MODESTA JIMENEZ VDA. DE NOCETE, PLAINTIFF?APPELLANT, VS. PILAR OIRA, DEFENDANT?APPELLEE.

This is a pauper’s appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental, the Honorable Judge Macario P. Santos, presiding, dismissing the case on the
stated reasoning that it being one of forcible entry appealed from the
municipal court (now City Court) of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental and the “pleadings of the parties show
clearly that the question of ownership over the land in question is very much
involved and for that reason, this case should have been dismissed outright in
the inferior court; added to this is the fact that the original plaintiff has
already died.  Since actual possession is
an indispensable requisite in a forcible entry case, which circumstance is
wanting in the now plaintiff, for the most that she could reasonably aver is
only constructive possession which began upon the death of the original
plaintiff, her case is untenable.”

The lone assignment of error of appellant reads thus:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF:

A.  DUE TO THE DEATH OF THE
ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF, MARCELO NOCETE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S HUSBAND AND
PREDECESSOR-IN­-INTEREST, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL IN THE TRIAL COURT.

B.  SINCE THE QUESTION OF
OWNERSHIP OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION IS INVOLVED AS SHOWN IN THE PLEADINGS.

After going over the record on appeal herein, We find no other
recourse but to dismiss this appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction on the
part of this Court inasmuch as the inferior court was without original
jurisdiction in the premises.  To be
sure, We have come to this conclusion not for the reasons advanced by the court
a quo, but for others, more patent which from the very start
should not have escaped the justice of the peace with whom the complaint was
filed.  Indeed, this case has been
treated all along as one of forcible entry whereas very little reflection is needed
for anyone to see that it is not such a case. 
Withal, a cursory read­ing of the answer filed by the defendant in the
inferior court readily reveals that plaintiff and defendant are referring to
distinct lots, albeit they both proceeded from the subdivision of a bigger lot
into six aliquot parts; plaintiff acquired one part and the defendant be­came
the owner of another part.

The original complaint filed in the inferior court contained the
following pertinent material allegations:

“C O M
P L A I N T

x        x          x          x          x

2. That plaintiff
has been the legal, actual and physical possessor of a portion of a parcel of
land, consisting of one-sixth (1/6) share thereof, together with the im­provements
existing thereon, be­ing a portion of Lot No. 3463 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre, which is more particularly described and bounded as follows:

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE No. 557-A 
(now TCT No. T-81)

A parcel of land (Lot No. 3463 of the
Cadastral Survey of Dumaguete) with the improvements
thereon, situated in the barrio of Candaw-ay, City
of Dumaguete, Philippines.  Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 3462
& 3466; on the SE., by Lot No. 3466, Sapang Okay,
and Lot No. 3463; on the SW., by Lots Nos. 3463 & 3464; and on the NW., by
Lots 3461 and 3458; containing an area of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
SIXTY-EIGHT (45,568) SQUARE METERS, more or less, and assessed at P150.00 under
Tax Declaration No. 15308.

x        x          x          x

5. That from 1925,
date of his purchase, plaintiff immediately took actual and physical possession
of the premises in question, openly, peacefully, adversely, in concept of
owner, and continuously until this year 1961, when, in the month of May, 1961,
and then again on Septem­ber 8, 1961, respectively, his posses­sion has been
unlawfully disturbed by defendant and illegally dispossessed plaintiff by
force, intimidation, threat, stealth or strategy, to the damage and prejudice
of plaintiff.

x        x          x          x

12.  That in the month of May, 1961, defend­ant
entered the land in question, and by means of force, intimidation, threat,
stealth or strategy, illegally dispos­sessed plaintiff of the land and
unlawfully wrested from him his possession thereof, gathered the coconuts on
the land and availed herself of the proceeds thereof in the amount of P49.00,
to the damage and preju­dice of plaintiff.

13.  That despite the pleading made by plaintiff to
defendant not to re­peat her unlawful act alleged in the preceding 12th
paragraph, which, by the way, lasted for only about one day in the month of
May, 1961, for defendant left the premises im­mediately after gathering the
coco­nuts, defendant, on September 8, 1961, again entered the land in question,
and by means of force and intimidation illegally dispossessed plaintiff of the
land and unlawfully wrested from him his possession thereof, gathered the
coconuts on the land and availed herself of the fruits thereof in the amount of
P49.00, to the damage, and preju­dice of the plaintiff.

14.  That every after harvesting and gathering the
coconuts in the land, one day in May, 1961, and again on September 8, 1961,
defendant leaves the premises in question and plain­tiff fears that since
harvest time is approaching, defendant will again enter the land and harvest
the pro­ducts thereof.”

For emphasis, the following additional allegations are quoted
separately:

“PETITION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

12.  Paragraphs 1 to 14 above are reproduced herein
by reference.

13.  That the unlawful and illegal, acts of the
defendant adverted to above, unl­ess restrained, would cause great or
irreparable injury to plaintiff.

14.  That plaintiff is entitled to an injunction,
restraining, and enjoining de­fendant from the commission or continuance of her
unlawful and illegal acts of forcibly entering the lot in question and gathering
and har­vesting the products thereon.

15.  That great or irreparable injury would result
and suffered by plain­tiff before the matter can be heard on notice, and
plaintiff is ready and willing to put up the requisite bond for the issuance of
the injunc­tion.”

In the light of these allegations, certainly, this is not a case
of forcible entry, for the very simple reason that the defendant allegedly
entered the land of the plaintiff only one day each in the months of May and
Sep­tember, 1961, leaving immediately after harvesting coco­nuts therein, and
on the day the complaint was filed, plaintiff was the one in actual physical
possession of the land in question. 
Properly considered, the said com­plaint alleges three causes of action,
the first two re­ferring to the allegedly unauthorized entries or trespassing
of one day each in May and September, 1961 by the defendant and her gathering
or harvesting of plain­tiff’s coconuts therein (valued totally at P98.00) for
which plaintiff is asking for reimbursement and damages and the third being the
plaintiff’s fear that “since harvest time is approaching, defendant will
again enter the land and harvest the products thereof”, against which he
asks for (a writ of preliminary) injunction.

Without these allegations and the prayer for in­junction, the
plaintiff’s action is a simple one for recovery of the cost of the coconuts
harvested allegedly by the defendant.  It
is likely that the plaintiff so thought his action to be, because the writ of
injunction he prayed for was only a preliminary one, little realizing, perhaps,
that the court had no jurisdiction to issue such a writ, being merely an
inferior court, not a court of first instance upon which such jurisdiction is
conferred by law.  Only if his case were
really a forci­ble entry one that the inferior court could legally issue a writ
of preliminary injunction.^[1]
On the other band, We perceive that plaintiff’s main concern was to stop de­fendant
from going back for another one-day excursion or trespass in his land.  For this reason, it is more in consonance with
this objective that his complaint should be treated as one for injunction,
which, of course, is beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court.  (See Rus­tia vs.
Franco, 41 Phil. 280, 283)

We deem it unnecessary to deal more than in passing, with the
other points discussed by the parties. 
We con­sider the way they were handled by the lower court as more fit
for the attention of the Department of Justice in its effort to improve the
quality of the judicial ser­vice in this country.  Just as an example, the two grounds invoked
by the court a quo in dismissing appel­lant’s case, already
stated at the outset hereof, are clearly erroneous.  His Honor held that by the allegations in the
pleadings, it is obvious that the issue of owner­ship is involved, thus
overlooking that it is already settled by decisions of this Court that inferior
courts do not lose jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer merely because the issue of ownership is raised in
the pleadings and that it is only after evidence is presented and the court
finds therefrom that the question of possefession is inextricably fused with the issue of
ownership, such that the former cannot be decided without first passing on the
latter, that it can declare itself without jurisdiction.  (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963
ed., Vol. III, pp. 280-281.) Likewise, His Honor held that because the
plaintiff died while the appeal to the court of first instance was pend­ing,
the case had to be dismissed, since “actual posses­sion is an
indispensable requisite in a forcible entry case, such circumstance is wanting
in the plaintiff (the widow who substituted for the deceased plaintiff on
behalf of his estate, at least half of which was hers as her share of the
conjugal assets), forgetting that, if this case were a genuine one of forcible
entry, it was the actual possession of her husband and/or the family prior to
the entry that would be material and said actual possession passed to his
estate juridically and fact­ually upon his death,
said estate being, legally speaking a continuation of the deceased plaintiff’s
person and per­sonality.  It would be
subversive of the social order and the peace and tranquility in the community,
if just be­cause the plaintiff in a forcible entry case dies, the estate would
be held as without personality to continue the action to oust the intruder from
the property con­cerned.  Again, the
court a quo and appellee seemed to be
of the view that the action of forcible entry is a person­al one, which is
erroneous, since definitely, such an act­ion is a real one, being founded on
the privity of the real property, the land or
building involved, even if at the same time it is in personam
and, not in rem.

This case is indeed a clear example of how inade­quate
understanding of the simplest rules of procedure on the part of some members of
the bar, no less than some judges, can cause useless effort, anxiety and ex­pense
to the parties and, of course, the clogging of the dockets of the courts, with
the consequent detriment to public interest. 
Much of the delay in the administration of justice so much decried by
many these days, can be easily relieved, if lawyers and, particularly, judges of
the courts of first instance, devoted more time to acquaint themselves with –
at least, the basic rules of procedure and took greater interest in trying to
adhere to them, without forgetting at the same time that tech­nicalities that
subvert substantial justice must be dis­regarded.  In his short tenure of hardly three months so
far in this Court, the writer of this opinion has obser­ved that a great
number, if not the majority of the cases coming up here for resolution, involve
questions of procedure, very often so simple that it is to be wond­ered why
they ever reached this Court.  Thanks to
Repub­lic Act 5440, this Court can, at least, minimize now instances of this
nature, since under this law, the Court can dismiss outright this kind of
appeals, but the Court still needs the cooperation of the lower courts and the
bar in finding the most effective solutions to the rather slow pace of
litigations in our courts which may, indeed, God forbid, be the last straw that
might break the camel’s back of the confidence of our people in our democratic
form of government and way of life.

WHEREFORE, this appeal is dismissed, without costs.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur

Reyes, JBL, and Teehankee, JJ., concur in
the result.

Concepcion, C.J., did not take part.

^[1]
Under the Rules in force in October 1961, when case was originally filed, a
plaintiff in forcible entry case could secure a preliminary injunction only
“to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession
against plaintiff” (section 3, Rule 72). Under Article 539 of the Civil
Code, already in force then, plaintiff in such a case could also move for a
preliminary injunction to restore him in his possession, if the action is filed
within ten days from the filing of the complaint. Obviously, neither of these
injunc­tions were possible simply because defendant was not in possession. Even
if the petition for injunction were waived in the light of the rule on
injunction in ordinary cases (Rule 59), still no injunction would lie in this
case be­cause, as regards future harvest times, there was no specific averment
that defendant was actually threatening to gather coconuts again in the area in
question, all that is alleged is plaintiff’s fear, which is purely speculative,
that defendant would go back to her land.