THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ZAMBOANGA CITY AND BASILAN CITY, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQU…

People versus Montejo

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and preliminary injunction brought by the People of the Philippines against Judge Gregorio Montejo of the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan, together with Mayor Leroy S. Brown and his co-accused in a murder case. The prosecution asks the Supreme Court to correct the trial judge's repeated rejection of its evidence and his refusal to let it propound certain questions, and to declare Senator Roseller Lim disqualified from appearing as counsel for the accused. The case matters because it fixes two working rules: the trial court's exclusion of relevant evidence amounts to grave abuse of discretion, and the constitutional ban on a legislator appearing as counsel in a criminal case turns on whether the offense charged is connected to the public office.

Procedural History

The accused were charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan, presided over by Judge Gregorio Montejo. During the trial, the judge rejected several exhibits offered by the prosecution, both in its direct evidence and in rebuttal, and sustained objections to questions put to the prosecution's medico-legal witness. He also overruled the prosecution's objection to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim as counsel for the accused, relying on the case of Montillo versus Hilario and Crisologo. The prosecution then filed this special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and preliminary injunction directly in the Supreme Court. The Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction without bond, enjoining the judge from proceeding with the trial pending resolution of the petition. The respondents answered that the rulings complained of were in conformity with law.

Facts

The amended information alleged that during May and June 1958, in the sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor Leroy S. Brown, as city mayor, organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandos, armed them with pistols and high power guns, and established a camp called a sub-police headquarters at Tipo-Tipo, placed under his command, orders, direct supervision, and control, where his co-accused were stationed. Criminal complaints were entertained in that sub-station, with Detective Joaquin R. Pollisco acting as investigating officer, and persons were ordered apprehended and detained there for days or weeks without due process of law and without being brought to the proper court.

On or about the fourth and fifth of June 1958, one Yakan Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown without any warrant or complaint filed in court and brought to the sub-station. On the way, he was maltreated pursuant to the mayor's instructions, concurred in by Pollisco, that Tebag be mauled until he surrendered his gun. Once inside the sub-station, with his hands securely tied, Tebag was subjected to further and more severe torture by Patrolman Graciano Lacerna, Mohamad Hasbi, Pollisco, Dionisio Dinglasa, and other special policemen, in consequence of which he died.

To simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace officers in an encounter with armed bandits, the body was brought early the next morning to a nearby isolated field, where Hasbi fired twice at the dead body from behind, and an old Japanese rifle supplied by Mayor Brown was placed beside it. A report of the imaginary encounter was submitted, and Hasbi caused a companion to shoot him on the left arm. At the trial, the prosecution offered evidence of the sub-station's operations, of Tebag's arrest and death, and of the alleged simulation, including the testimony of the National Bureau of Investigation's medico-legal chief on the trajectories of the bullet wounds. The trial judge rejected this evidence and the related questions, while admitting, with notable liberality, records of supposed achievements of the sub-station, a congratulatory communication, a letter of commendation, and even a magazine article, as evidence for the defense.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the prosecution's direct and rebuttal evidence and in refusing to permit the prosecution to propound the questions adverted to.
• Whether or not Senator Roseller Lim is disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as counsel for the accused in the criminal case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 17 of Article Six of the Constitution provides:

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.

This provision governs the second issue, because the accused are public officers and the question is whether the murder charged was committed in relation to their offices.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the lower court not only erred but also committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting the prosecution to propound the questions adverted to. The Court found it obvious that the evidence and the questions are relevant to the issues in the criminal case. Although it is not possible to determine with precision, at this stage, how far the exhibits may affect the outcome, it is elemental that all parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish their respective pretense. The Court stressed that the guilt or innocence of the accused is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their testimony, so the parties should be allowed a certain latitude in presenting evidence, lest they be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated, a danger to be avoided particularly in a case of this nature, importance, and significance.

On the second issue, the Court held that a mere perusal of the amended information readily elicits an affirmative answer. The information alleged that Mayor Brown, as city mayor, organized the police patrol and civilian commandos, armed them, established the camp under his command, supervision, and control, where his co-accused were stationed, entertained criminal complaints, conducted investigations, and assumed authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law, and that, in line with this set-up and acting upon his orders, his co-accused arrested and maltreated Tebag, who died in consequence. The Court reasoned that although public office is not an element of murder in the abstract, the offense charged is intimately connected with the offices of the accused and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. They had no personal motive to commit the crime and would not have committed it had they not held their offices, and the co-accused obeyed Mayor Brown because he was their superior officer. The Court distinguished Montillo versus Hilario and Crisologo, where the information did not show that the official positions of the accused were connected with the offense charged and the motives were personal, which is not the situation in this case.

Doctrine

First, the exclusion of evidence that is relevant to the issues in a criminal case, coupled with a refusal to allow the prosecution to propound proper questions, constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari, because all parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish their respective pretense, especially where the outcome hinges on the veracity of opposing witnesses. Second, under Section 17 of Article Six of the Constitution, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives is disqualified from appearing as counsel in a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. The test is whether the offense charged is intimately connected with the public office and was perpetrated in the performance, though improper or irregular, of official functions, even if public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract.

Disposition

The Court set aside and reversed the rulings complained of, and enjoined the respondent judge to admit the prosecution's direct and rebuttal evidence and to permit the formulation of the questions referred to, with costs against the respondents.

Remember This

Remember that a legislator may not appear as counsel in a criminal case where the offense charged is intimately connected with the public office and committed in the performance, though improper or irregular, of official functions. Examiners use this case to test the constitutional disqualification of legislators as counsel and the grave abuse of discretion standard for the exclusion of relevant evidence.