JOANA GINETE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AIDA C. SANTOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, BATANGAS CITY, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Ginete versus Santos

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Joana Ginete against Judge Aida Santos, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7, and the People of the Philippines. Ginete was convicted of estafa in absentia after she failed to appear at the promulgation of judgment, and the trial court refused to give due course to her notice of appeal. She came to the Supreme Court asking it to annul that refusal. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between the constitutional right to be heard and the statutory privilege to appeal: an accused who is notified, who stays away without justifiable cause, and who is convicted of a crime that is not a light offense, loses her remedies against the judgment unless she surrenders and asks leave of court within fifteen days.

Procedural History

Ginete was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7. She was arraigned, pleaded not guilty with the assistance of a counsel de oficio, and trial on the merits followed. The trial court rendered judgment on June 21, 2012, finding her guilty, and later issued a warrant of arrest against her. On August 31, 2012, a new counsel entered his appearance for her and filed a notice of appeal with entry of appearance. In an order dated November 5, 2012, the trial court denied the notice of appeal, holding that she had been duly notified of the hearings and of the promulgation, that she failed to appear without justifiable cause, and that she had therefore lost the remedies available to her, including appeal. From that order, Ginete went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asking that the order be annulled and set aside.

Facts

An information dated May 27, 2002 charged Joana Ginete with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. She was arraigned on October 21, 2002 and, assisted by a counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. At the pre-trial, the defense admitted the existence of her counter-affidavit and her signature on it, as well as the existence of her letter of appointment as accounting staff of Montenegro Shipping Lines and her signature on the revenue report.

On February 9, 2005, Ginete filed a waiver of appearance. Despite that unqualified waiver, the trial court still sent her notices. When the case was set for the initial presentation of defense evidence on October 5, 2011, the notice was returned with the information that she could not be located at the given address. The hearing was reset to February 8, 2012, and her counsel, who was present, was warned in open court that her failure to appear on the next scheduled hearing would be deemed a waiver of her right to present evidence. Subpoenas for the February 8, 2012 hearing were again sent to her last known address, and her bondsmen were likewise notified, but the notices were returned unserved because she could not be located.

On June 21, 2012, the trial court found her guilty of estafa and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered her to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of 715,468 pesos and 96 centavos as actual damages, plus costs. She was notified of the promulgation set on June 27, 2012, but did not appear. On August 31, 2012, through new counsel, she filed a notice of appeal. The trial court denied it on November 5, 2012.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in considering the petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence and in deciding the case and promulgating judgment in absentia.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the notice of appeal by applying the Mapalao doctrine.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14, paragraph 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appeal is unjustifiable.

This is the constitutional basis for trial in absentia, which the Court invokes to sustain the trial court's proceeding without the petitioner.

Section 1, paragraph (c) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.

This provision treats the absence of the accused, without justifiable cause, at a trial of which she had notice, as a waiver of her right to be present.

Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

This is the provision the Court construes: it governs the loss of remedies upon absence at promulgation and the manner of recovering them.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari under Rule 65 lies only to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and the abuse must be patent and gross. The Court held that trial in absentia is authorized by the Constitution, and that under Rule 115 the absence of the accused without justifiable cause at a trial of which she had notice is a waiver of her right to be present. Ginete had voluntarily waived her appearance in 2005, yet the trial court still notified her of the October 5, 2011 and February 8, 2012 hearings, and her counsel was warned in open court that her failure to appear would be deemed a waiver of her right to present evidence. The notices were returned unserved because she could not be located at her given address. Having been notified, she cannot claim deprivation of due process, and the trial court cannot be faulted for considering her to have waived her right to present evidence.

On the second issue, the Court likewise found no grave abuse of discretion. Estafa is not a light offense, so it was mandatory for the petitioner to be present at the promulgation of judgment. She was notified of the promulgation set on June 27, 2012, but did not appear. Under Section 6 of Rule 120, if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused loses the remedies available against the judgment, namely a motion for new trial or reconsideration and an appeal. The Rules allow her to regain her standing only by surrendering and filing a motion for leave of court to avail of those remedies within fifteen days from promulgation. She did neither. Her mere filing of a notice of appeal through new counsel was not an act of surrender, which the Court described as an act whereby a convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits herself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict. The Court also stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor part of due process; it is a mere statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the law.

Doctrine

First, trial in absentia is constitutional. After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided she has been duly notified and her failure to appear is unjustifiable. Her absence without justifiable cause at a trial of which she had notice is a waiver of her right to be present thereat, and she cannot later claim denial of due process.

Second, when the judgment is for conviction and the accused fails to appear at the scheduled promulgation despite notice, without justifiable cause, she loses the remedies available against the judgment, including the right to appeal. The exception is narrow: within fifteen days from promulgation, she may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of those remedies, stating the reasons for her absence; if she proves justifiable cause, she may avail of them within fifteen days from notice.

Third, surrender means a physical and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict. The filing of a notice of appeal is not surrender, and without a valid surrender and a proper motion, the notice of appeal is properly denied due course.

Fourth, the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right nor part of due process, and must be exercised strictly in the manner and within the periods fixed by the Rules.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the order of the trial court denying the notice of appeal was affirmed; the petitioner lost, and her conviction stood.

Remember This

Memorize the rule of Section 6 of Rule 120: absence without justifiable cause at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction forfeits the remedies against the judgment, and only a surrender plus a motion for leave of court within fifteen days can restore them. Examiners use this case to test the difference between the constitutional right to be heard, which may be waived, and the statutory privilege to appeal, which is lost when the Rules are not followed.