G.R. No. L-46306. February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, BRANCH III, AND BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, RESPONDENTS.
SANTOS, J.:
On the basis of the complaint[1]
of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto
was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castañeda, Jr., with the crime of
Falsification of Public Document committed, according to the Information, as
follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of
San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with
deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his
spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein
he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse in
favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII,
Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making
it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to said
sale when in fact and in truth she did not.[2]
At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the
witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking
Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification
by reason of interest or relationship. – The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are
interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
xx xx xx
xx xx
(b) A husband can
not be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or
against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to
disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule,
contending that it is a “criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other.” Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or
against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration was filed but
was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, seeking to set
aside the aforesaid orders of the respondent Judge and praying that a
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order be issued by this Court
enjoining said judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid
Criminal Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved – (a) to issue a temporary
restraining order, and (b) to require the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the petitioner.[3]
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27,
1977,[4]
and its Memorandum in support of the Petition on August 30, 1977.[5]
The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5, 1977.[6]
Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision.[7]
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the
sole issue determinative of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification
of Public Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto
– who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a
deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent
to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in
fact and in truth she did not – may be considered as a criminal case for a
crime committed by a husband against his wife, and, therefore, an exception to
the rule on marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner’s stand that the case is an exception to
the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by
the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification
of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife’s signature in a
deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the
sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact
and in truth she did not. It must be
noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the
wife’s name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of
the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. Clearly, therefore, it is the husband’s
breach of his wife’s confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which
prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. To rule,
therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one
spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards
the factual antecedents of the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific
offense may be classified as a crime committed by one spouse against the other
is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan,[8]
this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be
followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this
jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64,
25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
“The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon
the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly
affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE
DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT
COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by)
one against the other.”
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v.
Daquigan, this Court held that the rape committed by the husband of the
witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by the husband
against his wife. Although the victim
of the crime committed by the accused in that case was not his wife but their
daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for the reason that
said criminal act “positively undermine(d) the connubial
relationship.”[9]
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case
where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife
herself. And it is undeniable that the
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. This is apparent not
only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts[10]
in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order
disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the
witness-wife underscore the fact that the marital and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, as We have
occasion to point out in previous decisions, “identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
nonexistent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at
protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.[11]
Thus, there is no reason to apply the marital disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that
the wife should not be disqualified from testifying against her husband in the
instant case. For, as aptly observed by
the Solicitor General, “(t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the
dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications against his
wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a
license to injure and prejudice her in secret – all with unabashed and complete
impunity.”
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court
dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or
against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as
the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby
SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to proceed with the trial of the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to
testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr., concur.
[1]
See Annexes “A”, “B”, and “B-1” of the Petition
(Rollo, pp. 11-15).
[2]
Annex “C” of the Petition (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
[3]
Rollo, p. 39.
[4]
Ibid., p. 44.
[5]
Ibid., p. 76.
[6]
Ibid., p. 87.
[7]
Ibid., p. 99.
[8]
G.R. No. L-39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270, at 273.
[9]
Id., p. 274.
[10]
Victoria Manaloto, through her counsel, assisted the Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga in filing the instant petition for certiorari (rollo, pp.
9-10). Furthermore, she filed on Aug.
22, 1977 a memorandum in support of the petition (rollo, pp. 68-74),
and, on Dec. 28, 1977, a pleading entitled “Chronologically – Effected
Observations and Circumstances in Support of or to Buttress Memorandum for
Private Petitioner Victoria M. Manaloto, dated August 18, 1977 “informing
this Court that the trouble in her marital relation with her husband, the
herein private respondent, is “beyond repair.” (rollo, pp.
105-108).
[11]
People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704 (cited in Ordoño vs.
Daquigan, supra.).