REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. IÑIGO PABLICO CORPIN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Republic versus Corpin

The Case

This is the case of Republic versus Corpin, decided by the Supreme Court in June 1958. The Republic of the Philippines, through the provincial fiscal and later the Solicitor General, sought to oust Iñigo Pablico Corpin from the office of municipal mayor of Biliran, Leyte, on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen and was therefore unlawfully holding that position. The action was one of quo warranto, the proceeding by which the State tests a person's right to hold a public office. The case matters because it teaches when the Government may bring its own quo warranto suit, and when the courts may refuse it, in light of a prior suit already filed by a private relator over the very same question.

Procedural History

On June 20, 1956, the provincial fiscal of Tacloban, Leyte, in representation of the Republic and upon the relation of Jose Napalit, filed a complaint for quo warranto against Corpin. The defendant moved to dismiss, invoking the pendency of an earlier quo warranto case filed by Napalit himself, which the Court of First Instance had decided in the defendant's favor and which was then on appeal before the Court of Appeals. The trial court allowed the defendant to withdraw that motion and to file an opposition instead. On September 17, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Leyte issued an order denying permission to commence the action, with costs against the indemnity bond filed by the relator. The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The fiscal then appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's holdings that permission was required, that the pending case could be pleaded in abatement, and that the complaint should not be given due course.

Facts

Corpin had been proclaimed mayor-elect of Biliran, Leyte. Jose Napalit, a defeated candidate for the same office, filed a quo warranto petition against Corpin, seeking to impugn his election on the ground of ineligibility. That case was decided by the Court of First Instance in Corpin's favor and was elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals, where it remained pending.

Later, on June 20, 1956, the provincial fiscal, in the name of the Republic and upon the relation of the same Jose Napalit, filed a second quo warranto complaint against Corpin, this time alleging that he was not a Filipino citizen and was therefore unlawfully holding the office of municipal mayor.

The trial court refused to allow the second action to proceed. It noted that the petition for leave had been filed long after the one-week period following the proclamation, as required by the Election Code, and that the earlier quo warranto case between Napalit and Corpin was still pending before the Court of Appeals, whose decision would be decisive of the same issues. Hence the appeal by the Republic.

Issues

• Whether or not the present petition for quo warranto required the permission of the trial court before it could be filed.
• Whether or not the pending quo warranto case filed by Jose Napalit against the same defendant may be pleaded in abatement of the Government's action under the principle of res judicata.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving due course to the present action for quo warranto.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or fiscal must commence action.—The Solicitor General or a fiscal when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the last two preceding sections can be established by proof, must commence such action.

This is the provision the Government invoked, arguing that the fiscal had good reason to believe a proper action lay and that no leave of court was needed.

Section 4 of the same Rule provides:

SEC. 4. When Solicitor General or fiscal may commence action with permission of court.—The Solicitor General or fiscal may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action to be given to him by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought.

This is the provision the trial court applied, and which the Government itself had invoked in its own petition for leave, making court permission a condition before the action could be commenced.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Government could not now claim that permission was unnecessary. Its own petition had invoked Section 4 of Rule 68 and had expressly asked for leave of court. The Court observed that the appellant was not in a position to charge the trial court with an error that it itself had induced and persuaded the court to commit.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that the pendency of the earlier quo warranto case could be pleaded in abatement. The issue in both cases was identical: whether Corpin was a Filipino citizen at the time he was declared mayor-elect and whether he was illegally occupying the post. A final decision in the first case, whether by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, would definitively settle that issue and serve as res judicata. The Court reasoned that when the objective is the same, the procedure followed to reach it is of little import. It stressed that the Government could have intervened in the first case, or appeared as amicus curiae, instead of allowing months to pass before bringing its own belated suit.

On the third issue, the Court held that the granting or withholding of permission under Section 4 of Rule 68 rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, especially where the Government's suit is brought upon the relation of the same party who filed the first quo warranto proceeding. The Court quoted with approval the rule that in exercising its discretion the court may consider all the circumstances, the motives of the relator, the time elapsed since the cause of complaint occurred, and whether the public interest will be served, and may refuse leave because of the prior institution of actions involving the same questions.

Doctrine

First, a fiscal or the Solicitor General who invokes Section 4 of Rule 68 and asks for leave of court cannot later repudiate that position and insist that permission was unnecessary under Section 3. A party may not charge the court with an error it induced.

Second, where a defeated candidate has filed quo warranto against the winning candidate on the ground of ineligibility, and that case has been decided by the trial court and is pending appeal, the Government need not bring a second quo warranto suit upon the relation of the same party. A final decision in the first case will settle the same issue and constitute res judicata, and the second suit may be abated.

Third, the grant or denial of permission to file a Government quo warranto suit under Section 4 of Rule 68 rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, which may consider the relator's motives, delay, and the pendency of prior actions involving the same question.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying permission to commence the action, with no costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: when the Government sues in quo warranto upon the relation of the same private relator who already filed the same suit over the same issue, the second action may be abated as res judicata, and leave under Section 4 of Rule 68 lies in the trial court's discretion. Examiners use this case on the distinction between Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 68, on the doctrine that a party cannot profit from an error it induced, and on the discretion of courts to refuse leave to file quo warranto.