G.R. No. L-27907. May 22, 1969
LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC. AND LA CAMPANA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, INC. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., LA…
SANCHEZ, J.:
For the second time the unfair labor practice case lodged by
petitioner against respondents comes up before this Court.
Charging grave abuse of discretion, the present petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction seeks the annulment
of the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) en banc
of April 6, 1967 and promulgated on July 31, 1967 directing reopening of CIR
Case 3985-ULP and directing further proceedings thereon. Assertion is now here made by petitioner that
prior to such order of April 6, 1967, the judgment in said case (CIR Case
3985-ULP) has became final and executory. The reason given is that the resolution of
this Court of May 23, 1966 in G.R. L-25903[1]
denying review of said CIR judgment in the aforementioned unfair labor practice
case, for lack of merit, has become final, and that on August 22, 1966, entry
of final judgment has been recorded.
We issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P200-bond.
As we turn back to the record, we find that on January 25, 1966
in the aforesaid case 3985-ULP, CIR Associate Judge Ansberto
P. Paredes rendered judgment finding that private
respondents herein are “guilty of unfair labor practice as charged and are
hereby ordered to cease and desist from further committing the same, to
reinstate all the members of complainant union mentioned in paragraph 5 of the
Amended Complaint (hereinabove copied) to their former positions without loss
of seniority, and other benefits and privileges, and to pay their respective backwages from December 4, 1963, date of filing of the
charge basis of the Complaint, until actual reinstatement.” Private
respondents moved for reconsideration.
On March 18, 1966,
CIR en banc denied the motion.
As aforestated, this Court, on May 23, 1966, dismissed respondents’
appeal for lack of merit in G.R.. L-25903.
On July 12, 1966, we
denied the motion to reconsider. It was
on August 20, 1966 when
herein private respondents made of record in this Court that they were no
longer filing a second motion for reconsideration and instead would pursue
another course of action in CIR.
On the date heretofore adverted to, August 20, 1966, private
respondents filed a motion for new trial before CIR alleging newly discovered
evidence, honest mistake and insufficiency of the evidence. On September
15, 1966, the writer of the decision below, Judge Ansberto P. Paredes, inhibited
himself in view of the fact that a close relative of his entered appearance as
counsel for respondents.
On February 18, 1967,
Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne,
finding herein respondents’ motion for new trial unmeritorious and time-barred,
denied said motion.
Came the challenged CIR en banc resolution of April 6, 1967 penned by Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne directing
reopening and further proceedings. This
opinion was concurred in by Judge Amando C. Bugayong (in the result) and Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador. Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez and Judge Ansberto
P. Paredes took no part.
1.
The main issue here to be
resolved, as presented by petitioner, is whether CIR may legally reopen the
case after judgment thereon has become final and executory
with the dismissal by this Court of the appeal therefrom
of herein respondents.
This problem calls into question the applicability of Section 17
of Commonwealth Act 103, as amended – particularly the proviso thereof which
reads:
“SEC. 17. Limit of
effectiveness of award. – An award, order or decision of
the Court shall be valid and effective during the time therein specified. In the absence of such specification, any
party or both parties to a controversy may terminate the effectiveness of an
award, order or decision after three years have elapsed from the date of such
award, order or decision by giving notice to that effect to the Court: Provided, however, That at any
time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the Court may, on
application of an interested party, and after due hearing, alter, modify in
whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any
question involved therein.”
For, CIR took the position that while the court’s decision of January 25, 1966, affirmed by CIR en
banc on March 18, 1966,
had become final and executory, it was still within
the power of CIR to reopen the case upon the proviso just quoted. CIR took stock of the claim that certain
members of petitioner union executed affidavits refuting the veracity of the
testimony of Dionisio L. Sison
which became the basis of the questioned decision; that private respondents
were precluded from cross-examining petitioner’s other witnesses whose
testimony also was the basis of said decision, and were not allowed to adduce
evidence to substantiate their defense.
On the merits of the affidavits in support of the new trial, we
need but reproduce the order, the first, of Judge Tabigne
of February 18, 1967 –
“As to the remaining first ground (newly discovered
evidence), the Court is of the considered opinion and so holds that the alleged
affidavits of the six (6) members of complainant union (Annexes ‘1’ to ‘6’ to
the petition at bar), five (5) of whom are complaining members and two (2) of
them even testified in court, cannot considered, much less be given the color
of, newly discovered evidence which respondents could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and presented during the trial on the merits of the
case. For affidavits of retraction or
recantation which are characterized by a confession of perjury and an allusion
of conspiracy between the lawyers and officers of the union on one hand and
the latter’s witness (Dionisio L. Sison)
on the other are to be considered unreliable and must not in any way be allowed
to prevail over testimonies freely given by witnesses in open court and wherein
the adverse party has all the opportunities to cross-examine and test the credibilities of said witnesses. This has to be so because discovery of new
evidence or of new witnesses, or impeaching witnesses examined during the
original hearing or tending to show subornation of perjury of such witnesses is
not sufficient to justify relief. And
this is even obvious from the context of the affidavits where none of the
affiants, especially Eligio Oblero
and Proceso Forteza who
testified in court, claim that it was not Sison who
dismissed them. Similarly, a claim that
the testimony upon which a judgment has been based was false or perjured is no
ground to assail said judgment unless the fraud refers to jurisdiction. Moreover, to give credit to such kind of
affidavits would not only give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings but
would also run counter to the principle that ‘the finality of litigation and
stability of judicial decision both require that conclusions once reached as
the outcome of legal proceedings should not be changed.’ The reason for this
is that all questions that had been discussed and passed upon in the decision
have already acquired the character of res judicata. And
it must be remembered in this connection that all matters relative to the issue
of dismissal had already been finally adjudged when respondents’ petition for
review was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit, and, therefore,
can no longer be entertained in the instant petition for new trial.”[2]
Neither is there merit to the statement of respondent CIR that
herein private respondents were precluded from cross-examining petitioner’s
witnesses and that they were not allowed to adduce evidence to substantiate
their defense. Of the ten witnesses
presented by petitioner in the court below, only two were not
cross-examined. But why? From the very
decision of Judge Paredes of January 25, 1966 itself – which had long since
reached the state of finality – we find that private respondents were
represented by two attorneys. Each of them
received previous notice of the hearing of July 21, 1965 at which date petitioner rested its
case. And yet, neither attorney appeared
thereat. On July 30, 1965, as stated in the said decision,
“it was respondents” turn to adduce evidence and as there was again
no appearance whatsoever on their part, the Court considered the case submitted
for decision and cancelled the hearing for August 2, 1965.”[3]
It would appear to us then that private respondents were not
deprived of any right at all. They lost
that right by default. They cannot now
complain. They had two attorneys. Both of them did not appear, not even on the
date set for the presentation of their own evidence. They cannot lay the blame at the door of the
court. Their concept of justice is obnoxious
to our concept of diligence.
On top of all of these, there is the final judgment of this Court
dismissing private respondents’ petition for the review of the decision. To be recalled at this point is Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, which in terms emphatic provides that upon
the receipt of the judgment of this Court by the Clerk of the Court of
Industrial Relations, such judgment “shall immediately become conclusive,
final and executory.”
Reopening of the case in the circumstances presented is beyond CIR’s power.
2. The foregoing notwithstanding respondents vehemently contend
that reopening is not yet closed to CIR.
We make the prefatory statement that the disputed CIR order of
April 6, 1967 directing further proceedings was not issued purposely “to
carry into effect the decision” previously rendered. Nor is it aimed at “a confirmation of
the judgment”. Which, it must be
conceded, are both proper.[4]
But CIR relied on Church vs. La Union
Labor Union, 91 Phil. 163, 168-169, and Apo
Workers Union vs. Castillo, 97 Phil. 998
(unreported). Church vs. La
Union Labor Union is not to be read as giving comfort to
respondents cause. There, the original
decision directed petitioner to reinstate the laborers who went on strike, or,
in the event such is not possible, to give them one month pay in lieu of notice
of separation from service. The amended
decision in turn ordered petitioner to reinstate in Manila
those laborers who desired to be reemployed therein and to give one month
separation pay to those who preferred not to be so reemployed. In upholding the amended decision, this Court
observed that the arrangement so made was deemed the most equitable solution to
the plight of the laborers whose right to be reinstated has been subsequently subverted
by petitioner by closing its depot at San Fernando, La Union, and resuming its
operations in Manila. The amendment
could thus be made for the reason that the closing of the San
Fernando depot came about after the original
decision. In the language of this Court
in that case, “the award was amended x x x because of developments that had later taken place which
had the effect of changing the relative situation of the parties.”[5]
Nor is the Apo Workers Union
case to be equated with the present. In Apo Workers Union, the union, on February 2, 1953, filed in CIR a
petition that the company pay all union members Christmas bonus. Petition was granted. The company did not appeal. Afterwards, on October 15, 1953, respondent Judge Castillo issued an
order approving the claim for attorneys’ fees of Enage
& Beltran. Subsequently, Judge
Castillo issued a clarifying order stating that “every worker who is a
beneficiary under the order, has to pay a 10% attorneys’ fees.” After the
order, Attys. Muaña & Logarta,
counsel for the Cement Workers Union, intervened, because their client, the
said Cement Workers Union, then had another case pending in the same court
against the same company, the Cebu Portland Cement
Company, involving the same Christmas bonus claimed by Apo
Workers Union, and because they assert “their right to share in the amount
to be paid by the laborers of said union by way of attorney’s fees.” The
trial court dismissed the intervention.
The appeal to CIR en banc remained unacted
upon. We ruled that insofar as said
motion for intervention was concerned, the order directing the payment of
attorneys’ fees to Enage & Beltran cannot be
considered final, and that the lower court “may still alter or modify the
same in the manner it may see fit as was done in this case by Judge Castillo”,
it appearing that “the period of three years from the time of the award
made in favor of ‘Enage & Beltran’ has not yet
transpired.”
In the present case, there is no such supervening event noted in
the Church and Apo Workers Union
cases.
Here, the proposed testimony of two members of the union who
recanted and that of the other union members who did not previously testify
are not new. Neither is the failure to
cross-examine petitioner’s witnesses and to present evidence on behalf of
respondents of any avail. They have been
foreclosed in the court below and thwarted here on appeal. These are matters which cannot be resuscitated. The reason being that no new issue, no change
in the relative position of the parties – which would warrant reopening of the
case – has been adduced; no new matter which could not have been litigated is
urged.[6]
It is worth remembering that the rationale behind the proviso in Section 17 is
that in labor cases, changes in situation could conceivably occur after the
decision has become final.
Some such situation would arise if an event occurs after the
decision which would nullify, or render impossible or inequitable, enforcement
thereof. For instance, if the employer is
thrown into bankruptcy, or the company’s business has been destroyed or has
suffered heavy losses or has considerably decreased.[7]
So it is, that the authority of CIR to reopen a case under Section 17 of
Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, must be based “only upon grounds
coming into existence after the order or decision was rendered by the Court of
Industrial Relations, but not upon grounds which had already been
directly or impliedly litigated and decided by said court nor upon grounds
available to the parties at the former proceeding and not availed of by any of
them.” Such is the ruling of this Court in Pepsi?Cola Bottling
Co. vs. Philippine Labor Organization, 88
Phil. 147. This Court there emphasized
that “[t]o hold, otherwise may give way to vicious and vexatious
repetition of proceedings.”[8]
In Nahag vs. Roldan 94 Phil. 87. 91, this Court in effect
reaffirmed the Pepsi–Cola doctrine. We there said: “While the above section
apparently authorizes the modification of an award at any time during its effectiveness,
there is nothing in its wording to suggest that such modification may be
authorized even after the order for the execution of the award has already
become final – with respect, of course, to the period that had already elapsed
at the time the order was issued. To
read such authority into the law would make of litigations between capital and
labor an endless affair, with the Industrial Court
acting like a modern Penelope, who puts off her suitors by unraveling every
night what she has woven by day. Such a
result could not have been contemplated by the Act creating said court.”
The ruling in Pepsi–Cola and Nahag
takes on added dimension when in 1966 we repeated once again that CIR’s power under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103
“to modify, alter or reopen any award, order, or decision, on application
of an interested party, during the period of its effectiveness, x x x can be exercised only upon
grounds coming into existence after the decision was rendered, not upon grounds
already directly or impliedly litigated and decided, or which were, or could
be, available to the parties during the original hearings.”[9]
The baneful effects of a contrary rule are easily discernible.
CIR may then, after its own judgment has become final, freeze the
decision, revive and reopen, decide and redecide a
case, time after time, bandy its judgment from one suitor to the other, for so
long as one witness may recant or another witness who could have testified may
care to testify, or where representations can be made by new counsel that the
former attorney has ineptly handled the case, and the like. Well did this Court say in a recent case
(1965), that “if we interpret it [Sec. 17, CA 103] as conferring on the C
.1. R. unconditional power to reopen finally adjudicated cases, its decisions
and orders could never be relied upon as final; conflicts between capital and
labor would be interminable; and industrial planning would become
impossible.”[10]
With the result that, as pointed out in Dy Cay
vs. Crossfield & O’Brien,
38 Phil, 521, 527, “litigation might become more intolerable than the
wrongs it is intended to redress.” In these circumstances, it is not at
all improbable that the prevailing party may not live to enjoy the benefits of
a decision favorable to him. We are confident
that public policy and public interest will not permit some such situation to
obtain.
4. We now come to the motion to dismiss filed in this Court on March 10, 1969 by new counsel for
petitioner. In that motion, we read the
averment that the petitioning union, “after careful and serious
consideration of their Petition, taken in the light of recent developments
affecting their relationship with the respondent-company, have decided that
they have lost interest in the further prosecution of their claims”; that
the unions legislative council, on February 5, 1969, adopted a resolution
authorizing the new counsel to file a motion dismissing this case; that the
former counsel who directed this case before this Court, Atty. Eulogio R. Lerum, had been relieved
of his services in a letter of the union dated January 13, 1969; and that
“the dismissal of this instant case would serve the best interests of both
parties who are now in the process of formulating a collective bargaining
agreement in their earnest desire to establish industrial peace and promote the
economic well-being of all the parties concerned. This drew a reply from Atty. Eulogio Lerum that “while he
admits that he had received termination notice from the alleged officers of the
above named union, he had not been disauthorized by
the complainants who had retained him to appear in their behalf” and that
“said complainants are against the dismissal of their case for the reason
that they want to vindicate their rights and it is against public policy to
settle an unfair labor practice by amicable settlement (Sec. 5(a), Rep. Act
875).”
While it may be true that the labor union itself has lost
interest in the case, we do not believe that such should give ground for the
dismissal of this case. The labor union
as a body in reality has not so great a material interest in the controversy as
would prejudice it in the event of dismissal.
It is the twenty-one (21) members for whose benefit the ULP case was
prosecuted who stand to take tremendous losses. Nor is the argument that union and employer
are now in the process of formulating a collective bargaining agreement of any
consequence. That would not be affected
by the decision we now render as an aftermath of the ULP case. Unless of course such a dismissal is a quid
pro quo before the parties could sit around the bargaining
table. Which surely enough is not to the
“best interests” of the laborers.
And, as we examine the record, we observe that none of the
members of the legislative council who adopted the resolution relied upon in
the motion to dismiss is personally affected by the decision rendered by
the CIR in Case 3985-ULP. That decision,
it will be recalled, directs private respondents herein not only to reinstate
the twenty-one (21) union members without loss of seniority and other benefits
and privileges but also to pay their respective backwages
from December 4, 1963, date
of filing of the charge, basis of the complaint, until actual
reinstatement. It is easy enough to
perceive the injustice which may be visited upon these twenty-one (21) union
members if the petition herein were to be dismissed. For then, a new trial, will be had, with the
consequent trouble, expense, anxiety and another long delay before they could
enjoy the fruits of their victory which they have legally and definitely
won only after a long and protracted legal battle. At any rate, it is better on balance that we
foreclose a flanking movement which could destroy rather than uphold the rights
– to reinstatement and monetary award – of individual laborers acquired under
the final judgment.
These are the considerations which leave us unprepared to throw
the present petition out of court and instead prompt us to exercise the
discretion granted by Section 4 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court to decide this
case on the merits since the same had already been submitted for decision as
early as December 20, 1967.[11]
It is timely at this point to recall the language of this Court in the 1918
case of United States vs. Sotto, 38 Phil. 677:
“We hold that the rule announced in the case of Dee See Chow vs.
Stanley (p. 208, ante) is applicable to criminal as well as to civil
cases, and that, after a case has been heard and is submitted to the court for
decision, the appellant cannot, a his election, withdraw the appeal.”
For the reasons given, the petition herein for certiorari is
granted; and the resolution of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations en
banc dated April 6, 1967
issued in Case 3985-ULP is hereby set aside and declared null and void.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., did not take part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.
[1]
Entitled “La Campana Food Products, Inc., et
al., Petitioners, versus La Campana Food
Products, Inc. and La Campana Chemical Industries,
Inc. Employees Association, et al., Respondents.”
[2] Rollo, pp. 72-74.
[3] Rollo, p. 37.
[4]
Luzon Brokerage Co. vs. Luzon Labor Union, 83
Phil. 801, 803.
[5]
At p. 168.
[6]
San Pablo Oil Factory, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 6 SCRA
628, 631-632.
[7]
Connell Bros. Company (Philippines)
vs. National Labor Union, 99 Phil. 1049 (unreported)
[8]
At p. 149; emphasis supplied.
[9]
New Manila Lumber Co., Inc. vs. Centino, 18
SCRA 125, 131. See also: Rattan Art and Decorations, Inc. vs.
Rattan Art and Decorations Union, L-6466, May 21, 1954; San Pablo Oil Factory,
Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra.
[10]
Philippine Land-Air Sea
Labor Union (PLASLU) vs. Cebu Portland Cement
Company, L-20987, June 23, 1965. See also: Galvez vs.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, 3 SCRA 418, 422-423.
[11]
Section 4, Rule 50, Rules of Court, provides: “An appeal maybe withdrawn
as of right at any time before the filing of appellee’s
brief. After that brief is filed the
withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. The withdrawal of an appeal shall have the
same effect as that of a dismissal in accordance with section 2 of this
rule.” Cf. Krivenko vs. Register
of Deeds, 79 Phil, 461, 466-467.