AMELIA C. ELAYDA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND SPOUSES PEDRO ROXAS AND LEONORA T. ROXAS, RESPONDENTS.

Once again, in the resolution of an appeal, the Court is called upon
to apply a familiar rule of unvarying observance which is, that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari of a
judgment of the Court of Appeals, this Court being bound by the latter’s
findings of fact,^[1]
subject to certain well defined exceptions.^[2] In accordance therewith, the Court now
resolves the proceedings at bar.

The proceedings originated from a complaint of Amelia C. Elayda filed in the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) at Quezon City
against the Spouses Pedro Roxas and Leonora T. Roxas.^[3] In her complaint, Elayda
basically sought recovery of loans extended to the defendants in the aggregate
sum of P90,000.00, with interest, the loans
having been secured by post-dated checks issued by the spouses and receipts
signed by them purporting to show that they had received jewelry to be sold on
commission.  In their answer, the Roxases admitted having received said loans but claimed
that the loans had been paid in full; that in fact, their total payments exceeded
the total obligation justly and actually due from them, and they had been
required to pay usurious interests.

On these issues, trial was had.

The plaintiff, Elayda, presented her
testimonial and documentary proofs in due course, in substantiation of her
cause of action for recovery of P90,000.00 plus interest.

The Roxas spouses in their turn,
adduced evidence which tended to show that they had received the loans
aggregating P90,000.00 on two separate occasions — one in the sum of
P40,000.00 and the other, in the amount of P50,000.00; that they were required
to give, and did give, a
“kickback” of P10,000.00 and to pay, as they did pay, interest at the
rate of four percent (4%) a month; and that the total payments made by them to Elayda amounted to P112,674.00.

To counteract this evidence of the Roxases,
Elayda tried to submit a statement prepared by her
accountant to the effect that the total loan given by her to the spouses
amounted to P186,000.00, not P90,000.00 (as stated in her
complaint and as sought to be established by her in her evidence-in-chief);
that the payments made by the spouses on
account thereof came up to only P110,474.00 — of which the sum of
P14,223.81 was charged to interest at 14%
per annum and P96,250.19, to principal — thus leaving a balance due from them
of P89,749.81.  The proffered statement
was rejected by the Trial Court, on objection of the Roxases,
on the ground that it was contrary to the judicial admissions in plaintiff’s
complaint and was being presented after conclusion of the trial.

The Trial Court thereafter rendered judgment adversely to the
plaintiff Elayda.^[4]
Upon the ultimate finding that :

” * * (as
established by the evidence) defendants have paid plaintiff the total sum of
P112,674.00 on account of the principal loan of P90,000.00 but it is settled
law that in a usurious transaction the creditor may only be reimbursed the
amount of the principal loan and must return the interest paid by the debtor
the agreement to that effect being null and void (Art. 1957,
New Civil Code).  It results that
plaintiff is under obligation to return to defendants the sum of P22,674.00 representing the kickback and usurious interest
charged on the loan.”,

it disposed of
the case as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the preponderance of evidence being clearly in
favor of defendants, the complaint is dismissed and the plaintiff is condemned
to reimburse and return to defendants the sum of P22,674.00.
with costs against plaintiff.”

Elayda filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial.  This
was denied.^[5]

Elayda appealed to the Court of
Appeals.  There she also failed.  The Appellate Tribunal affirmed the Trial
Court’s judgment in its entirety, as “being in accordance with law and the
evidence.”^[6]
She moved for reconsideration, and when her motion was denied,^[7]
took an appeal to this Court by certiorari.

Various errors are attributed by Elayda
to the Court of Appeals and the Trial Court, viz.:

1) affirming
the Trial Court’s adjudgment that Elayda
should return P22,674.00 to the Roxases, as excess
payment of the latter;

2) taking
account of partial payments of the Roxases prior to November 17, 1964, the date when
they agreed on P90,000.00 as the liquidated unpaid balance;

3) finding that the only
loans extended to the Roxases were two:  one in the amount of P50,000.00, in
September, 1963 and the other, in the sum of P40,000.00 in November, 1963, and
disregarding the five (5) checks presented by Elayda
in the total sum of P97,600.00;

4) finding
that the Roxases did pay 4% interest monthly to Elayda;

5) holding
that the failure of Elayda to deny, specifically and
under oath, the Roxases‘ allegation of usury, was an
implied admission of the allegation;

6) not
sentencing the Roxases instead to pay P90,000.00,
with interest at 12% per annum from November
17, 1964 as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The assignment of errors makes it obvious that the whole case
turns on one crucial issue, which is, whose version of the material occurrences
has been established by a preponderance of the evidence:

a) that of Elayda — that the amount lent by her to the  Roxas
Spouses was actually P186,000.00, not P90,000.00 (as set out in
her complaint); that the payments made by the defendants added up to only
P110,474.00, of which the sum of P14,223.81 was applied to interest at 14% per
annum and P96,250.19, to principal, thus leaving a balance of P89,749.81 still
owing to her — or

b) that of the Roxases — that the loan in truth given was only P90,000.00
; that they gave on demand a “kickback” of P10,000.00 and paid
interest at the rate of four percent (4%) a month; and that all the payments
made by them, really came to P112,674.00.

It should be equally obvious that the determination of this issue
— which includes substantially all other questions set up by Elayda (e.g., whether or not the checks given to Lim Go
Tong constituted additional loans of the Roxases;
whether interest at usurious rates was in fact paid; etc.) — is essentially a
factual adjudication which, by authority of the rule and precedents adverted to
in the opening paragraph of this opinion, is conclusive on and may not be
reviewed by this Court, absent any of the recognized exceptions thereto.  But this is what at bottom petitioner would
have this Court do:  go over the proofs
presented by the parties, and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if
the Trial Court and the Appellate Court were correct in according superior
credit to this or that piece of evidence and eventually, to the totality of the
evidence of one party or the other. 
This, the Court cannot and will not do.

Of course, the matter of whether a particular item of proof was
properly admitted or rejected in light of the rules of evidence,
is an issue of law.  Of this character is
the issue raised by Elayda in respect of the Trial
Court’s rejection of her accountant’s statement.  This issue this
Court can and does now pass upon.

The Court declares the rejection to be correct.  Such rejection is entirely in accord with the
“familiar doctrine” that “an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether
objection is interposed by the party or not * * “^[8] That doctrine, by the way, has since
been embodied in the revised Rules of Court, effective on January 1, 1964,
Section 2, Rule 129 of which reads as follows:

“Judicial admissions. — Admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require
proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake.”

Nothing in the record shows that Elayda’s
admissions in her complaint were indeed “made through palpable
mistake.”

Besides, if it be true that the total loan liability of the Roxases was not P90,000.00 only, but P186,000.00 (or
P187,600.00), it is quite surprising that Elayda’s
evidence-in-chief, as plaintiff, was directed to proving an obligation of only
P90,000.00.  Even more surprising is the
fact that in her complaint Elayda only alleged the
sum of P90,000.00 as the indebtedness of the Roxases to her.  The
evidence of an indebtedness in excess of P90,000.00
would therefore appear to be a mere afterthought, difficult to accept at face
value.

Also correct was the Trial Court’s ruling, sustained by the
Appellate Court, that Elayda’s failure to deny
specifically and under oath the accusation of usury set out in the Roxases‘ Amended Answer with Counterclaim — alleging that Elayda required and received from the Roxas
Spouses, “kickback and interest in excess of the legal rate” —
constituted an admission of that accusation. 
The ruling is entirely in accord with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court which pertinently provides that “(a)llegations of usury are deemed admitted if not
denied specifically and under oath.” The admission is a judicial
admission, albeit implied, and cannot be negated “unless previously shown
to have been made through palpable mistake,” supra, a showing which Elayda has
not made.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the
challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding that of the Trial Court,
is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Sec. 2, Rule 45 (second paragraph), Rules of Court; Manlapaz
v. CA, et al., 147 SCRA 236; Maclan v.
Santos, 156 SCRA 542; Apex International Financing Corp. v. IAC, 166
SCRA 458; Reynolds Phil. Corp. v. CA, 169 SCRA 220; Mayuga
v. Mayuga, 170 SCRA 347; Lauron
v. CA, 184 SCRA 215

^[2]
SEE, e.g., Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 19 SCRA 289

^[3]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-7860 and assigned by raffle to Branch
IX of the CFI, Quezon City

^[4]
Rendered on September 14, 1972
by Hon. Judge Feliciano S. Gonzales, then presiding over Branch IX of the CFI, Quezon City

^[5]
By Order promulgated on March 30, 1973 by Hon. Ulpiano
Sarmiento, who had taken over as Presiding Judge of
Branch IX, after Judge Gonzales’ retirement

^[6]
The decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on May 30, 1978, was written
for the Division by Hon. Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera (now Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court), with whom concurred Hon. Mama D. Busran and
Carlos L. Sundiam, JJ.

^[7]
By Resolution dated November 6, 1978

^[8]
Joe’s Radio Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 104 Phil. 333
(1958), cited in Santiago v.
de los Santos,
61 SCRA 146 (1974)