IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YU HIO SOO ALIAS WILLIAM KEE ENG HOC TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. YU HIO SOO ALIAS WILLIAM KEE ENG HOC, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE,…

Yu Hio Soo versus Republic of the Philippines

The Case

This is a naturalization proceeding in which the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition of Yu Hio Soo, also known as William Kee Eng Hoc, to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. The trial court granted the petition, and the Republic appealed to the Supreme Court. The case matters less for what it says about the qualifications for naturalization than for what it says about mootness: while the appeal was pending, the petitioner acquired citizenship through another route and took his oath, and the Court was asked to decide whether there was anything left to rule upon.

Procedural History

The petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the Court of First Instance, where the then Judge Teofilo B. Buslon rendered a decision declaring him eligible for Philippine citizenship and granting the petition. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor, elevated the matter to the Supreme Court through the Solicitor General. The grounds raised on appeal were that the petitioner failed to show a lucrative income, that he had not acted in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, and that his witnesses were incompetent. The petitioner's brief disputed these points, and the appeal was submitted for decision. Before the Court could rule, the petitioner filed a motion dated February 13, 1976, informing the Court that he had been granted Filipino citizenship under Presidential Decree No. 836 and had already taken his oath of allegiance. When asked to comment, the Solicitor General manifested that the Republic had no objection to the dismissal of the case for being moot and academic.

Facts

Yu Hio Soo sought admission as a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization. After trial, the Court of First Instance found in his favor, declaring him eligible for citizenship and granting his petition. The Republic appealed, questioning his income, his conduct during his stay in the country, and the competence of his witnesses.

While the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the petitioner acquired Filipino citizenship by another means. He was granted citizenship under Presidential Decree No. 836 and took his oath of allegiance on February 4, 1976, before an Assistant Solicitor General in Manila. In his motion, he prayed that the case be dropped and that he be allowed to withdraw the documentary evidence he had presented before the Court of First Instance.

The Solicitor General, asked to comment, interposed no objection to the dismissal, manifesting that the petitioner had already taken his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen in connection with his approved application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. The Court noted a discrepancy in the dates: the petitioner's motion spoke of an oath taken on February 4, 1976, while the Solicitor General's manifestation referred to February 3, 1976. Either way, the fact of acquisition and oath was undisputed by both sides.

Issues

• Whether or not the appeal from the decision granting the petition for naturalization had become moot and academic by reason of the petitioner's acquisition of Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree No. 836 and his taking of the oath of allegiance.
• Whether or not the appellate grounds raised by the Republic, namely the lack of a lucrative income, improper conduct, and incompetent witnesses, still required resolution once the case had become moot.

Applicable Provisions

Presidential Decree No. 836 is the decree under which the petitioner was granted Filipino citizenship, as invoked in his motion:

Petitioner has been granted Filipino citizenship under Presidential Decree No. 836 and has already taken his oath of allegiance on February 4, 1976, before an Assistant Solicitor General in Manila; and under these circumstances the question raised by appellant in the appeal has become moot and academic.

This decree is the source of the supervening citizenship that removed the subject matter of the appeal.

Letter of Instruction No. 270 is the measure under which the Solicitor General acknowledged the petitioner's approved application and oath:

They have no objection to the dismissal of this case for being moot and academic, it appearing that petitioner-appellee had already taken his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen on February 3, 1976 in connection with his approved application under Letter of Instruction No. 270.

This instruction confirms, from the Government's own mouth, that the petitioner had already become a citizen by a route outside the naturalization case on appeal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal had become moot and academic. The petitioner had been granted Filipino citizenship under Presidential Decree No. 836 and had taken his oath of allegiance, and the Solicitor General, representing the very party that appealed, interposed no objection to the dismissal. With the petitioner already a citizen, a judgment on whether the trial court correctly granted naturalization would serve no purpose.

On the second issue, the Court did not reach the merits. The grounds raised by the Republic — the lucrative income, the proper and irreproachable manner of conduct, and the competence of the witnesses — were left unresolved because the supervening event had stripped the appeal of any live controversy. The Court's disposition rested on the single ground that the case was moot and academic.

Doctrine

A case is moot and academic when a supervening event has removed the controversy, so that a ruling would have no practical effect. When the party who appealed a naturalization judgment itself manifests that the petitioner has already acquired citizenship under another law and has taken the oath, the appeal is dismissed for being moot and academic, and the appellate grounds are not passed upon. For a Bar answer, the rule is this: courts decide live controversies, not questions that events have already answered, and the proper disposition is dismissal, not a merits ruling.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for being moot and academic, without costs, and did not rule on the merits of the naturalization.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a supervening grant of citizenship and oath of allegiance renders the naturalization appeal moot and academic. Examiners use this case to test mootness and the effect of supervening events on pending appeals, not the qualifications for naturalization.