G.R. No. L-23965. January 30, 1968
FLOREÑA TINAGAN, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE PERLAS, JR., WARDEN, PROVINCIAL JAIL OF ILOILO, RESPONDENT.
ANGELES, J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus to secure the discharge from detention of
petitioner, Floreña Tinagan,
who was arrested and put to prison by the respondent provincial warden in the
provincial jail of Iloilo. Upon the commencement of these proceedings in
this Court, the petitioner was allowed provisional liberty upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P200.00.
The disputed confinement of petitioner was effected in pursuance of an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, dated December 22, 1964, in Special
Proceedings No. 1588 of that court, to wit:
“Floreña Tinagan,
former mistress of Jaime Sisson, Sr. was appointed co-administrator in the
estate of Jaime Siason who, with his wife, Loreto Juaneza, was survived by his children, namely, Jaime, Jr.,
Eduardo, Fely and Alfredo, all surnamed Siason. The only
estate of the deceased is a house, according to the inventory submitted by the
administrator on September 25, 1963. Not a
portion of the claims of the creditors which have been allowed by the
court have been paid. Upon petition of
the creditors, the Court ordered the sale of
the house by public auction, where the Chinese
Commercial High School
was the highest bidder. On September 26, 1964, the court ordered Floreña
Tinagan, in her capacity as co-administrator of the estate, to deliver the house in her possession to
the Iloilo Chinese
Commercial High School
on or before October 24, 1964. After the expiration of October 24, 1964,
the Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School informed the Court that Floreña
Tinagan as administrator of the estate had not yet
delivered the said house and she
refused to deliver the same. So on October
27, 1964, this Court
ordered the Sheriff to eject Floreña Tinagan from said house and deliver
the possession of the house to the Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School. The administrator, Floreña Tinagan, refused to obey
the order of the Court after she was duly apprised by the Court of her duties
and obligations as administratrix. So on November 4, 1964, this court ordered for her arrest. She escaped arrest. When brought to the Court and asked if she
was willing to comply with the order of the court to deliver the house to the Iloilo
Chinese Commercial
High School, she told the Court
that she did not want and she does not want to obey the order and would refuse
to obey the order of the Court.
“WHEREFORE, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the
co-administrator, Floreña Tinagan, is
hereby ordered committed to the Iloilo Provincial Jail for refusing to obey the order of the Court and
to remain confined therein until such time when she signifies her willingness
to obey the order of the court and will in effect obey the said order of the
court.
“The petition for bail is denied.”
It is claimed that it is error for the court to order
petitioner’s immediate arrest and commitment to prison since the acts allegedly
committed merely constitute indirect or constructive contempt, in which case,
before petitioner may be punished therefor, a charge
in writing should be filed and opportunity to be heard be given her, citing
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
The respondent counters with the argument that the petitioner is guilty
of direct contempt under section 1 of the same Rule, which may be punished summarily,
since the misbehavior was committed in the presence of the court or judge.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 71 are hereunder quoted:
“Section 1. Direct
content punished summarily. – A
person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required so to do, may be summarily
adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or both, if it be an inferior
court.”
“Section 3. Indirect
contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. –
After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for contempt:
“(a) Misbehavior
of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
“(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by
a court or judge, including the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property
the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
x x x x x
“But nothing in this section shall be construed as to prevent the
court from issuing process to bring the accused party into court, or from
holding him in custody pending such proceedings.”
The issue, therefore, is whether or not the alleged misbehavior
of the petitioner would fall under one or the other class of contempt of
court. If under the first, called direct
contempt, the process of the immediate arrest of petitioner was proper;
if under the second, called indirect contempt, there must be a written charge
and hearing before petitioner could be punished.
The alleged contemptuous conduct of petitioner consists in her
refusal to obey an order of the court, after she was duly apprised of her
duties and obligations as administratrix, to deliver
the house to the Iloilo Chinese
Commercial High School,
the subject matter of the order.
Respondent contends that the act of petitioner in answering the
judge that “she did not want and she does not want to obey the order and
would refuse to obey the order of the court” constituted misbehavior in
the presence of the court and/or disrespect toward the court or judge.
While petitioner’s answer might be construed as a challenge to the court’s
authority to enforce its lawful orders, We are of the opinion, however, that
under the circumstances, petitioner’s conduct does not amount to a direct
contempt, considering that petitioner would not have had the occasion to give
such an answer “in the presence of or so near a court or judge” were
she not arrested and brought to court.
In the predicament the petitioner was placed – a rested and brought before the Judge, and then was
asked “if she was willing to comply with the order of the court to deliver
the house”, having in mind an earlier petition[1]
filed by her for “Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction,” praying to annul, for being premature, the
court’s order issued on July 27, 1964, directing the public auction of the
building occupied by her – petitioner merely manifested to the court what she
believed to be the correct answer to the question of the court. She had her own valid reasons for resisting
obedience to the court’s order because her petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court had not yet been
resolved. Instead of giving the
petitioner an opportunity to explain her refusal to comply with the order, the
Judge, in violation of petitioner’s constitutional
right to due process, immediately ordered her confinement.
The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, with
caution, deliberation and with due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual.[2]
Courts should be slow in jailing people for non-compliance with their
orders. Only in cases of clear and
contumacious refusal to obey should said power be exercised.[3]
In the case of Austria
v. Masaquel, G.R. L-22356, August 31, 1967, We held that giving of an
affirmative answer, in the courtroom, to the question of the judge, “Do
you doubt the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and
impartially because the lawyer of the other party was my former
assistant? Do you doubt?” is not an
act amounting to contempt of court.
Said this Court in
elucidation:
“When petitioner answered ‘Yes, sir’ to the question asked by
respondent Judge, petitioner simply expressed his sincere feeling under the
circumstances. x x
x
“x x x But
the petitioner was simply truthful and candid to the court when he gave that answer. It would have been unfair to respondent Judge
had petitioner answered ‘No, sir’ because then he would not be sincere with the
court, and he would be inconsistent with the request that he made through his
counsel for respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further hearing the
case. When respondent Judge asked that
question, he necessarily expected a truthful answer from petitioner, and indeed
petitioner gave him the truthful answer.
We are not persuaded that in so answering petitioner meant to be disrespectful,
offensive or insulting to respondent Judge.
Nor do We consider that in so answering petitioner meant to cast
reflection on the integrity and honesty of respondent Judge.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
granted. The bond posted by the
petitioner is hereby declared cancelled.
No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
G.R. No. L-23555, Floreña Tinagan,
Petitioner v. Hon. Valerio V. Rovira, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Tan
Chuy Ho, Rosario Geralde, Adelina Juan S. Loa & Ester H. Jamora,
Respondents.
[2]
U.S. Federal
Trade Commission v. Fairyfood Products Co. 94
F. 3d. 844; 17 C.J.S. 19, note 34.
[3]
Gamboa v. Teodoro,
L-4893, May 13, 1952; De Esparagosa
v. Tan, L-6525, April 12, 1954.