THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FULGENCIO BAQUIRAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Baquiran versus People

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Fulgencio Baquiran, a criminal case for murder decided by the Supreme Court in June 1967. Baquiran was charged with shooting Alberto Castillo to death with a carbine in the municipality of Tumauini, province of Isabela, and was convicted by the trial court. The case matters because it is a classic lesson on the weight of eyewitness identification: the Court acquitted on the ground that the widow's and daughter's identification of the accused was riddled with contradictions and belied by their own conduct, and that an alibi, though the weakest of defenses, must be credited where the prosecution's identification is weak. It is a staple for questions on proof beyond reasonable doubt, the credibility of witnesses, and the burden of proof.

Procedural History

On September 7, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information for murder against Fulgencio Baquiran before the Court of First Instance of Isabela. After due trial, that court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of Alberto Castillo in the amount of 6,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. Baquiran appealed to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the evidence closely and reversed the judgment of conviction.

Facts

On the evening of April 29, 1959, between six and seven o'clock, Alberto Castillo was eating supper with his family in their dining room in barrio Sisim Alto, Tumauini, Isabela. The room was walled on three sides only, the southern part being completely open. An assailant approached from the southern side of the yard and, from about two meters away, fired a carbine at Castillo. The bullet tore through his body, causing instantaneous death. Two empty carbine shells were later found about a meter and a half from where the gunman stood, and the municipal health officer found two gunshot wounds, one of which plowed through the liver, traversed the lungs, and smashed the heart muscle.

Juanita Marilao, the widow, and her daughter Celedonia, then twelve years old, testified that the appellant Fulgencio Baquiran was the gunman. Juanita said she fled and hid in the bushes, and that at about midnight she sought the help of her barrio mates Mateo Forto and Alfonso Ocampo and went to Tumauini to report the killing to the Constabulary detachment. But the witnesses for the prosecution told a different story of that night: Sergeant Augusto Venturina testified that Juanita refused to talk about the matter, while Forto, Chief of Police Bernardo Gumatay, and Doctor Guillermo Laman all testified that she said she could not recognize the killers because it was dark and their caps were tilted downward. The accused was not ordered arrested until May 3, 1959, after a complaint was filed the day before.

For his part, Baquiran, a barrio lieutenant of Arcon, Tumauini, set up an alibi. On the afternoon of April 29, a store owner reported the theft of a bottle of wine to him. He went home at five o'clock, learned of the report, cooked for his wife who had just given birth, and went to the store at about six o'clock. After thirty minutes he left to send for the suspected thief, arriving at the house of a barrio policeman at about seven o'clock, where he waited about an hour for a report. At around eight-thirty he returned to the store. Four witnesses, none of them his relative, corroborated the time and sequence of these events. The defense also proved that barrio Sisim Alto is more than six kilometers from barrio Arcon, and that one must pass through two other barrios and cross a river to go from one to the other.

Issues

• Whether or not the guilt of the accused for the murder of Alberto Castillo was proven beyond reasonable doubt, given the identification made by the widow and her daughter.
• Whether or not the alibi of the accused may be credited in the light of the weakness of the prosecution's evidence on identity.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the constitutional presumption of innocence and the rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court states the governing principle in these words:

The prosecution has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused, and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility.

This principle bears on the case because it places the whole burden on the prosecution and prevents the weakness of the alibi from supplying what the identification lacked.

The Court also quotes its own earlier ruling on the nature of alibi:

The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily proven was never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases; otherwise, we will see the absurdity of an accused being put in a more difficult position where the prosecution's evidence is vague and weak than where it is strong.

This ruling bears on the case because it explains why the accused may be acquitted even though his alibi is, as the Court itself says, the weakest defense an accused can avail of.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It laid down the test of credibility in these words:

It is a legal truism that evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself.

Measured against human knowledge and common experience, the testimony of Juanita Marilao suffered from a plethora of contradictions. She first said the family ate by the light of two improvised kerosene lamps, but her sworn statement taken a day after the murder, and her daughter's abstract of testimony, both said they used two candles. She insisted the gunman fired only once, yet the doctor and the sergeant both concluded that two shots were fired. She said she saw the appellant before her husband did, yet gave no warning, although her husband was able to ask, who are you, before he was gunned down. Most tellingly, her conduct after the killing showed she never recognized the assassin: she did not reveal his identity to the Constabulary although it was inquired into three times or more, and she admitted on cross-examination that she was not able to identify the killer although she suspected somebody. The Court held that suspicion is not identification, and that her subsequent identification was an afterthought born of a prejudiced mind. The daughter's testimony fared no better, for she revealed the name for the first time only on May 1, 1959, and admitted that she repeated what she heard her mother declare. The alleged motive over a tobacco land was likewise weakened, since the widow herself admitted that before her husband's death there was no question between him and the accused about that land.

On the second issue, the Court held that the alibi acquired commensurate strength because no positive and proper identification had been satisfactorily made. The alibi was uncontradicted, corroborated by four disinterested witnesses, and the prosecution did not show that the accused had the time and opportunity to travel to Sisim Alto, shoot the deceased, and return to Arcon. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of conviction.

Doctrine

First, evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself, tested against the knowledge and common experience of mankind. Second, the natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime and recognizes the offender is to reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity; silence at the first opportunity casts serious doubt on a later identification. Third, suspicion is not identification, and an identification that ripens only after ample time for reflection is an afterthought. Fourth, alibi, though the weakest defense, acquires commensurate strength where no positive and proper identification has been made, because the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it of that responsibility.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and acquitted Fulgencio Baquiran, with costs de oficio.

Remember This

Memorize the line that suspicion is not identification, and that the weakness of the defense never relieves the prosecution of its burden. Examiners use this case in criminal law and evidence to test alibi, the credibility of eyewitnesses, and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.