JUAN REPOLLO JOINED BY HIS WIFE BEATRIZ CALUMPANG, FLORENTINA REPOLLO JOINED BY HER HUSBAND VALERIO ABO, MARIA REPOLLO JOINED BY HER HUSBAND FELIX TORRES, REMEDIOS TORRES VDA. D…
HERNANDO, J.:
The Antecedents:
On October 26, 1926, Hospicio Repollo married Victoria Labe. Out of their union, they begot five children namely: Juan, Florentina, Jovito, Maria and Genaro Repollo. However, appellants aver that the union did not last long as Victoria abandoned Hospicio in the year 1932 or 1933. Appellants assert that Hospicio admitted his estranged relationship with Victoria in a document denominated as a Deed of Heirship and Sale.[2]
During the couple’s de facto separation, Hospicio found comfort in the arms of Vitaliana Lisondra. Sometime around 1958, Hospicio and Vitaliana entered into a common law relationship. As a result of their cohabitation, appellants Perseveranda, Tita and Nestor Repollo were born. On November 14, 1981, Victoria Labe died, which paved the way for Hospicio and Vitaliana to finally formalize their relationship. On March 6, 1982, the couple were joined together in the Holy Matrimony of marriage[3] after having lived together as common law husband and wife.
Appellants claim that Hospicio and Vitaliana were able to purchase several properties during their cohabitation. They contend that Hospicio never owned any real property prior to said cohabitation. On April 14, 1993, Hospicio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] involving one of his properties, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9908, in favor of his wife Vitaliana and their children Perseveranda, Tita and Nestor. Subsequently, on April 17, 1993, Hospicio executed another Deed of Absolute Sale[5] also in favor of appellants Vitaliana, Perseveranda, Tita and Nestor.
Appellees now maintain that Hospicio could not have executed the assailed documents owing to his frail health. They assert that at the beginning of January 1993, Hospicio grew seriously ill, became inarticulate and already bed-ridden. Appellees contend that Hospicio no longer possessed a well and disposing mind when the documents of sale were allegedly executed. Consequently, appellees filed a Complaint before the court a quo against appellants[6] for the declaration of nullity of the foregoing deeds of sale. Furthermore, they prayed for an accounting of the properties owned by Hospicio, to partition the same among his legal heirs and for appellants to pay damages.
On June 27, 2008, the trial court rendered a Decision insinuating the nullity of the assailed deeds of sale and assigning Hospicio’s properties to his heirs, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that all the legitimate children of Hospicio Repollo and Victoria Repollo including their heirs and successors shall be assigned one (1) share each of one (1) part of all the properties owned by Hospicio Repollo, while the three (3) illegitimate children of Hospicio Repollo and Vitaliana Repollo shall be assigned one-half (1/2) of the share of each legitimate child. Vitaliana Repollo shall inherit nothing.
Hence, the current appeal before Us.
The Issue:
The main issue here is whether or not the trial court erred in its disposition of the properties owned by Hospicio Repollo.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly impressed with merit.
Although the trial court did not categorically rule on the nullity of the April 14, 1993 and April 17, 1993 Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Hospicio Repollo in the fallo of its Decision, it is evident from the body thereof that it found the deeds to be void, to wit:[7]
It has been established and admitted by the defendants that the questioned Deeds of Sale (Exhs. “16” and “17”) were executed in the year 1993, whether it happened before the death of Hospicio Repollo is immaterial because this was executed after the death of the first wife, Victoria who died on November 14, 1981 (Exh. “A”). Clearly, the deed is void per provision of Art. 130 of the New Civil Code [Family Code] which states:
“Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no conjugal settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.”
While the abovementioned provision of the law renders void any disposition of conjugal partnership property prior to its liquidation, this is not absolute. In The Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. v. Ester Servacio and Rito Go,[8] the Supreme Court was emphatic:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Here, the records are bereft of the fact that the lands subject of the deeds of sale were allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to any of the heirs. Thus, the disposition of the properties even without prior liquidation is not necessarily rendered void. Hence, the trial court erred in hastily ruling that the deeds of sale executed by Hospicio was void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code.
Moreover, it bears stressing that the April 14, 1993 and April 17, 1993 Deeds of Absolute Sale, which were notarized by Notary Public Roy Lozano, had effectively conveyed the subject properties to the appellant heirs. Thus, the requirement of prior liquidation would unduly prejudice the vested rights already acquired by appellant heirs over the properties sold to them by Hospicio.
Parenthetically, having been duly notarized, said deeds are public documents which carry the evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution.[9] The fact of their notarization would be regarded as evidence of the facts therein expressed in a clear and unequivocal manner.[10] While appellees fervently assert that the deeds of sale were products of fraud and chicanery, they utterly failed to discharge the burden of overturning the presumption of regularity attached to the assailed deeds. Public documents enjoy a presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.[11] Here, aside from appellees’ bare allegations of fraud, there is no other compelling evidence proving the same. Neither is there any adequate proof that Hospicio’s signatures were indeed forged. Furthermore, appellees’ aver that Hospicio was already seriously ill, inarticulate and bed-ridden at the time the deeds were executed. Nevertheless, it was not substantiated by competent evidence. It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[12]
To reiterate, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of regularity lies with the party contesting the notarial document. Unfortunately, appellees failed to discharge said onus. Absent clear and convincing evidence to contradict the same, We find that the assailed deeds of sale are valid and binding. However, this extends only in so far as appellant heirs Perseveranda, Tita and Nestor are concerned. With respect to Hospicio’s wife, Vitaliana, the sale cannot be enforced since husband and wife cannot sell property to each other.[13] Hence, the sale in favor of Perseveranda, Tita and Nestor remains valid while the sale to Vitaliana is rendered void. Under Article 1420 of the Civil Code,[14] if the stipulations in a contract can be separated from each other, those that are void will not have any effect, but those which are valid will be enforced.[15] In case of doubt, the contract must be considered as divisible or separable.[16]
All told, the properties sold by Hospicio to Perseveranda, Tita and Nestor shall pertain to them. As for the remaining properties, it shall be partitioned in accordance with the trial court’s Decision that the legitimate children of Hospicio and Victoria, including their heirs and successors, shall be assigned one share each of one part of said properties. On the other hand, the three illegitimate children of Hospicio Repollo and Vitaliana shall be assigned one-half of the share of each legitimate child.
Along the same vein, the court a quo was correct in ruling that Vitaliana is not entitled to any of the properties. At first glance, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision that “Vitaliana Repollo shall inherit nothing” would seem to conflict with its finding that she “will only share as heir of her deceased husband”, viz:[17]
Although, Art. 130 of the Civil Law says the second marriage shall be governed by mandatory regime of complete separation of property, there is no showing that Vitaliana has contributed anything to the acquisition of all these properties in questioned, thus, Vitaliana, will only share as heir of her deceased husband per Art. 897 of the New Civil Code which states:
“Art. 897. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children which must be taken from that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of.”
However, after a careful consideration of the records, no conflict would arise since all of Hospicio’s properties were forfeited in favor of his first marriage to Victoria.
We agree with the trial court’s finding that no property was acquired during Hospicio’s second marriage with Vitaliana. Since appellants never disputed this fact, the presumption that all of Hospicio’s properties were acquired during his existing marriage with Victoria stands. Concomitantly, it must be noted that during his marriage with Victoria, Hospicio cohabited with Vitaliana as common law husband and wife. Concededly, it was during their (Hospicio and Vitaliana) cohabitation that said properties were acquired. Since the properties were acquired during a cohabitation with a legal impediment, Article 148 of the Family Code applies:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,[18] only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Premised on the foregoing provision, Hospicio and Vitaliana will be deemed co-owners of the remaining properties if there is proof that said properties were acquired through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. Regrettably, no satisfactory proof was adduced to establish that Vitaliana contributed to the purchase of these properties. As borne from the records, Hospicio was employed as a bosero while Vitaliana was a plain housewife. There is no showing that Vitaliana was engaged in business or any other form of economic activity from which to source her alleged contribution for the purchase of said properties. Hence, it is presumed that the properties were acquired solely by Hospicio through his own income.
Corollarily, since Hospicio was validly married to Victoria at the time of his cohabitation with Vitaliana, his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. Stated differently, the remaining properties form part of the conjugal partnership property of Hospicio and Victoria. Consequently, the trial court’s ruling that Vitaliana would not inherit anything from Hospicio is accurate. Indeed, even if Vitaliana is Hospicio’s legitimate heir, she has nothing to inherit from him since all of his properties accrued to the conjugal partnership existing in his first marriage and no new properties were acquired during their marriage.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 27, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of Dumaguete City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that:
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1)
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The April 14, 1993 and April 17, 1993 Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Hospicio Repollo in favor of his children Perseveranda, Tita and Nestor Repollo remains valid. However, the sale of the subject lands in favor of Vitaliana Repollo is declared null and void ab initio;
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2)
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All the legitimate children of Hospicio Repollo and Victoria Repollo including their heirs and successors shall be assigned one (1) share each of one (1) part of the properties owned by Hospicio Repollo EXCLUDING the lands subject of the April 14, 1993 and April 17, 1993 Deeds of Absolute Sale;
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3)
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The three (3) illegitimate children of Hospicio Repollo and Vitaliana Repollo shall be assigned one-half (1/2) of the share of each legitimate child;
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4)
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Vitaliana Repollo shall inherit nothing.
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This case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the specific properties to be partitioned amongst the heirs of Hospicio Repollo and for proper disposition in accordance with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
Lagura-Yap,** and Azcarraga-Jacob, JJ., concur.
* Re-raffled to Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando as ponente on June 24, 2014 on account of the inhibition of Justice Pamela Ann A. Maxino.
** Per Office Order No. 20-14-GTI dated August 5, 2014.
[1] Penned by Hon. Candelario V. Gonzales, Rollo, pp. 54-75.
[2] Original Records, p. 237.
[3] Original Records, p. 584.
[4] Original Records, p. 243.
[5] Original Records, p. 242.
[6] Appellants Filemon Repollo and Roy Lozano were impleaded because of their alleged role in the fraudulent preparation and notarization of the assailed deeds of sale.
[7] Rollo, pp. 72-73.
[8] G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011.
[9] Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 2006.
[10] Sps. Alfarero v. Sps. Sevilla, G.R. No. 142974. September 22, 2003
[11] Meneses v. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011.
[12] Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 138463, October 30, 2006.
[13] Art. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under Article 191.
[14] Art. 1420. In case of a divisible contract, if the illegal terms can be separated from the legal ones, the latter may be enforced.
[15] Francisco Chavez v. Public Estates Authority et. al., G. R. No. 133250, May 6, 2003.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Rollo, p. 74.
[18] Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
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