PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. GREGORIO FLORES, ET AL., AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari from the resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc dated May 17, 1963, which
denied the Philippine Refining Company’s motion for reconsideration of the
portion of the decision of the trial Court dated April 19, 1963, ordering the
computation and payment to the therein petitioners (pri­vate respondents
herein) of the money value of fourteen (14) days vacation leave.

The petitioners in the Court below were former workers in the
Philippine Refining Company, Inc., (here­inafter referred to as the
Company) and members of the Philippine Refining Company Workers Union (CLO)
during their employment.  From 1945 to
1946 the union made numerous labor demands on the Company which gave rise to
several strikes and became the subject of litigation in CIR Cases Nos. 4-V and
32-V.  For having participated in an
illegal strike
on April 30, 1947, the said workers
were dis­charged for cause as of said date.

On December 28, 1956 Gregorio Flores and 110 others filed in the
CIR a petition dated December 26, 1956, which was docketed as Case No. 1042-V,
alleging among other things that the proceedings in Cases Nos. 4-V and 32-V
were suspended and were never continued or reopened, and that their demands
involved therein were left without final solution at the time of and after the
death of their former counsel during the pendency of
those proceedings.  They prayed:

“1.  That herein petitioners be reinstated to their
former work in the factory of the respondent;

“2.  That
they be paid their accumulated vacation leave with pay, backpay
during the Japanese occupation, salaries not paid due to the outbreak of the
last world war, unpaid overtime work, gratuity, and one month separation pay;

“3.  That the herein action be considered as a new
action, or a continuation or reopening of Cases Nos. 4-V and 32-V and such
other incidents and/or issues arising therefrom
during the labor controversy in this Court in 1946-1947 between the same
respondent and there herein petitioners; and

“4.  That such other relief as justice and equity
may require be granted the petitioners;”

The Company moved to dismiss the petition, but in an order dated February 13, 1958 the resolution of
the motion was held in abeyance until the case was submitted for decision.  In the same order the trial Court considered
the petition of December 26, 1956
“to be a petition for
enforcement of judgment in Cases Nos. 4-V and 32-V, where the Court has assumed and acted on its original jurisdiction.”

Subsequently the petition was amended several times for the
inclusion of 132 additional claimants.

After trial and submission of memoranda, the trial Court in its
decision dated April 19, 1963 dismissed the case “insofar as demands for
reinstatement, payment of backpay during the Japanese
occupation, overtime pay, gratuity, and separation pay are concerned,” but
ordered the Company to pay the petitioners below (respondents here) the money
value of the fourteen (14) days vacation leave. 
On this point the Court said:

“With respect to vacation leave, the decision dated January
24, 1947 in Case No. 32-V, which
was subsequently clarified and amended by the Court en banc in
its resolution dated May 9, 1947, reads
as follows:

‘The Court, therefore, directs the Company to grant two weeks
vacation leave with pay to all
laborers and working men who have rendered therein at least one year of continuous and faithful service,
to be enjoyed cumulatively at any time during the following year, provided the
enjoyment of the same shall not unnecessarily interrupt the proper functioning
of the business of the company and provided further, that nothing in this
decision shall prohibit the company from converting and giving to the laborers
or working men an equivalent in cash, of such vacation leave earned during the
period herein specified and, provided lastly, that those who have already
rendered continuous and faithful service of one year until the date of the
rendition of the decision, should enjoy the right of two weeks vacation leave,
during the current year.  For the purpose
of this vacation leave, continuous service should be construed as to include in
its computation absence or interruptions due to force majeure,
to acts of God and to lawful causes.’

“Respondent contended that the claim for payment of the accumulated vacation leave is without
merit because they have not served long enough from the date of the decision
establishing the right to vacation leave on January 24, 1947 up to
their discharge on April 30, 1947.  The contention is not correct because the
award clearly provides, among others, that laborers who have already rendered a year of service as of the
date of the decision would enjoy the right of two weeks vacation leave.  Having been in the employ of the company
since after liberation, it is believed
with some approach to accuracy that until, or as of, the date of rendition of
the judgment on January 24, 1947
they already acquired to their credit a year of service.  The period of strikes in January and
September, 1946 should not be discounted in the computation of continuity of
service, said strikes not having been declared illegal.

“It is also argued that petitioners could not demand cash in
lieu of such leave because commutation into cash was merely permissive and at
the company’s discretion.  This argument,
to the mind of the Court, is somewhat an arbitrary interpretation of the
award.  Simply stated, the theory of
respondent is that it will only give cash in lieu of leave when it thought wise
giving because it is best to its
interest but will refuse to recognize that which the laborers believe is good
for them, i.e., make use of the vacation leave or ask for the cash value
thereof and continue working.  That could
not be the intent and meaning of the award. 
From the context of the decision the company is not prevented or
precluded from giving the equivalent money value in lieu of enjoying or going
on leave, if the workers so desire.

“So that since the right has accrued, it stands to reason,
under any standard, that until the day of the declaration of the illegal strike
the workers should receive from the company, and the latter to pay, the money value of the vacation leave of at least fourteen (14) days.

“Prescription could not lie with regard to this particular
claim because Article 1144 of
the Civil Code provides ten years from
entry of Judgment within which the action on judgment prescribes.  The pertinent
decision on vacation leave is dated May 9, 1947 and, according to the records of Case
No. 32-V, the judgment was entered on the same date.  The petition in the case at bar was filed on December 28, 1956, which is very much within the prescriptive
period.”

The motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
portion of the decision having been denied by the CIR en banc, the Company brought this
appeal.

The issues presented by
the petitioner are as follows:

I.  On Jurisdiction

“A.  Does the Court of Industrial Relations have
jurisdiction to enforce a judgment rendered more than five (5) years past, or
almost ten (10) years since to be more precise, contrary to Section 23 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559 in relation to Section 6 of Rule
39 of the Rules of court?

“B.  Does the Court of Industrial Relations have
jurisdiction over a mere money claim consisting of the cash value of vacation leave pay where the claimants,
respondents Flores et al., have long ceased to be connected with petitioner
PRC?

II. 
On Authority to Alter Awards

“A.  Can the Court of Industrial Relations modify
its judgment far outside the three (3) year period within which it may, under
Section 17 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, amend, alter, set aside or reopen its orders, decisions or awards?

III. 
On Laches

“A.  Is not non-commutable and non-cumulative
vacation leave, or its cash equivalent, if allowed, unclaimed for almost ten
(10) years as held in Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. vs. A. Balanguit, G. R. No.
L-8715, June 30, 1956,
deemed waived or otherwise barred by laches?

Under Section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 559, an award, order or decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations “may be enforced by a writ of execution or any other
remedy provided by law in respect to enforcement and execution of orders, decisions or judgments of the Court of First
Instance.” Under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the (former) Rules of Court,
“A judgment (of the Court of First Instance) may be executed on motion
within five years from the date of its entry … (and) after the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action.”

As has been noted
heretofore the private respondents, in their petition below, prayed for several
reliefs – reinstatement, vacation leave with pay, backpay, overtime pay, gratuity, and separation pay – but
all such reliefs were denied except the money value
of the vacation leave already earned. 
Concerning this particular item the allegation in the petition is as
follows:

“(a)  With respect to this demand, the workers were
granted fourteen (14) days vacation leave with pay every year by this Honorable
Court in its decision dated January 24, 1947 (Case No. 32-V).”

1.  The Company challenges
the jurisdiction of the respondent Court to enforce its 1947 judgment on the
ground that more than five (5) years had passed since it became final when the
petition for that purpose was filed on December
28, 1956.  The decisive
question is of course, whether
the said petition, insofar as the award of vacation leave with pay is concerned, is a mere
motion for execution or an independent action to enforce the judgment within
the meaning of Section 6 of Rule 39. 
Stress is laid by the Company on the statement of the trial Judge in his
order of February 13, 1958 denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss,
construing the petition as “one for the enforcement of the judgment in
Cases Nos. 4-V and 32-V, where the Court has assumed and acted on its original
jurisdiction;” as well as on the pronouncement in the decision of April 19, 1963
that:  “In the opinion of the Court
the action would be treated as an incident to the original cases considering that, except
for the claim for gratuity and
separation pay, the subject matters are (a) continuation of the original cases or an
implementation of the decision rendered therein.”

The distinction sought to be drawn by the Company is more
specious than substantial.  It may be
observed that one of the prayers in the petition below was that the same
“be considered as a new action, or a continuation or reopening of cases Nos.
4-V and 32-V and such other incidents and/or issues arising therefrom
…;” and that it was in fact
initially filed as an independent action
and assigned its own docket number (1042-V). 
Indeed it could not have been filed as a simple motion for execution,
considering the other demands of the petitioners below which had not been the
subject of previous
adjudication.  If the Court of
Industrial Relations considered the action “as an incident to the original
cases,” it was because “the subject matters are (a) continuation
of the original cases or an implementation of the decisions rendered
therein,” and only as premise for the court’s ruling turning down, as it did,
“respondent’s contention that petitioners’ cause of action is barred by
prior judgments, that the petition does not state a valid cause of action, and
that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.”
From the more realistic point of view the petition below was not a mere motion
for execution but an action to enforce the judgment within the meaning of
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.

The argument that the
respondent Court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved a simple
money claim, the claimants having long ceased to be connected with the Company,
is manifestly without merit, considering that such claim was not being filed
for the first time but had already been awarded by final judgment, and all that
was being sought was its enforcement.

2.  The Company says that
the respondent Court, in its decision now under review, modified its en banc
resolution of May 9, 1947.  Under that resolution the Company’s employees
were granted two weeks vacation leave with pay provided they had rendered at
least one year of continuous and faithful service, the same to be enjoyed
cumulatively at any time during the following year.  The question now at issue is:  May such vacation leave be commuted
and converted into cash?  The same
resolution of the respondent Court answers this question in the affirmative, as follows:  ” … nothing in this decision should prohibit
the company from converting and giving to the laborers or working men the
equivalent in cash, of such vacation leave earned during the period herein specified …”
The Company submits, however, that under this provision the commutation
of the leave was permissive and depended solely upon the choice of the Company itself. 
As the respondent Court correctly found this is an unduly restrictive construction of the decision.  The fact that the Company was not prohibited
from converting the vacation leave into its equivalent in cash does not
necessarily mean that the workers had no right to ask for such conversion.  A fair and reasonable reading of the decision
would indicate that its import is that once they did demand such right the
Company was not forbidden to grant it. 
The decision is only permissive in this sense.  This is all the more
true with respect
to herein private respondents, who
had ceased to work as of April 30, 1947 and hence could no longer actually enjoy the vacation leave they had already earned
for services rendered up to the date of their dismissal – a right granted them
in the following portion of the judgment: 
“provided lastly, that those who have already rendered continuous
and faithful service of one year until the date of the rendition of the
decision, should enjoy the right of two weeks vacation leave, during the
current year.”

On the other hand, the sense of the judgment is that the vacation
leave granted thereunder, which could be enjoyed
following at least one year of continuous service, was only for a period of two
weeks.  The respondent Court in effect
adopted this view by ordering its examining division to “compute the money
value of 14 days vacation leave of the 242 petitioners herein, if entitled, … and render a report thereon
immediately, for further disposition.”

3.  The Company contends that
the claim of the workers for the cash equivalent of their vacation leave is
barred by laches, citing Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
vs. Balanguit, 99 Phil. 486.  The ruling of this Court in that case is not
here applicable.  The petition therein
was filed in 1952, some six years after the claimants were laid off, they being
employees of the FEATI, with whom they had a collective bargaining agreement
recognizing their right to the vacation leave, and the FEATI having ceased its
operations when they were taken over by the Philippine Air Lines in 1947.  In holding that laches
barred the claim, this Court said:  “It would be
unfair now to demand this payment from the PAL after more than five years when
the papers and the records of the service of said employees … may no longer
exist; when the FEATI has long ceased its operations and has long ceased to
exist and when its officials who were in a position to determine which
employees because of their faithful, efficient and continuous service were
entitled to leave and for how many days, may no longer be available.”
These circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.  Furthermore, while in the Philippine Air Lines
case the claim was filed for the first time after a number of years, the
petition in the present case was filed before the respondent Court to enforce a
judgment it had already rendered – a remedy expressly provided for in the Rules
of Court.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated April 19, 1963
and its resolution of May 17, 1963,
denying the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, are hereby affirmed with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., took no part.