JOSE TOPACIO NUENO, COMPLAINANT, VS. PASCUAL SANTOS, RESPONDENT.

These
proceedings present for consideration the question of what action, if
any, should be taken against Attorney Pascual Santos for malpractice.

Judge Anacleto Diaz of the Court of First Instance was made a special
investigator of conditions in the city government of Manila. In the
course of the investigation a complaint was filed by Jose Topacio
Nueno, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, against
Pascual Santos, another member of the municipal board, it being alleged
that the latter had interested himself in prohibited games. Santos was
required to answer the charges which he did by denying them. Hearings
were had on the said charges and the testimony of a number of witnesses
was taken. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Diaz made a report
to the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, in which he
recommended the removal of the respondent from his office of member of
the municipal board, and that all the papers connected with the charge
that the respondent had openly been running a club for gambling
purposes, such as the Circulo Nacionalista Consolidado Club and had
directly taken part in said games, be transmitted to the Supreme Court
for action, “it being evident that the respondent, as a member of the
Bar, violated his oath of office by deceiving the court and consenting
a falsehood to be committed, as it was in fact committed, in the case
referred to, viz.: Criminal case No. E-87890, Municipal Court of Manila, entitled P. P. I. vs.
Iñigo Hernandez.” On receipt of the report of Judge Diaz against
Attorney Santos, this court ordered it referred to the Attorney-General
for investigation, report, and recommendation. In the latter office
Attorney Santos was furnished with a copy of the report and was given
five days within which to state in writing whether or not he desired to
present evidence, in addition to that already adduced in the
investigation conducted by Judge Diaz, and to state why his disbarment
should not be recommended to the Supreme Court in view of the findings
of Judge Diaz. The respondent eventually filed an answer denying the
charge and requesting that he be given an opportunity to present
evidence in support of his defense.

At the commencement of
the investigation in the office of the Attorney-General, a question was
raised as to the exact charge, and it finally seems to have been agreed
that the respondent stood charged on but one count, namely, that he, as
counsel for Iñigo Hernandez who was charged with a violation of an
ordinance for having willfully and unlawfully encouraged, tolerated and
permitted to be played a game of chance and hazard commonly known as
“monte”, wherein money and other things of value were played for at No.
18 Soler Street, Manila, Criminal case No. E-87890 of the municipal
court of Manila, entered a plea of guilty for said Hernandez although
he knew that the latter was a mere waiter in said house and did not
encourage, tolerate, or permit a game of “monte” to be played in said
house. It seems further to have been agreed that additional evidence
could be received limited to that charge. At any rate, the respondent
called Iñigo Hernandez as his witness and testified in his own behalf.
It was only at the conclusion of the hearing that counsel for the
respondent protested against the evidence which had been received by
Judge Diaz being taken into account against him. The report of the
Solicitor-General concludes with the recommendation that disciplinary
action be taken against the respondent. In a memorandum filed with the
court the respondent has protested against the irregularity of the
investigation and has asked for exoneration.

The way the
proceedings have been handled leads us to believe that the respondent
was fully informed of the specific charge against him, and that it was
not improper to consider the evidence taken by Judge Diaz, and in
conjunction with the additional evidence received by the
Solicitor-General, to make findings thereon. We further believe that
there is no escaping the conclusion that the respondent attorney
consented to the doing of a falsehood and deceived the court when he
had an accused plead guilty to an offense which he had not committed.
The background of the administrative investigation showing the
respondent’s connection with prohibited games, under the circumstances
of the case, can only be taken into consideration in so far as it
relates to the precise charge laid against him. There was a clear
violation of the lawyer’s oath that he would do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court.

From one standpoint,
the facts merit our dealing sternly with the respondent for having
violated his oath of office. On the other hand, in favor of the
respondent are the circumstances that the charge is strictly
circumscribed to the improper action taken by him in one case; that
political considerations induced the filing of the charges against him
before Judge Diaz, and that the matter involved was not new but had
occurred approximately two years before the investigation was begun.
The facts, are, therefore, different from those found in the case of In re De Lara ( [1914], 27 Phil., 176), where the attorney was disbarred, and in the cases of In re Terrell ([1903], 2 Phil., 266), and Piatt vs. Abordo ([1933], No. 1781),^[1] where
the attorneys were each suspended, for a term of one year. A brief
period of suspension will serve to indicate our disapprobation of the
deceit practiced by the respondent on the court and will be fair to the
respondent.

It is the order of the court that effective as
of October 16, 1933, the respondent Pascual Santos be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three months.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villa-Real, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Page 350, ante.