PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDO CORTEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

On appeal before Us is the Decision¹ dated 18 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Third Judicial Region, Palayan City, Branch 40, the decretal portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Pablo Ignacio Alday, Serafin Perez and Eduardo Cortez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277, and hereby sentences all of the accused to a prison term of six (6) months to four (4) years and two (2) months.

“The subject lumber is hereby confiscated in favor of the government.

“SO ORDERED.”²

In an Information³ dated 25 August 1997, Serafin Perez (“Perez”), Pablo Ignacio Alday (“Alday”) and Eduardo Cortez (“Cortez”) were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 6^th day of July 1997, in the Municipality of Laur, Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confede-rating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in their possession and control 43 pieces of narra lumber and 106 pieces of ordinary lumber, totalling 1,056.2 board feet, worth P 70,719.00, and transport the same, without the papers and documents required under existing forestry laws and regulations.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”⁴

During the arraignment, Perez, Alday⁵ and Cortez⁶ entered a plea of NOT GUILTY. The counsel of Perez and Alday waived the right of both accused to a pre-trial conference.⁷ With respect to Cortez, the case was set for a pre-trial conference which, however, was terminated later on upon motion of his counsel.⁸

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Francisco Pagbilao, Jr. (“Pagbilao”), Alfredo Lantano (“Lantano”), Orlando Manzano (“Manzano”) and Danilo de Guzman.

Their testimonies, as succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, are as follows:

“On or about 9:00 o’clock in the morning of July 6, 1997, Forest Ranger Francisco Pagbilao, Jr., a member of the Karagsakan Task Force in Laur, Nueva Ecija and who was then assigned to the Bato Ferry Detachment, Laur, Nueva Ecija received a radio message from Karagsakan Detachment, Karagsakan, Dingalan, Aurora that a Forward Isuzu Truck bearing Plate No. CNS-948 coming from Dingalan was loaded with illegally cut lumber.

Immediately, Forest Ranger Francisco Pagbilao together with Sgt. Alfredo Lantao (sic) and PFC Orlando Manzano blocked the road near their detachment and intercepted the Isuzu truck bearing Plate No. CNS-948. The truck was being driven by accused Pablo Alday while accused Serafin Perez sat in the passenger seat. On the other hand, appellant was on board a motorcycle leading the Isuzu truck. Upon scrutiny, the team confirmed the information that the truck was indeed carrying illegally cut lumber. They asked the accused to show them the necessary permits coming from the Department of Environment and Natural resources but the three could not present any.

Thereafter, the Isuzu truck was brought to the detachment headquarters for further investigation. At this juncture, appellant Eduardo Cortez went to the detachment headquarters and told Francisco Pagbilao that he is the owner of several pieces of lumber inside the Isuzu truck and that he will use them in building his house. Serafin Perez who was in the passenger seat stated that he is the owner of the truck and that Eduardo Cortez, a friend of his, borrowed the same upon the assurance that it will not be used for any illegal purpose.

Nonetheless, the team found the truck loaded with 43 pieces of Narra lumber and 106 pieces of ordinary lumber. Forest Ranger Francisco Pagbilao personally counted the lumber and prepared a report scaled (sic) sheet.

The team seized the truck and brought it to Fort Magsaysay. A seizure receipt was issued by the military officers at Fort Magsaysay and Francisco Pagbilao, Alfredo Lantao (sic) and Orlando Manzano affixed their signatures therein.”⁹

The prosecution thereafter filed its formal offer of evidence.¹⁰ Record shows that Perez, Alday and Cortez filed no comment or opposition thereto.

On 8 November 1999, Perez, Alday and Cortez, through their respective counsels, asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence.¹¹ Accordingly, the court a quo granted their motion and gave them twenty (20) days from receipt of order to file the same.¹² However, Perez, Alday and Cortez failed to file the demurrer to evidence. In an Order dated 6 December 1999, the court a quo considered the filing thereof waived¹³ and consequently, scheduled the initial presentation of evidence for the defense.

On 1 August 2000, Perez, Alday and Cortez, through their respective counsels, waived their right to present evidence.¹⁴ The court a quo then ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. The parties having failed to file their memoranda, the court a quo considered the case submitted for decision in its Order dated 2 October 2000.¹⁵

On 18 January 2001, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.

Aggrieved, Cortez (now appellant) interposed the present appeal ascribing to the court a quo the following errors:

I

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO BE INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED.

II

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AND/OR ON REASONABLE DOUBT.

We find no merit in the Appeal.

Asserting that the court a quo’s Decision should be set aside, appellant underscores the following improbabilities, contradictions and inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence, viz:    

1. In his testimony, Pagbilao testified that the subject incident happened at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6 July 1997 while in the Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A to A-4),¹⁶ it happened in the morning of said date;
       
2. As to the exact number of confiscated illegally cut lumber, Pagbilao testified that they confiscated 43 pieces of narra and 106 pieces of ordinary lumber, while Lantano testified that they confiscated 1,000 pieces of ordinary lumber, 900 pieces of narra lumber as well as 43 pieces of narra (tablon). In their Joint Affidavit, however, they did not mention anything about how many pieces of narra and ordinary lumber they confiscated;
       
3. As to who actually prepared the Seizure Receipt,¹⁷ Pagbilao claimed that he was the one who prepared the same. On the other hand, Lantano testified that it was the military men of the 7^th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay who prepared and issued the said receipt and they were merely required to sign the same;    
       
4. As to the ownership of the illegally cut lumber, the Seizure Receipt and the Scale Sheet¹⁸ showed no acknowledgment from the accused that the lumber indicated therein was taken from them except the bare testimony of the prosecution witnesses. This omission materially affects the probative value of the aforesaid exhibits specially when Lantano repudiated some of the entries in their sworn statement for having been made without his knowledge and consent; and,
       
5. The prosecution failed to present any evidence to establish the value of the lumber as alleged in the Information. The value of the subject lumber is a significant and integral part in determining the penalty of the offense charged. Thus, the same should have been proven beyond reasonable doubt

In light of the foregoing, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, he must be acquitted.

We are not convinced.

As a rule, inconsistencies or contradictions in the testimony of the witness do not affect the veracity of the testimony if the inconsistencies do not pertain to material points.¹⁹

In the case at bench, the inconsistencies or contra-dictions raised by the appellant refer to trivial and insignificant details that do not destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They refer to minor matters such as the time when the subject incident happened, the quantity of the lumber seized and the identity of the person who prepared the Seizure Receipt. Evidently, these do not relate to the elements of the offense charged. Besides, the prosecution, in offering the testimony of Pagbilao, clearly stated that the latter would testify on the subject incident which happened in the morning of 6 July 1997.²⁰ Thus, to Our mind, the fact that Pagbilao, during his direct-examination, answered “yes” when asked if he remembers anything which happened in the evening of 6 July 1997,²¹ is of no moment. It must be emphasized that he consistently affirmed during cross-examination that the incident in question actually happened in the morning of said date.²² Moreover, this is corroborated by the testimonies of Lantano²³ and Manzano.²⁴ Likewise, an examination of the testimony of Lantano shows that there is really no inconsistency as to the quantity of the lumber seized. Lantano declared:

“Q : How many pieces of lumber was loaded?
A : 1,000 pieces ordinary lumber and 900 plus narra lumber, Sir.

Court : Is that by volume or pieces?
A : Board feet, Your Honor.

Atty Cruz:

May we move that the answer of the witness be stricken out from the record, My question is how many pieces of lumber was loaded in the truck at the time it was apprehended?

A : 43 narra lumber “tablon”, Sir.

Q : Is that the only lumber that was loaded in the truck at that time?
A : There was the ordinary lumber, Sir.

Q : How many pieces of ordinary lumber was loaded at that time?
A : I can no longer remember, Sir.”²⁵ (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing declaration belies appellant’s claim of inconsistency regarding the quantity of lumber confiscated. Contrary to appellant’s claim, Lantano corroborated the testimony of Pagbilao that there were indeed 43 pieces of narra lumber in the truck although he (Lantano) could not remember anymore how many pieces of ordinary lumber there were.

In sum, the prosecution witnesses were firm and consistent in positively identifying the appellant and the other two accused as possessing the subject lumber without the proper legal documents. Under the circumstances, We find no cogent reason to doubt their credibility. Settled is the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the court a quo are given the highest degree of respect. We will not ordinarily disturb these findings on appeal absent any clear showing that the court a quo has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of the case.²⁶ There is nothing in the case at bench which convinces Us to depart from this rule. This conclusion remains notwithstanding Lantano’s repudiation of paragraphs 8-11 in their Joint Affidavit ²⁷ stating:    

1. That on or about 9:00 A.M. of July 6, 1997, while manning our Detachment, we received a radio message from Karagsakan Detachment, Karagsakan, Dingalan, Aurora informing us that one (1) Isuzu Forward loaded with illegally cur (sic) forest products were able to escape said Detachment;
       
2. That Karagsakan Detachment informed us that the subject vehicle is bearing Plate no. CNS-948 and is escorted by a certain Police Sergeant Cortes;
       
3. That we prepared and waited, than (sic) said police officer arrived at our Detachment followed by the subject Isuzu Forward;
       
4. That said policeman informed us that the lumber loaded on said vehicle are for his personal use;
       
5. That we demanded from Sgt. Cortes the documents covering the forest products, but he cannot present any;   

1. That per inspection conducted, said Isuzu Forward is loaded with ordinary and narra lumber;    
       
2. That verification conducted by Forest Ranger Francisco Pagbilao, Jr. showed that the loaded lumber are illegal and subject for seizure/ confiscation;    
       
3. That in the instance, Policeman Cortes immediately left without giving further information leaving the vehicle bearing plate no. CNS-948;    
       
4. That further investigation showed that the vehicle is owned by a certain Serafin Perez and driven by Pablo Ignacio Alday both from Dingalan, Aurora, who refused to give any statement and to answer questions;    
       
5. That without our knowledge, both left and never returned;    
       
6. That the vehicle with its load was brought to the depot, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City for safekeeping.”²⁸

Clearly, such repudiation of the said paragraphs is inconsequential vis-à-vis Lantino’s testimony wherein he categorically stated that the appellant and the two accused possessed the subject lumber without the proper documents²⁹ — a flagrant violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, which provides:

“Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.”

Under the above provision, the following acts are considered punishable: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (2) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents.³⁰

In this case at bench, the appellant was charged with the second offense. Thus, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is also immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.³¹ Invariably, it does not matter that the confiscated lumber were allegedly for personal use of the appellant only. The prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice or criminal intent will not save the day for him.³²

Anent the value of the confiscated lumber, We agree with the court a quo’s finding:

“Although the value of the subject lumber has not been proven with certainty, such does not however exculpate the accused where his guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. To be sure, the subject lumber has some worth- a fact that this Court cannot ignore. It consists (of) 43 pieces of narra lumber and 106 pieces of ordinary lumber, totaling 1,056.2 board feet, said to have been worth P70,719.00 in the Information but which fact had not been actually proved. Considering the number and volume thereof and the cost of lumber under prevailing market conditions, the Court takes judicial notice that the nominal value of the subject lumber is more than Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00).”³³

Indeed, the court a quo has the power to take judicial notice and in this case, the value of the confiscated lumber deserves such because this is a matter of public knowledge or is capable of unquestionable demonstration. Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.³⁴ In the case at bench, the court a quo reasonably exercised its power since it took into consideration the testimony of Pagbilao and the Seizure and Scale Sheet.

However, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed by the court a quo. In meting out the subject penalty, the court a quo ruled:

“Reference is made to Article 309, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code for the imposable penalty which states that the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if the value of the thing stolen is more than P6,000.00 but does not exceed P12,000.00. Considering that there is no clear evidence to prove that the value of the subject lumber in fact exceeds P12,000.00, the Court believes and so holds that the said paragraph is applicable to the instant case, the penalty specifically being two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences all of the accused to a prison term of ar(r)esto mayor maximum period, as minimum to prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.”³⁵

The court a quo then sentenced the appellant and the other two accused to a prison term of six (6) months to four (4) years and two (2) months. We find the penalty of six (6) months within the minimum range as provided for by law. However, with respect to the maximum term, We hold that the proper penalty imposable under the circumstances is four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant EDUARDO CORTEZ for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correcional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Buzon, and Maambong, JJ., concur.

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¹ Original Record, pp. 266-271.

² Original Record, p. 271.

³ Id., pp. 1-2.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Id., p. 64.

⁶ Id., p. 109.

⁷ Id., p. 88.

⁸ Id., p. 128.

⁹ Rollo, pp. 68-69.

¹⁰ Original Record, p. 184.

¹¹ Id., p. 199.

¹² Id., p. 199-A.

¹³ Id., p. 200.

¹⁴ Id., p. 237.

¹⁵ Id., p. 244.

¹⁶ Original Record, p. 5.

¹⁷ Exh. “B,” Id., p. 173.

¹⁸ Exh. “C,” Original Record, pp. 177-178.

¹⁹ See Siccuan v. People, 457 SCRA 458, 464 (2005).

²⁰ TSN, 5 January 1999, p. 5.

²¹ Ibid.

²² TSN, 14 June 1999, pp. 2-3.

²³ TSN, 2 February 1999, p. 6.

²⁴ Id., p. 11.

²⁵ TSN, 18 May 1999, p. 17.

²⁶ See Siccuan v. People, 457 SCRA 458, 464 (2005).

²⁷ TSN, 18 May 1999, p. 11.

²⁸ Exh. “A,” Original Record, p. 5.

²⁹ Id., pp. 13-16.

³⁰ See Bon v. People, 419 SCRA 101, 113-114 (2004).

³¹ See People v. Que, 265 SCRA 721, 731 (1996).

³² See Tan v. People, 290 SCRA 117, 130 (1998).

³³ Original Record, p. 271.

³⁴ People v. Martinez, 274 SCRA 259, 273 (1997).

³⁵ Rollo, p. 59.