JOSE HUDENCIAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. S.P. MARCELO & CO., INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

The only issue in this appeal, taken by the plaintiff in forma
pauperis, is whether or not the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in
its Civil Case No. 4337, correctly dismissed the complaint, upon motion of the
defendant, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff’s allegations, which were deemed admitted for
purposes of the motion to dismiss, are as follows:  that the plaintiff was employed as a mechanic
by the defendant; that while the plaintiff was repairing a truck belonging to the defendant the
truck caught fire and ex­ploded, as a result
of which he suffered serious burns in different parts of his body; that the
defendant was immediately notified of the mishap, and its manager promised to
compensate him for the damages he sustained and to pay all the necessary
expenses for his treatment and hospitalization; that aside from the wages he
failed to earn because of his inability to engage in his usual work he paid
certain amounts for his confinement in a
hospital and for the plastic
surgery he had to undergo; that the defendant’s refusal to satisfy his claim
for compensation caused him mental suffering, for which he is entitled to moral
and exemplary damages; and that because he was compelled to seek the services
of legal counsel he is also entitled to recover attorney’s fees.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial
court, was based on the ground that the case involved a claim for compensation
under Act No. 3428 and hence pertained to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Work­men’s Compensation Commission.  The
plaintiff, on the other hand, contended and now maintains in this appeal that
his claim is based on Article 1711 of the Civil Code and is therefore
cognizable by the Court of First Instance.

We affirm the order of dismissal. 
There is no material difference, insofar as the plaintiff’s cause of
action is concerned, between the
provisions of the Work­men’s Compensation Act, Section 2, and Article 1711 of
the Civil Code.  The compensable injury
referred to in both statutes is one that arises “out of and in the course
of the employment.” Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 772 (amending
Act No. 3428), which took effect on June 20, 1952, claims for compensation
under the Workmen’s Compensa­tion Act were cognizable by the regular courts,
but since then exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, as provided in
Section 46 of the amendatory law, which states:

“SEC. 46.  Jurisdiction. – The Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner shall have juris­diction to hear and decide claims for com­pensation
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court…”

In relation to Section
46, Section 5 must also be considered. 
This Section provides that “the rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to an employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.” These
provisions were applied by this Court in the case of Manalo
vs. Foster Wheeler Corporation, et al., 98 Phil. 856, in sustaining the order
of the trial court dismissing an employee’s claim for damages against the
employer for injuries suffered in an accident which happened in the course of
his employment.  It was there said:  “The Legislature evidently deemed it
best, in the interest of expediency and uniformity, that all claims of workmen
against their employers for damages due to accidents suffered in the course of
employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, subject to the appeal in the law provided.”

It may of course happen that an employee may have claims against
his employer other than those re­coverable under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, in which case he should pursue his remedy in the courts.  Thus in the case of Pacana
vs. Cebu Autobus Co., 32 SCRA 442, where aside from
disability compensation the plaintiff sued for separation pay, sick leave,
vacation and overtime pay, we held that the order of the Court of First
Instance dis­missing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was
erroneous.  In the case at bar, however,
the claims are for work disability by reason of the accident as well as for
medical, surgical and hospital services, all of which are provided for in the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Insofar as the plaintiff’s claim for moral and exemplary damages
is concerned, we do not find it sufficient to remove this case from the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, since a mere
refusal on the part of an employer to pay the employee’s extra-­judicial claim
for compensation, as alleged in the complaint, is not a ground for the award of
such damages.  Otherwise there would be a
premium on the right to litigate.  The
following comments of Schneider are apropos:

“Since the remedy provided by the compensation act is
exclusive as against the employer, the employee must pursue all rights
for enforcement of his claim under the statute, and he has no other
remedies.  He may not maintain an action
ex delicto and for punitive damages because of the
alleged wrongful and wanton refusal of the employer to pay the compensation due
him.”^[1]

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Vol. 1, p. 245, citing Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Greed, 211 Ala. 95, 99 So. 791.