PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. JUANITO PAJARILLO AND ALMARIO RODRIGUEZ, ACCUSED.

For automatic review by this
Court are two decisions of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal,
imposing two death penalties on accused Juanito Pajarillo and Almario Rodriguez
one for the murder of Roque Danao,
and the other for the murder of Reynaldo Guevarra,
and ordering each of said accused to indemnify the respective heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the
amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to
pay proportionate costs.

It appears that two
separate informations were filed against the two
herein appellants, in the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal,
one for the murder of Roque Danao
(CCC-VII-467-Rizal), and the other, also for the murder of Reynaldo Guevarra (CCC-VII-468-Rizal).

Upon being arraigned on September
14, 1970, with the
assistance of Atty. Jose Galvan, as counsel de oficio,
both accused entered pleas of not guilty. 
However, at the first day of trial which was set for September 16 and
17, 1970, the two accused, through their de oficio
counsel, Atty. Galvan manifested to the court that they are withdrawing their
former plea of not guilty, and requested to be re-arraigned so that they could
enter a plea of guilty.^[1] With this manifestation, the trial court
informed the accused that by changing their plea of not guilty to one of
guilty, they will be sentenced to death as provided by law.  Atty. Galvan, nevertheless, reiterated that
accused “are withdrawing
their former plea of not guilty to that of guilty in the two cases.”^[2] Whereupon, the interpreter was ordered to
read to the accused the two informations, and on
being asked if they admit guilt, both accused gave affirmative answers.  Forthwith, the trial court promulgated the
corresponding sentence of death to both accused under each of the two separate informations.

The plea of guilty had
the effect of admitting all the material allegation of the information under
which herein appellants were arraigned.^[3] The first information is quoted hereunder as
follows:

“That on or about the 6th day of December, 1969, in the municipality
of Muntinlupa, province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, prisoners confined at the New Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
and members of the BRM (Bicol Region Masbate) gang, conspiring and confederating together with
seven (7) other John Does, also prisoners in said prison whose true identities
are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with deadly
weapons prisoner Roque Danao,
a member of a rival gang, the “Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik”, as a result of which, the said Roque Danao sustained stab wounds on the different parts of his
body which directly caused his death.

“Contrary to law, and with the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength present in the commission
of the crime.” (p. 5, Rollo).

The other information is also quoted as follows:

“That on or about the 6th day of December, 1969, in the
municipality of Muntinlupa, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, prisoners confined at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, and members of the BRM (Bicol
Regions Masbate) gang, conspiring and confederating
together with seven (7) other John Does also prisoners of said prison whose
true identities are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with deadly weapons Prisoner Reynaldo Guevarra, a
member of a rival gang, the “Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik,” as a result of which, the said Reynaldo Guevarra
sustained stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused
his death.”

The following facts, as
recited in the People’s brief, may thus be considered undisputed:

“At about 9:00 in the morning of December 6, 1969, a melee
took place between two groups of prison inmates at the Muntinlupa
Penintentiary, Muntinlupa, Rizal, namely, the Bicol Region Masbate (BRM) and the Sigui-Sigui
Sputnik, lasting for several minutes. 
After the prison’s custodial force and the PC broke up the riot with
tear gas, prisoners Romeo Danao and Reynaldo Guevarra were found dead from stab wounds and six other
prisoners were wounded (pp. 51-52, Rec.).

“Before the riot, accused Rodriguez was in his quarter (“brigada“). 
Hearing a commotion outside, he went down armed with a knife and upon
seeing another prison inmate, a Sputnik member, whose name he did not
know, fatally stabbed him in the chest, after which he returned to his
quarters.  Accused Pajarillo
also stabbed the victim (pp. 44-46, Rec.). 
During the same occasion, both accused, likewise, stabbed another
prisoner fatally three times (pp. 47-48, Rec.).

“In his postmortem examination of the victims Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, prison physician, found the cause of death as due
to “multiple stab wounds of the body’ (pp. 49-50, Rec.).”

The first question that
naturally comes to the mind of the Court is whether the trial court acted
properly in accepting the plea of guilty and forthwith pronouncing judgment
imposing the death penalty without requiring evidence to be adduced both as to
the guilt of the accused, and as to the circumstances attendant to the commission
of the crime^[4] to avoid improvident pleas of guilt.

We agree with the
Solicitor General^[5] in his observation that “in the instant
cases, x x x appellants’
pleas of guilty could not have been improvidently made.  They were apprised by the trial court of the
consequences of their pleas.  The record
shows that they pleaded guilty with assistance of counsel, Atty. Galvan, who
was on hand at all times, and that the presumption of regularity and
faithfulness in the performance of official function on his part has not been
overcome (pp. 1-4, t.s.n., September 16, 1970).”^[6]

Appellants’ counsel de
oficio in this appeal, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, himself observed, by way of justifying the
trial court’s conduct of the trial,
that the said court “before accepting the change pleas of guilty took
pains to explain that the only possible penalties in these cases would be that
of capital punishment.” Counsel de oficio
then states that “we would rather review the independently qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.”^[7]

As will presently be seen
the plea of guilty was well-advised, without it being followed by the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution.  Counsel de oficio
promptly seized the opportunity to assail the judgment appealed from, as
infected by the evident errors committed by the trial court.  Thus, it was a manifest error, as contended
correctly by counsel de oficio, who
should be commended for his zeal and industry in handling these cases for
appellants, for the court a quo to have applied Art. 160 of the
Revised Penal Code, there being no allegation in the informations
that the appellants were previously “convicted by final judgment” nor
evidence thereof adduced.  The
application of this provision would call for the imposition of the death
penalty, which is the maximum of the penalty for the new felony committed while
the appellants were in the penitentiary. 
For, indeed prisoners therein are not all serving final sentences; they
may be merely detention prisoners.  The
Solicitor General readily conceded that the trial court erred in this specific
instance.

The Solicitor General
also concurred with the view of counsel de oficio
that the pleas of guilty, which in themselves are mitigating, as in the cases
at bar, cover both crimes as well as the attendant circumstances qualifying
and/or aggravating the crime;^[8] and that such pleas are enough “to sustain
a conviction even for capital offense without the introduction of further
evidence (People vs. Parete, et. al., L-15515, April
26, 1961).”^[9] Appellants, indeed, confessed readily to the
crime with which they were charged.  And
introduction of further evidence after the plea of guilty could have proved
more prejudicial to the appellants for whose benefit the introduction of such
evidence is intended, as insurance against improvident pleas of guilty.  Evidence to show that appellants have been
“convicted by final judgment” when they committed the new crime might
have been presented and thereby call for the imposition of the death penalty.

Examining the entire
records of these cases which may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a
correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open
for review, it being the duty of the appellate court to correct such error as
may be found in the judgment appealed from,^[10] We find that abuse of superior strength and
treachery do not exist, as correctly contended by counsel de oficio,^[11] and again concurred in by the Solicitor
General General.^[12] Although alleged in the informations
these circumstances are not borne out by the Report of Intelligence and
Investigation,^[13] nor by the medical reports which do not
mention the location of the wounds as possible clue for the character of the
attack, whether frontal or from behind. 
On the other hand, in the statement of appellant Pajarillo,^[14] he admitted stabbing his victim in the
abdomen three times, suggesting a frontal assault.

Likewise, abuse of superior
strength is not convincingly disclosed by the prison report, it being merely
evident therefrom that the members of the rival gangs
are virtually equal in number which is given as 9 or 10 on the side of the
appellants’ gang, while on the rival gang, 2 were killed, 6 wounded, which
could possibly mean a greater number of members than just the eight (8)
members, killed and wounded.  Moreover,
mere superiority in number does not necessarily mean the existence of the
qualifying or aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.^[15]

As to the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation, We find the
Solicitor General again agreeing with counsel de oficio
that only in the case of appellant Pajarillo is this
circumstance present, as admitted by counsel de oficio.^[16] As to appellant Rodriguez, even as the appellee recited the facts in its brief, it would seem that
Rodriguez stabbed the victims only on a sudden impulse, negating evident
premeditation.

Appellants and appellees are also in agreement on the existence of two
mitigating circumstances, plea of guilty and that of voluntary surrender in
appellants’ favor.  We give our
imprimatur to their common submission, the same being in accordance with law
and the evidence.

It would result that appellant Almario
Rodriguez is guilty only of two crimes of homicide, with two mitigating and no
aggravating circumstances.  Appellant Juanito Pajarillo’s liability,
however, would be for two crimes of murder, qualified by evident premeditation,
with two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.  Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed on
appellant Rodriguez should be one degree lower than that prescribed for the
crimes committed (Art. 64, par. 3, Revised Penal Code) which would be prision mayor, or from 6 years and 1 day to
12 years.  For appellant Pajarillo, the penalty would be prision
mayor in its maximum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium
period.

Appellants, however, question the award of moral and exemplary
damages, as civil liabilities, no evidence having been presented, with respect
thereto, nor finding made in the decision, except their award.  We agree with the Solicitor General in its
refutation of appellants’ contention that “every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable” (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code), and
that “no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral x x x or exemplary damages may be
adjudicated,” for the assessment of such damages is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstance of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil
Code).  The circumstances are, as alleged
in the informations, to which appellants pleaded
guilty and, therefore, are deemed admitted, except as modified by the findings
of this Court upon a review of the entire records of these cases.

For all the foregoing, We hereby affirm
the two judgments of conviction, but modify the penalty imposed as follows:

(a)  For appellant Juanito
Pajarillo, who is hereby pronounced guilty of murder,
as found by the trial court, with two mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstances, an
indeterminate sentence of from 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, each in the two cases, Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VII-467 and CCC-VII-468,
Rizal, instead of DEATH as imposed by the court a
quo.

(b)  For appellant Almario
Rodriguez, who is hereby found guilty of homicide in each of the two cases,
with the same two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, each in the two cases, instead of DEATH as imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgments appealed from are affirmed in all other respects, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion,
Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Makasiar and Aquino,
JJ., dissent with dissenting opinions.

Fernando, C.J., (Chairman), concurs
with the dissent of J. Makasiar as to the plea of guilty having been independently made.

Barredo, J., votes with J. Aquino
in his dissent.

Antonio, J., took no part.

^[1]
Page 3, t.s.n., September 16, 1970.

^[2]
p. 4, t.s.n., Id.

^[3]
People vs. Boyles, 11 SCRA 88; People vs. Mongado,
28 SCRA 642; People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA
798; People vs. Pujinio, 27 SCRA 1185.

^[4]
U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; People vs.
Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798; People vs. Bulalake, et al., 106 Phil. 767; People vs. Baluyot, et al., 75 SCRA 148.

^[5]
The Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Antonio, is now a member of this Court.

^[6]
Page 5, Appellee’s Brief, p. 114; Rollo,
L-32571.

^[7]
Page 7, Appellants’ Brief, p. 67; Rollo,
Id.

^[8]
People vs. Boyles, et. al.
L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11
SCRA 88.

^[9]
Page 6, Appellants’ Brief.

^[10]
People vs. Villaruel, 51 O.
G. 242.

^[11]
Pages 7-9, Appellants’ Brief.

^[12]
Page 6, Appellee’s Brief.

^[13]
Pages 51-52, Record.

^[14]
Submitted to this
Court on motion of de oficio counsel
which was granted, together with prison report and medical report.

^[15]
People vs. Elizaga, et al.,
86 Phil. 364; U. S. vs. Devela, et al., 3 Phil. 625.

^[16]
Page 9, Appellants’ Brief.

Clean
Clean

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