BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., STANLEY WILLIMONT, EUGENE KNEEBONE, C.W. HEROLD, A.P. DAVIDSON, G.N. WRIGHT AND O.M. WESTERFIELD, PETITIONERS, VS. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION-PAFL…

Benguet Consolidated versus BCI Employees and Workers Union

The Case

This is a labor case. The BCI Employees and Workers Union, together with its member Donaciano Andrada, charged Benguet Consolidated and several of its officers with unfair labor practice. The union alleged that the company discriminated against Andrada in his status and conditions of employment because of his union activities, in violation of the unfair labor practice provision of the Industrial Peace Act, Republic Act Number 875. The case matters because it teaches how the Supreme Court treats a continuing act of discrimination, how it defines protected union activity, and how it defers to the factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations when those findings rest on substantial evidence.

Procedural History

The union and Andrada filed their unfair labor practice charge in the Court of Industrial Relations. After investigation, the acting prosecutor of that court filed a formal complaint against the company and some of its officials. The company answered, denying discrimination and denying any unjust refusal to implement the wage scale under the collective bargaining agreements. Trial followed before Associate Judge Amando Bugayong, who rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to implement the salary scale for Andrada from 1954 until his wage reached the level set in the collective bargaining agreements. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting en banc, denied, with one of the five judges dissenting. The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Pending the appeal, and at the petitioners' instance, the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent immediate execution of the judgment.

Facts

Before December 1954, Donaciano Andrada was a payroll clerk in the company earning three pesos and twenty-four centavos per day. In August 1954, he and several co-employees petitioned the company to be paid the rates prescribed in the existing collective bargaining contract, under which a first class payroll clerk was entitled to three pesos and fifty-six centavos per day. The company adjusted the salaries of the others, and reclassified Andrada from clerk second class to clerk first class, but gave him no corresponding increase. He then brought the matter to his union, which wrote the company asking what action had been taken on the petition. His department head, Stanley Willimont, told him that had he not brought his petition to the union, his future would have been better.

In January 1955, Andrada was transferred to the Purchasing Department as a first class clerk at the same salary. He was assigned to replace Ramon Alvia, who had performed invoice clearing duties as a bodeguero and who had been receiving four pesos and sixty centavos per day. Andrada asked his new department head, C.W. Herold, for the wage proper to that position under the collective bargaining contract, but nothing came of it. In a grievance meeting in August 1957, Eugene Kneebone told him that as long as Kneebone remained with the company the office could not give him any change of classification, that by presenting his grievance to the union he was cutting his neck, and that he was too vocal about his union activities. In July 1962, a general increase of twenty-four centavos was given to all categories, but Andrada was not benefited; when he asked his department head, O.M. Westerfield, for an increase, he was told that if he did not stop complaining about his rate, another employee would step over his head.

The union and Andrada filed the unfair labor practice charge in May 1963. The charge was filed only then because the matter had first been coursed through a series of conciliation meetings between the union and the company. The Court of Industrial Relations found the company and its officers guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered the salary scale implemented.

Issues

• Whether or not the company may be held liable for discrimination committed in 1954 when the union activities relied upon took place in 1958.
• Whether or not Andrada's seeking the help of his union in pursuing his claim to a salary adjustment constitutes proper union activity.
• Whether or not Andrada's claim is barred by laches.
• Whether or not the complaint had already been satisfactorily settled in the grievance proceedings.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4, paragraph (a), subparagraph (4) of Republic Act Number 875, the Industrial Peace Act, provides:

It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

This is the provision the charge invokes, and the whole case turns on whether the company's refusal to pay Andrada the proper wage scale was discrimination in a term or condition of employment because of his union activity.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners' submission was erroneous on two counts. First, what was charged was not discrimination committed in 1954 alone but continuing acts of discrimination committed starting in 1954, as alleged in the complaint. The refusal to implement the proper salary scale was supported by the findings below: in August 1954 Andrada was reclassified but received no salary adjustment unlike the other employees; in 1955, after he was assigned the work of a bodeguero with a higher pay rate, he still received no increase; and in July 1962, when there was a general pay hike, he was not benefited. Second, the militant union activity involved was not his having been elected district governor and steward, but his having sought the help of his union in pursuing what he believed was his right to a salary adjustment. The damaging statements imputed to Willimont and Kneebone, to which the court below gave credence, were never denied or controverted, and the seeking of the union's help by a member in connection with his correct wages constitutes proper union activity.

On the issue of laches, the Court held the claim without merit. The discriminations from 1954 to 1962 were continuing, and the charge was filed only in 1963 because the complaint was first coursed through a series of conciliation meetings between the union and the company.

On the issue of settlement, the Court held that the petitioners' submission was not borne out by the portion of Andrada's testimony relied upon. What could be inferred was that Andrada, who was on a monthly wage basis, refused to be classified on a daily wage basis. The court below found that he was justified in refusing, since an employee on a daily wage basis gets less than one on the monthly basis assuming the same pay rate, and this finding rested on the admission of the company's own official, Willimont.

In fine, the Court found that the findings of fact below furnished satisfactory answers to the questions presented, and that there was not even a slight suggestion that these findings were not based on substantial evidence. Hence, those findings are controlling.

Doctrine

First, an unfair labor practice charge of discrimination may rest on continuing acts of discrimination, not only on a single act at one point in time; a charge that discrimination began in a given year covers the continuing refusal to correct it in later years.

Second, the seeking of a union's help by one of its members in connection with the latter's correct wages is proper union activity, and discrimination against an employee for that activity falls within the prohibition of Section 4, paragraph (a), subparagraph (4) of Republic Act Number 875.

Third, laches does not bar a claim where the discriminatory acts are continuing, and where the delay in filing the charge is explained by prior conciliation meetings between the union and the employer.

Fourth, the factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations, when based on substantial evidence and not shown to be unsupported, are controlling on review.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment sought to be reviewed, revoked and set aside the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordered the petitioners to pay the costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: seeking the union's help on one's correct wages is proper union activity, and a continuing refusal to pay the proper wage scale is continuing discrimination. Examiners use this case to test the concept of continuing unfair labor practice, the definition of protected union activity, and the rule that factual findings supported by substantial evidence bind the Supreme Court.