GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. FAUSTINO CARDENA ADONA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions January 10, 2013 THIRD DIVISION CARANDANG, J.:


CARANDANG, J.:


Assailed in this appeal is the Resolution[1] dated January 10, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, granting the Petition for Extradition filed against herein respondent-appellant Faustino Cardena Adona, the decretal portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Petition for Extradition filed by the Petitioner, Government of the United States of America respresented by the Philippine Department of Justice is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Faustino C. Adona is hereby EXTRADITED from the Republic of the Philippines to the United States of America in connection with the offenses with which he is charged and said respondent is placed at the disposal of the authorities of the United States Government at the time and place to be determined by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines upon consultation with the United States Embassy of America.

Respondent’s Petition for Bail is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.”

The facts of the case:

Respondent-appellant Faustino Cardena Adona (hereinafter “appellant Adona”) was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery in the second degree, false imprisonment, second degree burglary, and grand theft before the Superior Court of the State of California, Country of Alameda, Freemont Branch.

A warrant for his arrest[2] was issued on April 20, 2011 by the Superior Court of California.

On November 22, 2011, Deputy Attorney General Ralph Sivilla of the State of California filed a seventh amended felony complaint charging appellant Adona and co-defendants with five (5) counts of Kidnapping to Commit Robbery in violation of California Penal Code Section 209(b)(1); five (5) counts of Robbery in the Second Degree in violation of California Penal Code Section 211; five (5) counts of False Imprisonment in violation of California Penal Code Section 236; one (1) count of Grand Theft in violation of California Penal Code Section 487(a); and second degree Burglary in violation of California Penal Code Section 459.[3]

On January 11, 2012, the Government of the United States of America (USA) made a request for the provisional arrest of appellant Adona pursuant to Article 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for Provisional Arrest[4] which was granted by the RTC of Manila, Branch 22 in its Order[5] of Provisional Arrest dated January 12, 2012.

On January 20, 2012, appellant Adona was arrested by agents of the NBI. He remains in custody at the NBI Detention Center.

On March 19, 2012, the United States Embassy transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) the request for extradition and the authenticated supporting documents.[6] The DFA, in turn, forwarded the documents to the Department of Justice (DOJ).[7]

On April 24, 2012, the DOJ filed the Petition for Extradition[8] with the RTC of Manila and the same was raffled to Branch 39.

Appellant Adona is a naturalized American citizen, born in the Philippines on December 19, 1971. On February 27, 2011, at approximately 8:40 A.M., fifteen (15) armed men, including appellant Adona, with shotguns, semi-automatic pistols, revolver and a long gun, stormed the warehouse of Unigen Corp. located at 45388 Warm Springs Blvd., Fremont California, USA. They took (3) employees from outside the warehouse and transported them inside the building. They also took two (2) more employees who were in the building. Lance Milburn, Christopher Jeremiah, Lowell Miller, Christopher Guerrero and Anthony Campa were all taken as hostages. The suspects duct taped their eyes and mouths, shoved them into an office and ordered them to give up their wallets. The suspects then searched the warehouse and stole 1.7 million computer chips, worth roughly US37 million dollars. Appellant Adona was described by several other defendants as the mastermind behind the robbery. He was identified as having been at the robbery planning meeting which occurred at a restaurant prior to the robbery of the company. Appellant Adona was identified as having gone to the Unigen business location in a van at the time of the robbery. For planning and assisting in the kidnapping and robbery that occurred at Unigen, appellant Adona aided and abetted in the commission of the crime and is criminally liable for all seventeen (17) charges as alleged in the complaint.

The offenses for which appellant Adona stand charged are extraditable offenses pursuant to Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. There is probable cause to believe that the crimes were committed and that appellant Adona committed the same.

Appellant Adona filed an Opposition to the Petition for Extradition[9]. He specifically denied the following: the events that led to the filing of the present petition; the existence or transmittal of the formal request for his extradition; the existence of the crimial charges filed against him before the Supreme Court of California as he already left the USA prior to the filing of the alleged criminal charges against him; and the existence of a warrant for his arrest.

Appellant Adona alleged that during the course of his employment as supervisor at USI Manufacturing, he had occasions to sell scrap and surplus computer parts. It was on these occasions when he met Kulwinderjit Sandhu (“Sandhu”), a person known to buy and sell computer and technology parts. Sometime in January 2011, he was approached by his acquaintances and employees of Unigen Corporation, Pierre Ramos (“Ramos”) and Alexander Robb Santos (“Santos”), who knew that appellant Adona had sold computer and technology parts. So Ramos and Santos asked appellant Adona to assist them in looking for possible buyers of computer microchips. Appellant Adona asked Ramos and Santos to bring some samples which he could show to computer and technology parts dealers. Sometime in February 2011, Ramos brought a few samples of microchips to appellant Adona who showed them to Sandhu who agreed to buy the microchips at the rate of $4.00 per piece. In the early part of March 2011, Ramos informed Adona that he already had the microchips and that the latter should contact his buyer. Rolando Secreto (“Secreto”), another acquaintance, would be bringing the microchips. During this time, appellant Adona was experiencing financial difficulties because he was out of work for almost two (2) years and he was planning to go to the Philippines to establish a trading business. A few days after Ramos got in touch with appellant Adona, the latter met with Secreto and went to the store of Sandhu. Appellant Adona introduced Secreto as the person selling microchips and he likewise informed Sandhu that the latter should directly conduct his business with Secreto as he, appellant, was planning to go to the Philippines.

On March 20, 2011, appellant Adona went to the Philippines. His wife, Grace, and their children followed sometime in June 2011 and stayed in the Philippines for a month. Appellant Adona started a rice trading business while in the Philippines. In September 2011, his wife sent him US$5,000.00 as business capital. His wife returned to the Philippines in December 2011 to help appellant Adona establish their rice trading business.

On January 5, 2012, while appellant Adona and his wife were inside SM Sucat, a group of individuals approached him and inquired if he is Faustino Adona. The moment he answered, he was hand-cuffed and immediately brought under the custody of the Bureau of Immigration. The persons who arrested appellant Adona introduced themselves as members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and agents of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI). They confiscated his personal belongings. Appellant Adona learned that he was arrested because of a deportation proceeding filed against him which was later on dismissed in a Resolution[10] dated January 19, 2012.

As defenses to the instant petition for extradition, appellant Adona claimed that his constitutional right against deprivation of liberty without due process of law was violated. Section 20 of PD 1069 provides that “if within a period of twenty (20) days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs had not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody.” In this case, the Order for provisional arrest was issued on January 12, 2012 and a provisional arrest on appellant Adona was effected on January 20, 2012. The request for filing the petition for extradition was embodied in Note Verbale No. 0508 dated March 16, 2012, as supplemented by Note Verbale No. 0548 dated March 29, 2012, which was way beyond twenty (20) days after the provisional arrest was made. Appellant Adona questioned his continued detention on several occasions for failure of the requesting state to submit its extradition request and supporting documents as required by PD 1069; however, the motions filed remain unresolved. Further, appellant Adona averred that the petition for extradition contains discrepancy as to the date of the commission of the offense, i.e., the petition states that the alleged crimes committed by appellant Adona transpired on or about February 27, 2001, while its attachments alleged that the extraditable offenses were committed on February 27, 2011. Respondent Adona likewise questioned the authority of the DOJ to sign the certification against forum shopping in a petition for extradition. Unless authorized by the requesting state, the DOJ is bereft of authority to execute and sign the certification against forum shopping. Finally, appellant Adona argued that the crime of Kidnapping to Commit Robbery is a non-extraditable offense because such crime does not exist under the Philipine laws.

Appellant Adona likewise filed a Petition for Bail praying that he be allowed to post bail for his provisional liberty. He alleged that he is not a flight risk and is wiling to abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. The reason why he left the USA is not to flee from possible prosecution but to establish a trading business in the Philippines. He does not have financial wealth to be considered as flight risk. And that his continued detention is questionable.

In support of his petition for bail, appellant Adona presented the testimony of his sister, Charito Adona, in addition to his testimony. Charito Adona testified that appellant Adona has no means to support himself and that the latter is totally dependent upon her for support. Charito was the one who loaned the US$5,000.00 used by appellant Adona as initial capital in his rice trading business. If the petition for bail will be allowed, it will be Charito who will post bail for the temporary liberty of appellant Adona. In his testimony, appellant Adona declared, among others, that he is fully dependent upon his sister Charito for support; he left the USA to establish a rice trading business here in the Philipines and not to flee from criminal prosecution; it was Hon. Irene Susan B. Natividad, Assistant Secretary, Office of the Legal Affairs, DFA, who evaluated and referred the request for extradition to the DOJ; he is not a flight risk; and he is willing to abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

The foregoing testimonies were likewise adopted as evidence in support of appellant Adona’s opposition to the petition for extradition.

On January 10, 2013, the RTC issued a Resolution granting the petition for extradition and denying the petition for bail. After a thorough review of the documents and evidence presented by petitioner-appellee, the RTC ruled that the extradition request and the annexed documents are sufficient both in form and substance to satisfy the requirements of the law; hence, appellant Adona should be extradited to the USA. Further, the RTC observed that appellant Adona never denied that he was indicted at the California Courts for different offenses. The RTC was inclined to believe that he is awaiting trial for the said crimes at the California Court and in order that due process is accorded him, he must be extradited to the US to face the charges against him.

Appellant Adona moved for a reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit in the RTC Order[11] dated April 5, 2013.

Hence, this appeal. Appellant Adona raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS FROM INCEPTION TO END IS NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. PERSONS ASIDES (SIC) FROM SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FILE THIS CASE.

2. NO AUTHORITY TO SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION.

3. ILLEGALITY OF THE DETENTION.

4. NONE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND PD 1069.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Appellant Adona maintains that petitioner-appellee failed to comply with the mandatory procedures under the RP-US Extradition Treaty and PD 1069 (“The Philippine Extradition Law”). Appellant Adona claims that the duty to evaluate the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents lies with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In this case, it was the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Legal Affairs of the DFA who prepared the transmittal of the documents and request for extradition to the DOJ. He argues that a mere Assistant Secretary of the Foregin Affairs has no power or authority to pass upon the evaluation of the extradition. Further, the Assistant Secretary appeared to have no written authority to do so. Appellant Adona likewise insists that his provisional arrest, and his continued detention are illegal and constitute a violation of his consitutional right against deprivation of liberty without due process of law. There was no request for his arrest from the USA. He contends that the arrest and the request for the provisional arrest were mere unilateral actions of the NBI and the DOJ. He claims, therefore, that because of the continuous illegality of his detention, all the proceedings should be declared null and void. Finally, appellant Adona avers that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping of the petition for extradition are defective considering that the Secretary of Justice has no authority to sign the same.

Simply put, appellant Adona assails non-compliance with the procedural requirements for extradition under the RP-US Extradition Treaty and PD 1069. He specifically questions the following: (1) the authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Office of the Legal Affairs of the DFA to evaluate the extradition request; (2) the absence of a request for his arrest on the part of the requesting state (USA) which renders his continued detention illegal and a violation of his right against deprivation of liberty without due process of law; and (3) the Secretary of Justice has no authority to sign the Verification and Certification of the petition for extradition.

We have perused the DFA transmittal letter dated March 21, 2012, marked as Exhibit “B”. While it was signed by Assistant Secretary Irene Susan B. Natividad (Exh. “B-1-a”), it is very clear therein that she signed the transmittal letter “For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs”. This implies that it was as if the Secretary of the Foreign Affairs signed the transmittal letter after evaluating the extradition request and its supporting documents and finding the same sufficient in form and substance pursuant to PD 1069 and the relevant treaty or convention. Assistant Secretary Natividad signed the transmittal letter for the interest of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. She was acting for the benefit of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. That she was duly authorized to sign the transmittal letter on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is shown by the fact that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs neither disapproved it nor countermanded the same, even after the transmittal letter was received by the Secretary of Justice.

Anent appellant’s claim of lack of request for his arrest by the Requesting State (USA), records show that the there was indeed a request for his arrest given by the US. His provisional arrest was not a unilateral act of the NBI and the DOJ. The continued detention of appellant Adona is therefore valid and legal and he is not deprived of his right to liberty without due process of law.

In Note Verbale No. 0508[12] dated March 16, 2012, a diplomatic note executed by the Embassy of USA, it was clearly stated therein that appellant Adona was provisionally arrested “at the request of the United States on January 20, 2012.” Contrary to appellant Adona’s insistence, there was a request sent by the Requesting State before the provisional arrest was efffected. It should be noted that after receipt of the request for extradition, Secretary Leila M. De Lima of the DOJ forwarded said request to the Interpol Section of the National Bureau of Investigation on January 11, 2012, after which the NBI filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Application for Provisional Arrest” with the RTC of Manila. Paragraph eight (8) of the pleading states that a request for the provisional arrest of appellant Adona was made by the United States Department of Justice, viz:

“xxx

8. On January 11, 2012, the Honorable Secretary of Justice/Officer-In-Charge, NBI, LEILA M. DE LIMA, forwarded to Atty. CLARO C. DE CASTRO, JR., Chief, INTERPOL Section, Foreign Liaison Division, the original copy of the letter request of even date of the Unites States Department of Justice, with the enclosed copy of the “warrant of arrest” issued by the Honorable DENNIS McLAUGHLIN, Judge of the California Superior Court of the State of California, Country of Alameda, Fremont Branch, is hereto attached and marked as Annexes “C” to “C-20” and is made an integaral part hereof, directing his office to file immediately this Urgent Application for the Provisional Arrest of FAUSTINO CARDENA ADONA.”

Further, appellant Adona’s reliance on Section 20 of PD 1069 as to the 20-day effectivity period of the provisional arrest pending submission of the formal request for extradition is misplaced, as the RP-US Extradition Treaty, Article 9 thereof[13] provides a longer period of 60 days for the effectivity of the provisional arrest. The DFA received the request for extradition on March 19, 2012. Appellant Adona was provisionally arrested on January 20, 2012. Thus, it was well-within the 60-day period provided for in Article 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

The Verification and Certification are not defective. The lawyers of the DOJ who signed the same were duly authorized by the Secretary of Justice to specifically handle the extradition case against appellant Adona, and thus represent the interests of the Requesting State (USA). In the Department Order (D.O.) Order No. 217[14] dated March 2, 2012, the Secretary of Justice directed Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III, State Counsels Mildred Bernadette B. Alvor, Mary Grace R. Quintana, Ma. Pamelyn A. Omalin and Jeanette M. Dacpano “to take charge of, and handle, the request of the Government of the United States of America for the extradition of FAUSTINO CARDENA ADONA”.

Thus, the lawyers of the DOJ who signed the Verification and Certification against Non-Forum Shopping were duly authorized by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Section 5 of PD 1069 which provides:

Section 5. Duty of Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Referral of Request: Filing of Petition.

(1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of these case.

(2) The attorney so designated shall file a written petition with the proper Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, with a prayer that the court take the request under consideration and shall attach to the petition all related documents. The filing of the petition and the service of the summons to the accused shall be free from the payment of docket and sheriff’s fees.

(3) The Court of First Instance with which the petition shall have been filed shall have and continue to have the exclusive power to hear and decide the case, regardless of the subsequent whereabouts of the accused, or the change or changes of his place of residence. (Bold Ours)

On the other hand, that the lawyers duly authorized by the Secretary of Justice shall represent the Requesting State finds basis in Article 17(1) of the RP-US Extradition Treaty; viz:

Article 17

Representation and Expenses

1. The Requested State shall advise, assist, appear in court on behalf of the Requesting State, and represent the interests of the Requesting State, in any proceeding arising out of a request for extradition. (Bold Ours)

All told, the grounds raised by appellant Adona in the instant appeal fail to provide a justification for a reversal of the assailed Resolution of the RTC granting the petition for extradition.

This Court has thoroughly and carefully examined the records of the case and finds that the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty or convention on extradition proceedings were duly complied with and that a prima facie case exists against appellant Adona. Be it noted that a petition for extradition shall be granted upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case.[15] Unlike in a criminal case which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction, a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.

The request for extradition duly complied with the requirements as set forth in Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and Sections 4 and 5 of PD 1069. The supporting documents attached to the extradition request sufficiently established the facts of the criminal case especially the name and identity of the accused (herein appellant Adona), the acts and ommissions complained of, and the time and commission of the crime. Authenticated copies of the criminal charges and the warrant of arrest of appellant Adona were likewise annexed to the request.

Particularly, the extradition request includes the following documents:

(1) Affidavit dated March 8, 2012 of Ralph A. Sivilla, Deputy Attorney General in and for the State of California (Exh. “H”) ;

(2) 7th Amended Felony Complaint in Case No. 241188 (Exh. “I”);

(3) The arrest warrant dated April 20, 2011 issued by Judge Dennis McGlaughlin of the Superior Court of California, Country of Alameda (Exh. “J”);

(4) A copy of the text of applicable provisions of the California Penal Code (Exh. “K”);

(5) Affidavit of Marshall Norton of the Mountain View Police Department and assigned as a Task Force Agent with the Rapid Enforcement Alliance Computer Team (REACT) and lead case agent assigned to the case, subscribed on March 6, 2012 (Exh. “L”);

(6) Affidavits of Kulwinderjit Sandhu dated February 28, 2012 and Leonardo Abriam dated March 5, 2012 (Exhs. “M” and “N”).

As required under paragraph 5(a) of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the said documents were authenticated by Consul Arlene Tullid-Magno of the Philippine Embassy in Washinton D.C., USA.[16]

After the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, through the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Legal Affairs of the DFA, found that the extradition request was sufficient in form and substance, the said request was forwarded to the Secretary of Justice, who, in turn, immediately designated and authorized Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III, State Counsels Mildred Bernadette B. Alvor, Mary Grace R. Quintana, Ma. Pamelyn A. Omalin and Jeanette M. Dacpano to take charge of this case.

The lawyers of the DOJ then prepared and filed the written petition with the RTC of Manila, attaching thereto all related documents.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the RTC granted the petition after finding the extradition request and the annexed documents sufficient both in form and substance. Further, the extradition court ruled that appellant Adona never denied in his testimony that he was indicted at the California Courts for five (5) counts of Kidnapping to Commit Robbery; five (5) counts of Robbery in the Second Degree; five (5) counts of False Imprisonment; one (1) count of Grand Theft; and second degree Burglary, and he never presented evidence that the charges against him are sham or only intended to discredit him. Thus, the RTC concluded that appellant Adona is awaiting trial for the crimes with the California Courts and in order that due process is accorded him, he must be extradited to the US to face the charges against him there.[17]

Indeed, the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty on extradition proceedings were duly complied with. That a prima facie case exists against appellant Adona finds basis in the Affidavits submitted by Ralph A. Sivilla, Deputy Attorney General, State of California, and Marshall Norton of the Mountain View Police Department and lead case agent assigned to the case wherein Adona aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. It should be stressed that the ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable,[18] all of which, are present in this case.

We likewise affirm the denial of appellant Adona’s petition for bail.

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.[19] After a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.[20] Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.[21]

In asking that he be allowed to post bail for his provisional liberty, appellant Adona maintains that he is not a flight risk and he is willing to abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. He claims that he left the US not to flee from possible prosecution but to establish a rice trading business in the Philippines. He was a holder of an American Passport, however, his passport and other personal belongings were all confiscated by the agents of the FBI during his arrest on January 5, 2012. He does not have financial wealth to be considered as flight risk. He was laid-off from employment for a period of two-years before he left for the Philippines. Even during his stay in the US, he depended only on government aid and help from his parents. At present, he is living from financial support given by his siblings and parents.

The circumstances given by appellant Adona are not special and compelling enough to grant his application for bail. Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. As held in the Purganan case: “The present extradition case validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country.”

Further, appellant Adona faces the possibility of a lengthy incarceration. Under the US laws, appellant Adona faces life imprisonment for the charge of Kidnapping to Commit Robbery, five (5) years imprisonment for Robbery, and three (3) years imprisonment for False Imprisonment and Grand Theft. The prospect of imprisonment for a long period of time and payment of millions of dollars in fine if convicted to all the charges against him are enough reasons for appellant Adona to flee the country once he is allowed to post bail for his provisional liberty.

In the Affidavit of Marshall Norton (Exh. “L”)[22], it was likewise stated therein that he interviewed appellant Adona’s wife and learned that Adona’s departure from the USA was unplanned and that he had abandoned her and their children, leaving a note in their home saying he was going to the Philippines and did not know when he would be in contact. More so, Detective Norton interviewed the arrested suspects who stated that Adona had learned of the police inquiries at UHaul and believe that appellant Adona fled the USA on March 10, 2011 in order to avoid arrest.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated January 10, 2013 and the Order dated April 5, 2013 issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 39, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Barza, R. F., and Reyes-Carpio, A., JJ., concur.


[1] Rollo, pp. 22-38; Records (Vol. II), pp. 926-942.

[2] Exh. “J”, Records (Vol. II), pp. 581-581-A.

[3] Exh. “I”, Records (Vol. II), pp. 569-579-A.

[4] Records (Vol. I), pp. 190-205.

[5] Records (Vol. I), 154-155.

[6] Exhs. “C”, “C-1” to “C-5”, Records (Vol. II), pp. 552-556.

[7] Exhs. “B”, Records (Vol. II), pp. 541-542.

[8] Records (Vol. I), pp. 1-25.

[9] Records (Vol. II), pp. 165-182.

[10] Records (Vol. I), pp. 188-189.

[11] Records (Vol. II), pp. 998-997.

[12] Records (Vol. I), p. 38.

[13] 1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice.

2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:

a) a description of the person sought;
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of conviction against the person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for any denial.

4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7.” (emphasis supplied)

[14] Records (Vol. I), p. 350.

[15] Section 10, PD 1069.

[16] Exh. “D”, Records (Vol. II), p. 557.

[17] RTC Resolution, Rollo, pp. 37-38.

[18] Government of the Unites States of America vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Records (Vol. II), p. 611.