G.R. No. L-43434. May 25, 1979

JUAN SALANGUIT, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS), RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 25, 1979 FIRST DIVISION FERNANDEZ, J.:
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FERNANDEZ, J.:


This is a petition to review the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission in RO4-WC Case No. 155739 entitled “Juan Salanguit, Claimant, versus, Republic of the Philippines
(Bureau of Public Highways), Respondent” reversing the decision of the Acting
Referee of Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor, Manila,
and dismissing the case for lack of merit.[1]

On July 12, 1974, Juan Salanguit filed
a claim for compensation with Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor
at Manila on account of his illness of hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis
allegedly caused or aggravated by the nature of his employment with the
respondent Bureau of Public Highways.  An
Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness (Exhibit “A”), which was
considered as an answer to the claim, was simultaneously filed stating that the
employer is HED, Auditing Unit, Bureau of Public
Highways, that the respondent, Bureau of Public Highways, would not controvert
the claim and that the petitioner suffered his ailment during his regular
occupation (Items 1, 8 and 17, Employer’s Report).

The Acting Referee of Regional Office No. 4, Manila,
set the case for hearing at which evidence was adduced by the claimant.  After the hearing on the merits, the Acting
Referee rendered a decision dated September
26, 1975, the dispositive part of which
reads:

“(1) To pay
claimant, thru this Office, the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS as compensation under Section 14 of the Act; (Claimant should have been
entitled to P9,367.50 but was reduced to P6,000.00 maximum amount allowed by
law);

(2)  
To pay attorney’s fee to Atty. P. D. Dequeña as counsel for claimant the amount of P300.00
pursuant to Section 21 of the Act; and

(3)  
To pay to the Commission the sum of P61.00 as
decision fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.”[2]

The Republic of the Philippines
(Bureau of Public Highways), through the Office of the Solicitor General,
received a copy of the decision of the Acting Referee on October 6, 1975 but filed the petition to elevate
the records for relief from judgment only on February 18, 1976. 
The reason given for the late filing of said petition is “the
volume and pressure of work of the undersigned Solicitor who had to attend to
the preparation of appellee’s briefs in appealed
criminal cases, pass upon awards and decisions assigned to him on workmen’s
compensation cases prior to their submission to the Chairman of the Committee
on Compensation duly created by the Honorable Solicitor General, and attend
hearings of cases in the trial courts, the decision in question was not acted
upon immediately, or within the period required for filing a Motion for Reconsideration
x x x “.[3]

Although the petition to elevate the records for relief from
judgment was filed after four (4) months from the date that the Office of the
Solicitor General received a copy of the decision of the Acting Referee, the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission took cognizance of the appeal, reversed the
decision of the Acting Referee and dismissed the case for lack of merit.[4]

It is now settled that volume and pressure of work in the Office
of the Solicitor General is not a valid excuse for not filing an appeal or
petition for relief on time.[5]
Moreover, under the rules and regulations of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, the petition for relief should be filed within thirty days after
petitioner learns of the decision or award sought to be set aside and not more
than three months after such decision or award was entered.

Granting, arguendo, that there
was justification for the late filing of the petition to elevate the records
for relief from judgment, this Court finds that the petition
for review is meritorious.

The record discloses that the illness of Juan Salanquit,
petitioner herein, supervened during his employment with the Republic of the Philippines
(Bureau of Public Highways).  Hence,
there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable.[6]
The claimant is relieved of the duty to prove causation as it is then legally
presumed that the illness arose out of the employment.  To the employer is shifted the burden of
proof to establish that the illness is non-compensable.[7]

Moreover, the respondent, Republic of the Philippines
(Bureau of Public Highways), manifested that it was not controverting
the claim.  In view thereof, said respondent
is deemed to have renounced all non-jurisdictional defenses.[8]

The claimant did not rely on the disputable presumption
alone.  He presented evidence that he
acquired his illness as a result of the nature of his employment in the Bureau
of Public Highways.  The respondent,
Republic of the Philippines
(Bureau of Public Highways), did not rebut the disputable presumption and the
evidence adduced by the petitioner.

The facts, as found by the Acting Referee, are:

“After the hearing on the merits, the following pertinent
facts were duly established by substantial evidence.  That claimant was employed by the respondent
as Auditing Examiner II with station at Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, at the monthly salary of
P549.96.  That since
1966, claimant has been feeling the symptoms of his ailment like dizziness and
headache.
  He was found to be
suffering from hypertension.  Inspite of these symptoms, he continued working.  In 1969 claimant suffered a mild hypertensive
attack resulting to slight disfigurement of his face.  He was suffering from dizziness, headache and
numbness of the extremeties.  He was treated by Dr. Honorio
Carreon and the disfigurement of the face was
relieved and felt better.  On March 20, 1973, claimant was rushed
to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital due to another hypertensive attack.  He was found to be suffering from hypertension
with cardiac involvement.  He therefore
was adviced to stop working.

Respondent likewise submitted its ‘Employer’s Report’ and signified
its intention not to controvert the right of claimant to compensation.  Under Item 17 of the report, it stated that
claimant was sick in regular occupation. 
The Physician’s Report of Sickness also stated that the illness of
claimant was aggravated thereof.  According to the attending physician who executed the Physician’s
report, that it is his opinion that ‘the patient’s blood pressure was
aggravated due to much train work because of the nature of his job.’

It cannot be denied that the work of claimant involves brain work
and therefore the aggravation was due to mental stress and strain.  Due to the advice of his attending physician,
claimant stopped working and applied for retirement on August 16, 1973 at the age of 61 years.

After due consideration, Respondent admitted the compensability of
the claim by not controverting the right of claimant
to compensation.  The non-controversion was buttressed by the comment of the
attending physician that the ailment of claimant was contracted due to the
nature of his employment and was aggravated thereof.  Claimant did not claim for the reimbursement
of any medical and hospital expenses.”[9]

The belated contention of the Solicitor General that the
petitioner was not an employee of the respondent, Bureau of Public Highways,
has no merit.  In the Employer’s Report
of Accident or Sickness signed by Highway District Engineer, Domingo R. Rayco, the name of the employer is HED,
Auditing Unit, Bureau of Public Highways.  (Item 1).

In addition to the compensation benefits, the petitioner is entitled
to be reimbursed of whatever medical expenses he incurred if supported by
proper receipts.  The attorney’s fees
should be in the amount of P600.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision sought to be reviewed is hereby
set aside and the respondent, Republic of the Phi­lippines
(Bureau of Public Highways), is ordered:

1) To pay the petitioner the
sum of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as disability
compensation;

2) To reimburse petitioner
of his medical expenses if supported by proper receipts;

3) To pay petitioner the sum
of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) as attorney’s fees; and

4) To pay to the successor
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission the sum of Sixty-One Pesos (P61.00) as
administrative fee.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Guerrero, De
Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ.,
concur.

Makasiar, J., concurs in a separate opinion.


[1]
Annex “C”, Rollo, pp. 17-18.

[2] Rollo, p. 13.

[3]
Annex “B”, Rollo, pp. 14-15.

[4] Rollo, p. 18.

[5] Solite vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., 75 SCRA
388; Cruz vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., 81 SCRA 445.

[6] Section 44, Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended; Justiniano vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 18
SCRA 677.

[7] Balanga vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 83 SCRA 721.

[8] Lominog Dinaro vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et
al., 70 SCRA 292.

[9] Rollo, pp. 11-12.


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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

MAKASIAR, J.:

I concur with the additional opinion that the respondent employer
should likewise be directed to continuously provide the claimant with such
medical, surgical and hospital services as well as appliances and supplies as
the nature of his disability and the progress of his recovery may require and
which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical
capacity.  It is my consistent view that
the provisions of Section 13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, and
Article 185 of the New Labor Code confer such right on the disabled employee,
whether his disability is temporary or permanent.  This is in compliance with the social justice
guarantee of both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and in obedience to the
directive of Article 4 of the New Labor Code that “all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor”,
which is a re-statement of existing jurisprudence as well as Article 1702 of
the New Civil Code.  To limit such right
to a temporarily disabled employee would inflict gross injustice on those
permanently disabled, who still need to be relieved from the pain, trauma,
social ostracism or humiliation generated by such permanent disability.