A.M. No. RTJ-92-881. June 02, 1994
ANTONIO A. GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVEZ, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO NAVARRO AND NOEL NAVARRO, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE SINFOROSO V. TABAM…
KAPUNAN, J.:
For this Court’s
consideration is a letter-complaint, dated May 5, 1992 of Governor Antonio A. Gallardo of
the Province of Camiguin and
other officials of the said
province, charging Judge Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, at Mambajao, Camiguin with
manifest bias and partiality and highly irregular and outrightly illegal acts in connection with two cases filed before his court, namely:
A.
Special Civil Case No. 465 entitled “Pedro P. Romualdo vs. Governor Antonio A. Gallardo, et. al.” for Injunction, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order; and
B.
Criminal Case No. 561 entitled “People vs. Ruel D.
Dagondon, et. al.” for Illegal Possession of Indian Hemp (marijuana).
In Special Civil Action No.
465, respondent judge issued an Order restraining the continuance of various
public works projects being undertaken by the provincial government and the
disbursement of funds therefor, allegedly in violation of a 45- day ban on
public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code. Complainant alleged that respondent Judge, in spite of the fact
that it was the Commission on Elections, not the Regional Trial Court, which
had jurisdiction over the case, took cognizance of the same and issued the
temporary restraining order.
In Criminal Case No. 561, respondent Judge is accused to have
imposed the wrong sentence in violation of specific provisions of the Dangerous
Drugs Law, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the Revised Penal Code in order
to afford the accused in said case the right to avail of provisions of the
Probation Law.
Respondent Judge’s actuations, according to complainant, were
intended to favor the political faction of Congressman Pedro P. Romualdo in the
struggle with the group of Governor Gallardo for political supremacy in the
1992 elections. This Court, in a
resolution dated March 18, 1993, referred the administrative matter to Justice
Salome A. Montoya of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. Complying with said
resolution, Justice Montoya, in her final report, found the evidence as
follows:
“A. Re: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465:
“It appears that Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov. Antonio R.
Gallardo were both candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the positions
of congressmen and governor, respectively, of Camiguin. They belonged to opposing political factions
and were in a bitter electoral battle.
“On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections,
Cong. Romualdo filed a petition docketed as Special Civil Action No. 465 before
the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin (Br. 28) presided over by respondent Judge
Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor,
the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Budget Officer as respondents. In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to
prohibit and restrain the respondents from undertaking and/or pursuing certain
public works projects and from disbursing, releasing, and/or spending public
funds for said projects, allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects
were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881); that the public works projects were
commenced without the approved detailed engineering plans and specification and
corresponding program of works; that the expenditures of the 20% development
fund for projects other than for maintenance violated the Local Government
Code; that locally funded projects had been pursued without the provincial
budget having been first approved, and reviewed by the Department of Budget and
Management; and that the illegal prosecution of the said public works projects
requiring massive outlay or public funds during the election period was done
maliciously and intentionally to corrupt voters and induce them to support the
candidacy of Gov. Gallardo and his ticket in the May 11, 1992 elections.
“In the afternoon of the same day that the petition was filed,
Judge Tabamo issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for by the
petitioner Cong. Romualdo, as follows:
‘It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great
and irreparable damage and/or injury shall be caused to the petitioner as
candidate and taxpayer, such damage or injury taking the form and shape
occasioned by the alleged wanton, excessive, abusive and flagrant waste of
public money, before the matter can be heard on notice, the respondents are
hereby Temporarily Restrained from pursuing or prosecuting the project itemized
in Annexes ‘A’ and ‘A-1′ of the petition; from releasing, disbursing and/or
spending any public funds for such projects; from issuing, using or availing of
treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods, or
other things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with the
said projects.’
“In the same Order of April 10, 1993 the judge gave the
respondents ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the petition to answer the
same, and set the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for
hearing on April 24, 1992 at 8:30 A.M.
“Gov. Gallardo testified that when he received a copy of the
restraining order and reviewed the petition filed, being a lawyer, he at once
saw that the same was not within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. He said that the elections were
nearing and all their projects were suspended, the laborers could not get their
salaries, and the judge had set the hearing of the injunction on April 24, 1992
or very close to the elections of May 11, 1992. Believing that he could not get justice from the respondent
court, he decided to go to the Supreme Court where he filed a petition for certiorari
(docketed as G.R. No. L-104848) questioning the issuance of the temporary
restraining order and the jurisdiction of the court over Special Civil Action
No. 465.
x x x x x x x x x.
“On April 13, 1992 a rally or demonstration was held in front
of the premises of the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin. People, composed mostly of the unpaid
laborers, carried placards which protested the restraining order and urged
Judge Tabamo to order the release of their salaries. Most of the placards expressed contempt and ridicule for the
judge and referred to him as the ‘tuta’ of Cong. Romualdo and to the RTC as the
‘Romualdo-Tabamo-Court’ and ‘Romualdo Tabamo-Corruption.’
“Respondent Judge Tabamo testified in this regard that the
rallyists were laborers affected by the restraining order. They were taken from all over the island of
Camiguin and loaded in several cargo trucks chartered by the followers of Gov.
Gallardo. Judge Tabamo saw some of his
relatives among the rallyists and when he asked them why they were there, he
was told that the laborers were gathered on the representation that they would
collect their salaries in Mambajao, they were told that they could not receive
their salaries because of the restraining order issued by Judge Tabamo, and the
laborers did not feel good about it.
x x x x x x x x x.
“In the afternoon of April 23, 1992 Judge Tabamo received a
telegram from the Supreme Court in connection with G.R. No. L-104848, the
petition for certiorari filed by Gov. Gallardo reading as follows:
‘SUPREME COURT IN AN ORDER DATED APRIL 20 IN GR NUMBER 104848
ENTITLED ANTONIO GALLARDO ET AL VERSUS HONORABLE SINFOROSO TABAMO JR ET
AL. REQUEST RESPONDENTS TO COMMENT ON
PETITION WITHIN TEN DAYS FROM NOTICE AS WELL AS ISSUED TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND CONTINUING UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS FROM COURT
ORDERING RESPONDENTS JUDGE TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING
YOUR QUESTIONED ORDER DATED APRIL 10, 1992 AND FROM CONTINUING WITH THE
PROCEEDINGS IN SPECIAL ACTION NUMBER 465 ENTITLED PEDRO ROMUALDO VERSUS
GOVERNOR ANTONIO GALLARDO ET AL STOP FORMAL ORDERS FOLLOWS END. SUPREME COURT ASSISTANT CLERK LUZVIMINDA
PUNO.’
“After receiving this telegram Judge Tabamo issued an Order on
the same day of April 23, 1992 cancelling the hearing of the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction which had been previously set for April 24,
1992. He also said that he decided not
to go to court on April 24, 1992 in order to avoid being caught in the
crossfire between the two great political leaders in his province.
“It appears that on April 24, 1992 people came to the premises
of the court for the hearing of the application for injunction in SP No.
465. They were composed of followers of
both Gov. Gallardo and Cong. Romualdo. Gov. Gallardo said he went there to inform the judge about the temporary
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court, thinking that the same had not
been communicated to the judge. Cong.
Romualdo was then likewise present. The
Clerk of Court of Judge Tabamo announced that the case would not be heard any
more as the Supreme Court had issued an order for Judge Tabamo not to hear the
case. After this announcement, Cong.
Romualdo announced to the people that he had already ordered Gov. Gallardo to
give the salaries of the laborers and when the latter heard the announcement,
he told the people that it was not Cong. Romualdo responsible for the release
of the salaries.
“Thereafter, there were passionate exchanges of words between
the two factions and a rumble occurred among the followers of Cong. Romualdo
and Gov. Gallardo, where many were hurt and during which Gov. Gallardo claims
his life was placed in danger.
“Aristeo Marbella, Jr., who testified in this case for the
complainants, said that he was then with Gov. Gallardo and he was choked by Jayjay
Romualdo, the eldest son of the congressman; that another son of Romualdo tried
to hit him and still another son, Gogo Romualdo, also choked him; that
thereafter, Jayjay and Gogo attacked Rollie Gallardo, brother of Gov. Gallardo,
and when he (Marbella) turned around, Cong. Romualdo himself choked him and
wrestled with him; that he pleaded with the congressman who was his godfather
but the latter continued to pull and wrestle with him and then the brother of
the congressman pulled his hair and
George Romualdo, a son of the congressman, hit him at the back, and he fell
down. Marbella said that Gov. Gallardo
tried to help him and Rollie Gallardo but was held down by his bodyguards.
“Thereafter, Marbella went to the police and reported the
matter, as shown in the police blotter of the Mambajao Police Station. He said that he decided not to file a case
knowing that the same would fall in the sala of Judge Tabamo and it would be
useless as Judge Tabamo is the ‘tuta’ or tool of Cong. Romualdo.
“Another witness for the complainants on rebuttal was Camilo
Abanil, who testified that on April 23, 1992 he was with Edmundo Damisa and
Ruben Cloma in a Ford Fiera going around the province of Camiguin on request of
Gov. Gallardo who asked them to announce to the laborers that they could
already collect their salaries from the province; that when they reached the
town of Sagay, they were stopped by Mayor Talian and Vice Mayor Mabolo who was
angry and said that they were poisoning the minds of the people; that the younger
brother of Vice Mayor Mabolo pulled down Damisa from the Ford Fiera where they
were riding; that he (witness) went down to pacify the person who pulled Damisa
but he was the one mauled; and that he pleaded to the men and to the Mayor,
asking the latter to forgive him as they had not committed any fault but only
followed Gov. Gallardo.
“Abanil said that he too reported the matter to the police
station where the incident was placed in the blotter, and that he later had
himself examined by a doctor who gave him a medical certificate. Thereafter, he filed a case for slight
physical injuries against Tata Mabolo (Crim. Case No. 3488).
“Abanil also testified on the incident of April 24, 1992 when
he went to the court premises to witness the hearing because he was among those
not paid his salary. He said he saw
Junar Marbella being mauled by the group of Cong. Romualdo and Rollie Gallardo
being chased by the same group; that he saw Gov. Gallardo trying to help his
brother and Jun Marbella and when he (witness) tried to go near Gov. Gallardo,
he was also chased by the group of Cong. Romualdo who caught him at the steps
of the Capitol Building where Cong. Romualdo boxed him, and Dandan Romualdo
kicked him, Gogo Romualdo boxed him, and Dandan Romualdo wrestled with him;
that he fell to the ground and the group of Cong. Romualdo took turns kicking
him; that he has a medical certificate to show the injuries he sustained; and
that he at first thought of filing a case but decided not to, believing that
the case will fall in the sala of Judge Tabamo who is the ‘tuta’ or tool of
Cong. Romualdo. He further claimed that
the reputation of Judge Tabamo in Camiguin is no longer good and that his court
is termed RTC or Romualdo-Tabamo-Court.
“Edmundo Damisa, corroborated the testimony of Camilo Abanil
on the incident of April 23, 1992 when they went around the province to
announce that the laborers can get their salaries already, adding that Mayor
Talian told them to leave the municipality of Sagay, otherwise they would be
killed. He also testified that on April
24, 1992 he was outside the Capitol Building when he noticed a big commotion in
front of the RTC which was about 30 to 40 meters away; that he saw Rollie
Gallardo being chased by the men of Cong. Romualdo and saw Junar Marbella being
chased and then choked and boxed by the group of the congressman; that he also
saw Gov. Gallardo being held tightly by his security men as he wanted to free
himself and help Marbella and Rollie Gallardo; that he also saw the group run
after and maul Camilo Abanil; that he himself was chased by Cong. Romualdo who
was holding a small gun so he ran up the stairs of the Capitol; and that he
helped Gov. Gallardo get inside the Capitol because the commotion was already
very tense.
“Damisan said he had known Judge Tabamo since childhood days;
that the judge is not popular and is nicknamed RTC or Romualdo-Tabamo-Court
even in the billiard halls and cockpit; and that Judge Tabamo is often seen in
the cockpit because he participates in derbies. He denied that Judge Tabamo had told him to look for a lawyer
instead of making demands in the streets on April 24, 1992 and said that what
Judge Tabamo told him was that it was not easy for him to lift the restraining
order because he has children and it is Cong. Romualdo, who is the godfather of
one of his children, who can help them; and that Judge Tabamo also said that he
knew very well on whose side Damisa was and the latter also knew on whose side
he (Judge Tabamo) was.
“On January 29, 1993 the Supreme Court rendered its Decision
in G.R. No. L-104848, the petition for certiorari filed by Gov. Antonio
Gallardo, et al. against the respondent Judge Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr. and
Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo, granting the same. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court had no jurisdiction
over Special Civil Action No. 465 and ordered its dismissal. The challenged temporary restraining order
of April 10, 1992 was set aside.
“B. RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 561:
“One Ruel Dagondon was charged of Illegal Possession of Indian
Hemp (Marijuana) in Criminal Case No. 561 filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Camiguin (Branch 28).
“In a judgment dated July 18, 1991 the respondent Judge
Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr. found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him
to an imprisonment for the indeterminate period of from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day of prision correccional in its medium period to
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, and to pay a
fine of P6,000.00.
“After this judgment was promulgated on July 31, 1991, the
accused Dagondon filed a Notice of Appeal on the same day. On August 7, 1991, however, the accused
withdrew his Notice of Appeal and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Judgment on August 9, 1991, praying that the penalty imposed upon him be
reconsidered and that the following circumstances be considered as mitigating
in his favor: (1) that the accused did
not intend to commit so grave a wrong, (2) extreme poverty of the accused, (3)
lack of proper education, and (4) voluntary surrender. The respondent Judge asked Public Prosecutor
Julio A. Vivares to comment on the motion. The latter filed a Comment dated August 19, 1991 stating that the bases
for the motion for reconsideration are matters that should have been
established during the trial for the appreciation of the court and that even if
these circumstances were directly or indirectly touched during the presentation
of the defense of the accused, their acceptability or credibility is left to
the sound discretion of the judge.
“On August 26, 1991 respondent Judge issued an Order modifying
the Judgment dated July 18, 1991, by amending the penalty imposed on the
accused Dagondon to a minimum of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional in its medium period to 6 years of prision correccional in its maximum period, ‘in view of
the mitigating circumstances of extreme poverty and voluntary surrender.’
“This modified judgment was promulgated in open court on
August 30, 1991 in the presence of the accused Dagondon and his counsel.
“Subsequently, the accused Dagondon applied for probation,
which the respondent judge granted in an Order dated November 13, 1991.
“Complainants charge that Judge Tabamo modified the penalty so
that Dagondon can apply for probation, upon orders of Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo
who was approached by a close relative of Dagondon.
“In support of this allegation, the complainants presented
only the bare testimony of Ceferino E. Chan, Jr., a former process server in
the court of the respondent judge. Chan
testified in this regard that he was employed as process server in Branch 28
from January, 1978 to April 1992 when he took a leave of absence; that he is
familiar with Criminal Case No. 561 because sometime in August, 1991 he served
a copy of an Order modifying the judgment to the mother of Ruel Dagondon as the
latter was then not in the house; and that he told Dagondon’s mother that it
was good that the decision was changed and the latter answered that they had
gone to Cong. Romualdo to ask for help.
“Chan further testified that he resigned from his position as
process server sometime in July, 1992 because the people in Camiguin no longer
respect the court and even make fun of it, like saying that the RTC means
Romualdo- Tabamo-Court; that people would also say that it one wants to win a
case in the sala of Judge Tabamo, he should first kiss the hand of Cong.
Romualdo; and that people used to ask where else they could go since the court
is already controlled by Cong. Romualdo. He stated that Cong. Romualdo often goes to the chambers of Judge Tabamo
sometimes only in shorts and T-shirts.
“The respondent judge presented Alfreda Daiz, OIC Clerk of
Court of Branch 28 of the RTC of Camiguin. She testified that although Chan did not tell her the real reason for
his resignation from the court, there was a time that Chan told them that his
mother wanted him to administer their vast idle lands because even they, the
owners, did not know the location and boundaries of their lands; and that Chan
also had the plan to put up a business, particularly that of selling motor
parts, because he noticed the motorcycle drivers travel as far as Cagayan de
Oro just to buy parts for their motorcycles.
“Judge Tabamo denied that he had sent Chan to serve a copy of
the modified decision to the residence of Dagondon. He stated that the modified decision was promulgated in open
court on August 30, 1991, during which the accused was present with his
counsel, hence there was no need to serve a copy of the decision in his
house. The judge maintained that in all
his 23 years in the judiciary it was never his practice to serve copies of
decisions in criminal cases to parties because they are promulgated in open
court and that his practice was to furnish their counsels after the decision is
read and that in the Dagondon case the lawyer was furnished a copy of the
modified judgment in open court. He
added that if Chan had served a copy of the decision before it was promulgated,
then Chan had leaked it out and should have been made to answer for the act had
he known earlier about it.
“At any rate, Judge Tabamo points out that Chan has not
presented any proof to show that he served a copy of the decision to Dagondon’s
mother and the records of the case indeed do not show that the alleged service
was made.
“Judge Tabamo denied that Cong. Romualdo goes often to his
chambers in shorts and T-shirts, since the congressman stays most of the time
in Manila and goes home only for special occasions. He explained that Cong. Romualdo used to go around the province
to inspect his projects and visit his leaders and constituents, in the same
manner that Gov. Gallardo, being a lawyer, makes it a point to visit the
offices of the Register of Deeds, the fiscals, the courts and other offices and
engage the officials in conferences regarding matters of vital concern, like
the construction of the Hall of Justice.
“Judge Tabamo said that he had to maintain a healthy
relationship with the officials of the province. Incidentally, the Mayor of Mambajao is the wife of Cong. Romualdo.
“Judge Tabamo further testified that before Chan resigned on
July 1, 1992, the latter went on leave to campaign for his father who ran for
mayor of Mambajao; that Chan’s father lost in the elections but Chan refused to
go back to work; and that he had to send Alfreda Daiz to tell Chan to go back
to work or to resign. Judge Tabamo also
said that Chan was bitter because a sister of his lost a estafa case in the
court and a brother- in-law of Chan also lost his first case before the court.
“The complainants point out in regard to Criminal Case No. 561
that the court considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of Dagondon when the records show that he was arrested in a buy-bust
operation; and that the court imposed a maximum of six (6) years and one (1)
day provided under B.P. Blg. 179 for the offense committed by Dagondon.”
FINDINGS –
RE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO.
465
It may be conceded that on the basis alone of the actuations of respondent
Judge in relation to Special Civil Case No. 465, there may be no clear and
convincing evidence that respondent Judge had acted with manifest bias and
partiality for Cong. Romualdo.
The staging of the rally in front of the courthouse on April 13,
1992 cannot be imputed to respondent Judge. Obviously, the rally was orchestrated by the group of Gov. Gallardo who
picked up the participants from the different parts of the province. Also, the chaos that took place on April 24,
1992 after this Court set aside the temporary restraining order issued by
respondent Judge was occasioned by the attempt of Cong. Romualdo to get the
credit for the fact that the laborers would now be paid. This was resented by Gov. Gallardo and his
followers, resulting in the clash between the two contending groups. The motive of Gov. Gallardo in initiating
the rally is not hard to find. He had
sponsored a number of public works projects and hired hundreds of laborers,
which fact boosted his chances of political victory. When the projects were stopped and the laborers could not get
paid, he had to find a scapegoat, thus, the rally against respondent Judge.
However, respondent Judge can hardly justify his acts not only of
entertaining Special Civil Case No. 465 and issuing a temporary restraining
order stopping the prosecution of the public works projects on the ground that
it violated the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election
Code, but also, as will be discussed later, of imposing a wrong penalty in Criminal
Case No. 561 and, almost simultaneously, reducing the penalty with the evident
purpose of allowing the accused to avail of the benefits of the Probation
Law. Being an experienced judge, it is
highly inconceivable that he was not aware of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23
SCRA 533) where this Court categorically held that considering that the COMELEC
is vested by the Constitution with the exclusive charge of the enforcement of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction
by the trial court over a case involving the enforcement of the Election Code
“is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing
statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority
so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions.”
RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 561:
We agree with respondent Judge that the testimony of Ceferino E.
Chan, Jr. hardly deserves any credence. Respondent Judge emphasized without contradiction that he had never
served copies of his decisions in criminal cases to the parties; he promulgated
his decisions in open court and thereafter furnished copies thereof to
counsels. If, indeed, Chan served a
copy of respondent Judge’s order modifying his decision to the mother of Ruel
Dagondon, during which the mother allegedly blurted out her having gone to
Cong. Romualdo to ask for his help to reduce her son’s penalty, proof of
service of the order to the accused’s mother should have been presented in
evidence. The bare testimony of Chan
lacks any corroboration.
Neither was Chan’s declaration that Cong. Romualdo frequented
respondent Judge’s chambers buttressed by any independent proof. Respondent Judge admitted though that at
times, Cong. Romualdo would make official visits to his court regarding matters
like the construction of the Hall of Justice, in the same way that he would
also visit other provincial offices.
Nonetheless, the facts as established in their totality, more
particularly respondent Judge’s taking cognizance of Special Civil Case No.
465, despite his lack of jurisdiction, his issuance of a temporary restraining
order in said case, his imposition of the penalty in Criminal Case No. 561
which was unconscionably unwarranted given the facts and the law applicable,
and his reduction of the penalty by the application of two non-existent
mitigating circumstances with the obvious result of enabling the accused to
avail of the Probation Law, demonstrate an unmistakable pattern of highly
irregular acts constitutive of gross ignorance of the law and grave
arbitrariness. Respondent Judge has a
long experience as a judge, having been in the judiciary for over 20
years. It is, therefore, difficult for
this Court to sustain the contention that what he had done were mere errors of
judgment. In fact, no discretion was
required in both instances: the
applicable legal provisions are crystal clear and need no interpretation.
In his July 18, 1991 judgment in Criminal Case No. 561 (People
vs. Dagondon, et al.), respondent judge found the accused guilty as charged of
Illegal Possession of Indian Hemp (marijuana) and sentenced him to imprisonment
for an indeterminate period of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional in its medium period to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision
mayor in its medium
period. Additionally, the accused was
ordered to pay a fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00).
On the same day judgment was promulgated, the accused filed a
notice of appeal which he later withdrew in favor of a Motion for
Reconsideration of Judgment praying that the circumstances of voluntary
surrender, extreme poverty and lack of proper education be considered as
mitigating in his favor. On August 26,
1991, respondent judge issued an order amending the penalty imposed to a
minimum of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pision correccional in its medium period to six (6) years of prision correccional in its maximum period. In modifying the judgment, the alleged
mitigating circumstances of extreme poverty and voluntary surrender were taken
into consideration by the respondent judge. The reduction of the penalty enabled the accused, Ruel Dagondon to apply
for probation which was granted by respondent Judge in an Order dated November
13, 1991.
It should be noted that the accused was charged with violation of
B.P. Blg. 179 (Dangerous Drugs
Act), a special law. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, when an offense is punishable by a law other than
the Revised Penal Code, the court should sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same. The accused Dagondon
should have been sentenced to imprisonment anywhere from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years as mandated by B.P. 179. In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law after finding no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the minimum penalty originally imposed
by respondent Judge should not have been two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day but six (6) years and one (1) day. The incorrect minimum penalty was obviously mistakenly arrived at
by applying the rule applicable only for crimes punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, not a special law like B.P. 179. The basic error of respondent Judge stemmed from his unwarranted
assumption that the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to
12 years, provided for the offense involved by Sec. 8 of the governing law, is
the same as prision mayor despite the fact that the technical
terminology of penalties for felonies in the Revised Penal Code were not used
in the Dangerous Drugs Act at that time. He should likewise have readily noted that neither were the terms prision correctional or reclusion temporal used
therein and, for that matter, life imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua was used in and imposed under that
law then in force. The inexorable
conclusion, therefore, is that drug offenses were then considered, not as
felonies, but as crimes punished under a special law, hence the provisions of
Arts. 13, 64, 71 and 76 of the Revised Penal Code could not be given suppletory
effect. Consequently, the indeterminate
sentence should have been within the range for offenses punished by special
laws as provided in Sec. 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
To compound his error, respondent Judge considered in favor of
the accused the mitigating circumstances of extreme poverty and voluntary
surrender. Justice Montoya noted:
“Extreme poverty is not among the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code and it is doubtful whether
it may be considered as a circumstance of a similar nature or analogous to
those mentioned in said Article. On the
other hand, there appears to be no voluntary surrender on the part of the
accused because the decision itself states that the accused was arrested by the
authorities in a buy-bust operation and was brought to the police station in
Mambajao, and later to the PC-INP Headquarters at Camp Gen. Bonifacio
Aranas. In stating that there was
voluntary surrender, the respondent postulated in his Order modifying the
judgment that the accused, after committing the crime and having all the
chances to escape, voluntarily gave himself up to the authorities.”
It might, perhaps, have been easy for this Court to act with
extreme leniency if the only mistake committed by respondent Judge was the
application of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code to an offense punishable by
a special law. However, the pattern of
the “errors” committed one after another, which eventually enabled
the respondent Judge to apply the provisions of the Probation Law in letting
off the accused with a virtual slap in the wrist was so gross as to be
unconscionable.
Considering his experience in the bench and the ready
availability of legal sources and materials from which he could check and
verify his findings and conclusions, respondent Judge was clearly negligent in
misapplying the law. He knew or ought
to know that our laws impose severe penalties on violations of our dangerous
drugs laws; consequently, he should have been alerted to the possibility of
error when the penalty imposed was finally reduced to a ridiculously lenient
one. The inexplicably low penalty which
respondent Judge meted out on the accused in Criminal Case No. 561, was
certainly out of proportion to the crime for which the latter had been
convicted of.
The policy of the law in imposing strict penalties for violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act cannot be gainsaid. The intendment of the law is to eradicate a menace to our society by a
pernicious evil which day in and day out victimizes our youth. To lightly dismiss the respondent judge’s
mistakes in Criminal Case No. 561 would be to send the wrong signals.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote
justice by administering it fairly and impartially. The judge is the visible representation of the law and
justice. A judge who, through gross
ignorance of the law or serious misconduct frustrates the ends of justice
commits a rank disservice to the cause of justice which calls for the
application of appropriate disciplinary measures (Villa vs. Amonoy, 194 SCRA 48
[1991]).
Finally, respondent Judge failed to meet the standard mandated by
Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
“Rule 3.01 – A judge
shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
“Rule 3.02 – In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently
to ascertain the fact and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests,
public opinion or fear of criticism.”
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to hold respondent Judge
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and with grave abuse of
discretion, and to impose on him a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act or acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, and Regalado,
JJ., on leave.