ELIZALDE PAINT & OIL FACTORY, INC., PETITIONER VS. HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
praying this Court to reverse the resolution en banc of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated August 14, 1959 and to dismiss the case filed before
it on the ground that the industrial court lacks jurisdiction to try the same.

It appears that Pedro Basaysay was formerly employed by the Elizalde Paint
& Oil Factory, Inc. during the period from May 30, 1949 to January 2, 1958.
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement entered into between said company
and the Elizalde Paint & Oil Factory Labor Union of which Basaysay was a
member providing for gratuity to any deserving laborer who may retire, the
company tendered him a check in the amount of P1,051.90 as payment of any and
all kinds of services he may have rendered requiring him at the same time to
sign a release and quitclaim form. Believing, however, that he was entitled to
more compensation, he refused to take the check or sign the quitclaim form and
instead he, together with the union, filed the present action before the
industrial court on June 20,1959 praying that the company be ordered to pay him,
the ambunt of P1,101.80 as retirement pay, plus moral damages and attorney’s
fees.

Within,the regiementary period the company filed its answer alleging, among
others, that the industrial court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case, and on July 9, 1959, it moved to dismiss the case on the same ground.
After Basaysay and the union had filed their opposition, Judge Bautista issued
an order deferring resolution on the notion to dismiss until after the evidence
of both parties had been submitted intimating that the ground alleged therein
was not indubitable. Thereupon, on July 29, 1959, the company filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the court en banc denied the same on August 14,
1959 stating that the order sought to be reconsidered is interlocutory.

The only issue posed by petitioner is whether or not the Industrial court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case involving as it does merely the
recovery of certain retirement pay under the collective bargaining contract
entered into between the company and respondent union.

We are inclined to hold the negative. Firstly, since this case involves
merely the recovery of certain retirement pay after the employer-employee
relationship between petitioning company and respondent Basaysay had ceased, on
account of the letter’s separation from the service on January 2, 1958, and he
is not seeking his reinstatement,’ said case is merely for a money claim
cognizable by the regular courts.^[1]
Secondly, although we held in one case^[2]
that the industrial court has jurisdiction to enforce a collective bargaining
contract, such ruling only applies if the subject matter of the
contract sought to be enforced refers to a labor dispute affecting an industry
certified by the President, or when it involves minimum wage, hours of”
employment, or unfair labor practice.^[3]
Here, the issue refers to retirement pay, and not to any of the matters
mentioned above.

With regard to the claim that this petition should be dismissed because the
order sought to be reversed is only interlocutory, suffice it to quote the
following authorities:

“If the question of jurisdiction were not. the main ground for this petition
for review by certiorari, it would be premature because it seeks to have a
review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be useless and futile to go
ahead with the proceedings if the court below had no jurisdiction this petition
was given due course.” (San Beda College vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., 97 Phil., 787; 51 Off. Gaz., No. 11, 5636, 5638.)

“Although an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction is interlocutory, still if it is clear that the trial court
lacks jurisdiction a higher court of competent-jurisdiction would be justified
in issuing a writ of certiorari and prohibition, for the proceedings in the
court below would be a nullity and waste of time.” (Philippine International
Fair, Inc. et al. vs. Hon. Fidel Ibanez, et al., 94 Phil., 424; 50 Off.
Gaz., No. 3, 1036.)

Wherefore, petition is granted. The order appealed from is reversed without
costs. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is declared
permanent.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padlla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez
David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

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^[1] Price Stabilization Corporation
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 108, Phil., 134; Sampaguita
Pictures, Inc. et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 109
Phil., 316; 60 Off. Gaz. [52] 8583.

^[2] Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company vs. Coto Labor Union (N1AJ) 105 Phil., 915.

^[3] Philippine Sugar Institute
vs. CIR, et al,, 106 Phil., 401; Dee Cho Lumber Workers Union (NLU)
vs. Dee Cho Lumber Company, 101 Phil, 417; 55 Off. Gaz., [3] 434.