PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RENATO JAVIER Y ITABLE @ “HAPON”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Javier

The Case

This is People of the Philippines versus Renato Javier y Itable, known in the records as Hapon — a criminal appeal from a conviction for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Rey Ismael Ayo y Demetrio on the night of November 5, 1994 in Manila. The People prosecuted; Javier defended himself with denial and pointed to another man as the stabber. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it is a clean illustration of the elements of homicide and of intent to kill presumed from the lethal act; it is a working lesson on res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule, where a sworn statement given four hours after a startling stabbing was admitted; and it shows how the constitutional requirement that a decision state the facts and the law is satisfied even where portions of the stenographic notes were lost, where the accused was given the chance to reconstitute them and did nothing.

Procedural History

Javier was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17, under an information dated November 9, 1994. He posted a cash bond, and upon arraignment pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on September 5, 2011, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and imposing an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum, and ordering him to pay fifty thousand pesos as civil indemnity, fifty thousand pesos as moral damages, and thirty-two thousand four hundred eighty-six pesos as actual damages, with costs. Javier filed a notice of appeal, which the trial court granted on September 22, 2011, and he posted an appeal bond of forty thousand pesos. The records were elevated to the Supreme Court, and the appeal was resolved on the assigned errors that the trial court failed to express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law of its decision, and that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

At around eleven in the evening of November 5, 1994, Renato Ayo was walking home along Blumentritt Street in Manila when he passed the drinking session of Javier and his friends at Javier's patio. Someone shouted for balut and jeered. Renato asked why he was being heckled; Javier shrugged, said he was merely calling a balut vendor, then shoved Renato as two companions loomed behind him. Renato left and went home, where his brother Rey Ismael was drinking with friends, among them Benito Bartolo. Renato told his brother what had happened, and Rey Ismael decided to go to Javier's place, bringing Renato along.

When they met Javier and his companions, Rey Ismael taunted him, asking whether he did not know his brother. Javier then pulled out a fan knife, a balisong, and stabbed Rey Ismael in the chest. A passer-by, Joey Almenario, saw the stabbing. Benito Bartolo arrived at the corner and saw Rey Ismael on the ground with Javier standing over him, knife in hand, about to strike again; Benito tried to block the blow and was hit on the left forearm. A rumble and stoning followed, and Javier and his companions fled toward his house. Rey Ismael was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival at ten minutes past midnight.

An autopsy by Dr. Manuel Lagonera showed several injuries, the most fatal being a penetrating stab wound on the left anterior thorax that pierced the pericardium and lacerated the right ventricle of the heart. Renato Ayo gave a sworn statement at about a quarter to three in the morning, some four hours after the stabbing, consistently naming Hapon as the one who stabbed his brother in the chest. At trial, Javier denied the charge and insisted that his companion Joel Mangalindal was the stabber. The stenographic notes of the hearings of June 5, 1995 and July 11, 1995, covering Renato Ayo's testimony, were missing when judgment was rendered, and the notes of January 28, 1997, covering the testimony of defense witness Arlene Augero, could not be produced because the stenographer who transcribed them had died. The trial court gave defense counsel fifteen days to move on how to proceed, but counsel took no action to retake or reconstitute the testimonies. The June 1995 and July 1995 notes were later found and elevated with the records.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in rendering a decision without clearly and distinctly expressing the facts and the law on which it is based, in violation of the constitutional requirement for decisions.
• Whether or not the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide.
• Whether or not the sworn statement of Renato Ayo was properly admitted as part of res gestae.
• Whether or not the loss of portions of the stenographic notes, and the disregard of the sworn statements of witnesses who never took the stand, warranted reversal of the conviction.

Applicable Provisions

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, under which Javier was charged and convicted, provides:

Article 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

This is the crime established, its elements being a killing, done without justifying circumstance, with intent to kill, and without the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide or infanticide.

Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, invoked by the accused against the form of the judgment, provides:

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

The Court measured the trial court's judgment against this mandate and found it satisfied.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the judgment adequately addressed the issues and presented a complete account of the factual and legal findings, supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. The examination of the recovered stenographic notes showed that Renato Ayo's testimony on the incident and on the identity of the assailant was essentially similar to his sworn statement, which had been offered as part of his testimony without objection. As to the missing notes of Arlene Augero, the accused had been notified, given time, and still failed to act; the trial court rightly observed that any prejudice was purely imagined, since Augero did not witness the stabbing and merely received a phone call asking her to summon the police.

On the second issue, the Court held that all the elements of homicide were proven: the victim died from stab wounds, the killing was not attended by any justifying circumstance, intent to kill is presumed from the fact that death resulted from the unlawful act, and the killing was neither murder, parricide nor infanticide. Identity was established by two witnesses — Joey Almenario, a mere passer-by with no motive to lie, and Renato Ayo, whose relationship to the victim gave him every reason to name the true culprit rather than an innocent man. Against positive identification, the accused offered only denial, which is intrinsically weak and cannot prevail over categorical testimony. The Court also held that the sworn statements of Federico dela Cruz and Nemie Agra were correctly disregarded, because affidavits are hearsay unless the affiants take the stand and submit to cross-examination.

On the third issue, the Court held that the sworn statement of Renato Ayo was admissible as part of res gestae, the requisites being that the principal act is a startling occurrence, that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and that they concern the occurrence and its immediately attending circumstances. The Court explained the doctrine in these words:

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.

The four-hour interval did not destroy spontaneity, the declaration having been made so nearly contemporaneous with the event as to exclude design or deliberation. On the fourth issue, the Court held that the loss of the notes and the failure to present the affiants did not require dismissal, since the accused was heard, was given the opportunity to reconstitute the testimony, and slept on that opportunity.

Doctrine

• Elements of homicide. A person was killed; the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and the killing was not attended by any qualifying circumstance of murder, or by parricide or infanticide.
• Intent to kill is presumed from the fact that death resulted from the unlawful act of the accused.
• Res gestae requisites. A startling occurrence; statements made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and statements concerning the occurrence and its immediately attending circumstances. Spontaneity is the touchstone, and a statement made so nearly contemporaneous with the event as to exclude design or deliberation qualifies.
• Denial is weak. It cannot prevail over positive and categorical testimony, and must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.
• Affidavits are hearsay unless the affiants take the witness stand and are cross-examined.
• Credibility findings of the trial court bind the appellate court absent facts of weight and substance overlooked or misapprehended.
• The constitutional mandate on decisions is satisfied where the judgment addresses the issues and rests on evidence, even if some stenographic notes are lost, where the accused was given the chance to reconstitute them and failed to act.

Disposition

The appeal was denied; the conviction for homicide was affirmed, with the modification that actual damages were raised to thirty-three thousand five hundred pesos, the amount supported by receipts.

Remember This

Memorize the three requisites of res gestae and the rule that intent to kill is presumed from the lethal act — those two lines decide this case. Examiners use this case for res gestae and spontaneity, for denial against positive identification, and for the effect of lost stenographic notes on the constitutional requirement that a decision state its facts and the law.