PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND ASST. PROV’L. FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, BRANCH …

People versus Adil

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Visitacion, against Judge Midpantao Adil, the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The People ask the Supreme Court to set aside two orders of the respondent judge dismissing a charge of serious physical injuries against Margarito Fama Jr. on the ground of double jeopardy. The dismissal rested on an earlier case for slight physical injuries before the Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo, which had itself been dismissed for denial of the right to a speedy trial. The case matters because it fixes the rule on when a supervening fact, here a deformity left by a wound, takes a second prosecution out of the protection against double jeopardy.

Procedural History

On April 15, 1975, a complaint for slight physical injuries was filed against Fama Jr. in the Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo. He was arraigned on July 7, 1975 and pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the offended party filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal, and on July 28, 1975 the Fiscal filed an information for serious physical injuries in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, alleging a permanent scar and deformity on the right face.

Fama Jr. moved to defer proceedings on the ground of double jeopardy. The Fiscal then sought dismissal of the municipal case, but the Municipal Court instead dismissed it on September 11, 1975 for violation of the accused's right to a speedy trial. Relying on that dismissal, the respondent judge issued an order on September 22, 1975 dismissing the serious physical injuries case on the ground of double jeopardy, and denied reconsideration on October 14, 1975. The People then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari.

Facts

At about half past five in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, along Aquino Nobleza Street in Janiuay, Iloilo, Fama Jr. hurled a stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting him on the right cheek. Three days later, on April 15, 1975, a complaint for slight physical injuries was filed in the municipal court, alleging injuries that would require medical attendance for five to nine days, barring complications.

Only later, after the wound had healed, did the alleged deformity on Viajar's right face become apparent. On June 8, 1975, Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal charging serious physical injuries arising from the same incident. After preliminary investigation, the Fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance on July 28, 1975, alleging that the injury would heal in five to nine days but left a permanent scar and deformed the right face.

The municipal case was dismissed on September 11, 1975 for denial of the right to a speedy trial, after repeated postponements at the instance of the prosecution. On that same day, Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his memorandum in the serious physical injuries case, reiterating his theory of double jeopardy. The respondent judge then dismissed that case on September 22, 1975, and denied reconsideration on October 14, 1975, relying on the ruling in People versus Silva.

Issues

• Whether or not the dismissal of the earlier charge of slight physical injuries bars the later prosecution for serious physical injuries on the ground of double jeopardy.
• Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the second information is a supervening element that takes the case out of the rule in People versus Silva.

Applicable Provisions

The decision invokes the constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy trial, which the Municipal Court applied when it dismissed the first case. The Court's own order quotes Section 16 of Article Four of the Philippine Constitution:

Section 16. All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

That guarantee is the reason the first case was dismissed, and that dismissal is the very order on which the plea of double jeopardy in the second case was built.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the plea of double jeopardy cannot hold. The controlling doctrine is not People versus Silva, cited by the respondent judge, because in Silva the extent of the damage and the injuries were already existing and known when the prior minor case was prosecuted. Here, the deformity was not yet apparent when the first complaint was filed, only three days after the incident.

On the second issue, the Court held that the additional allegation of deformity is a supervening element that gives rise to a new and distinct offense. The Court relied on Melo versus People:

This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

It also relied on People versus Yorac:

Stated differently, if after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

And on People versus Buling, explaining how a deformity may be a supervening fact:

No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presume that such fact was not apparent or could have been discernible at the time the first examination was made. The course, not the length, of the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the original information.

The Court stressed that expert evidence is not needed to understand that a scar or deformity left by a wound on the face cannot be predetermined. Whether a deformity actually exists is a question of fact for the trial court. It was therefore grave error, correctible by certiorari, for the respondent court to have dismissed the second case.

Doctrine

The identity of offenses required for double jeopardy does not obtain when the second offense did not exist at the time of the first prosecution. A new fact that supervenes after the first prosecution, altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, removes the second indictment from the reach of double jeopardy. A deformity left by a wound is such a supervening fact, because the course of healing cannot be predetermined and can only be known after healing has ended. The guarantee of the right to a speedy trial, quoted above, justified the dismissal of the first case, but that dismissal does not bar a prosecution for a graver offense built on a fact that had not yet come into existence.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the orders of September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975, and ordered the respondent court to proceed with the trial and judgment of the serious physical injuries case according to law, with costs against Fama Jr.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a supervening fact that alters the character of the crime and gives rise to a new and distinct offense defeats the plea of double jeopardy. Examiners use this case to test the supervening fact exception, especially where a deformity appears only after the first charge for slighter injuries had already been filed.