the amounts
sought to be collected by the City.

Within the period for appeal, Pinzon filed a verified motion for relief from
the Stipulation of Facts and for a new trial, claiming that he did not have any
tenement houses as defined in section 130 of the Revised Ordinances of Iloilo;
that defendant’s houses were each occupied by one family alone, and he offered
to prove such fact; that said defendant had stipulated that he owned five (5)
tenement houses in the belief that, as defined in the Merriam Webster Pocket
Dictionary, “tenement houses” meant a “house rented or for rent”. Upon objection
by plaintiff’s, counsel, the Court denied the motion for relief, and defendant
Pinzon appealed to this Court,

Two issues are tendered in appellant’s brief: (1) Whether or not the Court
below erred in denying his motion to be relieved from the stipulation; and (2)
whether Ordinance No. 86, Ser. 1946, of Iloilo is valid as imposing a license
fee, or unconstitutional and void as levying a tax not authorized by law.

As to first issue: If it should be a fact, as appellant claims under oath and
has offered to prove, that each of his houses are rented by one family alone,
then he would not be liable to pay under the ordinance. “Casas do vecindad” are
defined by section 130, of the Iloilo City Revised Ordinances, in the following
terms:

“Art. 130. Casa de vecindad; definicion

Por casa de vecindad se entendera, (a) toda casa, edificio parte del mismo
que se alquile or arriende para ser ocupado como casa, vivienda or recidencia
por cuatro o mas familias que vivan independientemente una de otra y que guisen
o cocinen en dicha casa o edificio, o (b) toda casa, edificio o parte del mismo
en que mas de tres familias vivan y cocinen por separado en un mismo piso, con
derecho comun a los pasillos, escaleras, patios, baños, azoteas, inodoros y
excusados”.

(Rec. on Appeal, p. 12).

The proof offered by appellant would also constitute the best evidence of a
mistake on his part in entering in the stipulation of facts, and therefore, of
his right to be relieved therefrom. While the appellant, or his counsel, may not
be altogether free from negligence or blame in entering into the stipulation
without duly ascertaining the true meaning of the terms employed in it, such
consideration should yield to the cardinal principle of justice that fees, taxes
or imposts should not be exacted except from those really liable to pay them. It
was, therefore, reversible error for the lower Court to deny appellant the
opportunity to show his error and the non-applicability to him of the levies set
by Ordinance No, 86, Ser. 1946. Specially is this the case where the new trial
was asked in time and no additional prejudice is caused to the appellee, who may
collect interest and penalties for the delay, if finally adjudged entitled to
recover the imposts in question. A new trial is thus in order.

The foregoing conclusion renders it unnecessary for us to examine at this
time the second issue (of unconstitutionality) posed by the appellant. “It is
the general rule that a court will not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a statute to be invalid, unless a decision on that very point becomes
necessary to the determination of the cause” (McGirr vs. Hamilton and
Abreu, 30 Phil. 568; also 11 Amer. Jur. pp. 721 and 723).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records are
ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to reopen the case
for a new trial. The appellee not being at fault, nor to blame for the error of
the appellant, the latter shall pay the costs in this instance.

Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.