ROBUSTIANO CARAGAO, GORGONIA JAYME, ISABEL GARCIA HERNANDEZ AND HER HUSBAND BARTOLOME HENANDEZ, AUGUSTO, SOFRONIO, ENCARNACION, ROSALINA, JUAN, ANTONIO, CARMELITA AND ARSENIO, T…

This is a special action of certiorari to annul and set aside
an order for immediate execution issued on March 3, 1951, by the Honorable
Cirilo Maceren, judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, in Civil Case No.
288 of that court entitled G. P. Sebellino, as Administrator of the Estate of
Jose Caragao vs. Robustiano Caragao, et al. In the judgment rendered after trial
the court found that petitioner herein Robustiano Caragao had secured the
transfer to himself of three parcels of land, registered in the name of the
intestate Jose Caragao under certificates of title Nos. 331, 608, and 2715,
which he sold to his co-petitioners in this proceeding, the first to Isabel
Garcia and Bartolome Hernandez, the second to Josefa Caragao, and the third to
Gorgonia Jayme. As a result of the conveyances the lands, according to the
decision, are now registered in the names of the purchasers under Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 206, 207, and 208. The court, however, found that the
intestate had left a daughter by the name of Laureana Caragao by his first wife
named Catalina Baligya, and it, therefore, ordered the cancellation of the new
transfer certificates of title in the names of the petitioners, and the issuance
of new ones in lieu thereof in the name of Jose Caragao, deceased and that
defendants vacate the lands and pay Jose Caragao’s share in the products thereof
in the amount of P6,000. (Annex A.)

The judgment was rendered on December 28, 1950, and on January
6, 1951, the plaintiff moved for the immediate execution of the judgment (Annex
B). Opposition to the motion was registered by the defendants (Annex C). On
February 3, 1951, the court granted the motion for immediate execution, but upon
motion for reconsideration, it set aside its first order by another dated
February 10, 1951, which, in part, reads as follows:

* * *. It appearing that the plaintiff offers no objection to the
filing of the supersedeas bond to answer for damages, the order of the court
dated February 3, 1951, is hereby set aside and de fendants are ordered to file
a bond of P6,000 to answer for damages.

The defendants seem to have filed the bond, but opposition to
this was registered by the plaintiff on the ground that it was insufficient, and
the latter thereupon filed a coimterbond for P10,000. Subsequently, the
plaintiff also filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 20, 1951,
praying that the original order for the execution of the judgment be reinstated.
On March 2, 1951, the court set aside its order of February 10, 1951, and
directed anew the issuance of an execution, thus:

* * *. It having been shown that the property would be properly taken
care of and administered by the plaintiff herein for the better preservation and
protection of same and inasmuch as the issuance of a writ of execution having
been determined in its order of February 3, 1951, the order of this court dated
February 10, 1951, is hereby set aside, and let execution issue in this case
upon filing by the plaintiff of a bond in the total sum of P8,000, and an
additional bond of P1,000 to be filed by the plaintiff G. P. Sebellino as
embodied in the order of this court of February 3, 1951.

It is against this order that the present action is filed,
petitioners contending that after the filing of the supersedeas bond, the
execution of the judgment could not be justified by the reason expressed in the
order, i.e., that the property could be better preserved or protected in the
possession of the plaintiff.

The general rule is that the execution of a judgment is stayed
by the perfection of an appeal. While provisions are inserted in the Rules to
forestall cases in which an executed judgment is reversed on appeal, the
execution of the judgment is the exception, not the rule. And so execution may
issue only “upon good reasons stated in the order.” The grounds for the granting
of the execution must be good grounds. (Aguilos vs. Barrios, et al., 72 Phil.,
285) It follows that when the court has already granted a stay of execution,
upon the adverse party’s filing a supersedeas bond, the circumstances justifying
execution in spite of the supersedeas bond must be paramount; they should
outweigh the security offered by the supersedeas bond. In this last case, only
compelling reasons of urgency or justice can justify the execution. (Ibid.)

The “good reason” stated in the order subject of this
proceeding is “the better preservation and protection of the property.” But we
find from the record that the properties are three parcels of land. And we are
at a loss to understand how and why they could be better preserved if in the
hands of the administrator. Besides, the judgment shows that the lands are in
the hands of the petitioners, who already have titles thereto, and as there is
nothing to indicate that they were acquired in bad faith, the presumption arises
that the purchasers are possessors in good faith. It seems, therefore, that the execution of the judgment, after
the giving of the supersedeas bond, can not be justified, there being no urgent
or compelling reasons for granting the same. We, therefore, hold that the
execution was granted with grave abuse of discretion.

The petition is, therefore, granted, and the order of the
respondent judge of March 2, 1951, is set aside, and that of February 10, 1951,
revived. With costs against the respondents.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, and
Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.