HILARIO P. SORIANO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MA. THERESA V. MENDOZA-ARCEGA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 17 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PH…

Soriano versus Mendoza-Arcega

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition brought by Hilario Soriano against the presiding judge of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and the People of the Philippines. Soriano stood charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents and with violation of Section 38 of Republic Act Number 337, and he asked the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the trial court: the order declaring his redirect examination waived, and the order denying his motion for reconsideration. The case matters because it is the Court's clean statement that the right to be heard is satisfied when a party is given the opportunity to present his evidence, and that a litigant who squanders that opportunity through delay cannot afterwards cry denial of due process.

Procedural History

Soriano was charged in two criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, originally raffled to Branch 79 and later re-raffled to Branch 17. After the prosecution finished its evidence, the defense began presenting its own, and Soriano took the witness stand. When his original counsel withdrew their appearance, the trial court noted the withdrawals and reset the hearing. On the scheduled date, the court issued the first assailed order, declaring the redirect examination of Soriano waived and denying the new counsel's motion to cancel the hearing. Soriano moved for partial reconsideration, and the trial court denied the motion in the second assailed order. Soriano then went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, asking that both orders be annulled. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders.

Facts

Hilario Soriano was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents and with violation of Section 38 of Republic Act Number 337. The two cases were consolidated and heard jointly, and Soriano pleaded not guilty. His original counsel were Attorneys Sedfrey Ordoñez and Lamberto Gonzales, Junior.

During trial, but before the prosecution rested, the cases were re-raffled to Branch 17. After the prosecution's documentary evidence was admitted, the defense presented its evidence. Soriano testified and was cross-examined exhaustively. At the close of cross-examination, his counsel expressly asked to conduct a redirect examination at the next scheduled hearing. Before that date arrived, however, his counsel filed their respective notices of withdrawal of appearance. Soriano then filed an ex parte manifestation asking for sixty days from approval of the withdrawal to secure a new lawyer, and the redirect examination was set for September 22, 2005.

On September 15, 2005, the law firm of Chato and Vinzons-Chato entered its appearance for Soriano and asked that the September 22 hearing be cancelled, because the handling lawyer, Attorney Peter Paul Romero, needed time to study the case and had a prior commitment before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo. Soriano nonetheless appeared on September 22 and manifested that his new counsel had a conflict of schedule. The private prosecutor orally moved that the redirect examination be deemed waived. The trial court granted that motion, declared the redirect examination waived, and later denied reconsideration, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court's ruling that the petitioner's redirect examination is deemed waived amounts to a denial of his right to testify on his own behalf.
• Whether or not that ruling constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court governs postponements and provides:

A postponement or continuance for justifiable cause may be granted only by the court motu proprio, or upon motion of a party. The motion shall be filed before the day set for the trial.

The Court invokes this provision to stress that postponements are limited and cannot be had as a matter of right, which undercuts Soriano's claim that the hearing had to be cancelled for his new counsel.

Section 15, paragraph 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and error on certiorari.

The Court cites this constitutional command for the speedy disposition of cases to answer Soriano's due process argument, since the same Constitution that protects his right to be heard also demands that cases move forward.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no denial of Soriano's right to testify. He had already testified on direct examination and had been cross-examined; he was in fact granted the chance to conduct a redirect examination but lost it through his own delaying tactics. The Court noted that the trial court had earlier warned that any intent to unduly delay the prosecution would not be countenanced. Even granting that his original counsel withdrew, Soriano had ample time to secure new counsel, which he did. The Court held that the alleged conflict of schedule of Attorney Romero was of no moment, because the law firm could have sent another lawyer, and the motion to cancel lacked proof of the conflict. The Court added that a motion for postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and that a party who was given the opportunity to participate but failed to do so cannot complain of deprivation of due process.

On the second issue, the Court held that certiorari did not lie. The assailed orders were interlocutory, since they did not dispose of the case completely but left something more to be adjudicated. Certiorari requires a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and the Court found none, because the trial judge merely exercised sound discretion in denying the motion to cancel the hearing. The Court also observed that it was not the end of the day for Soriano, since he was given the chance to present other witnesses and evidence on his behalf.

Doctrine

The right to be heard is satisfied by the opportunity to present evidence, not by the actual presentation of every witness a party desires. A party who is given that opportunity but frustrates it through dilatory actions cannot afterwards claim a violation of due process.

The grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, consistent with Section 2 of Rule 30, which limits postponements to justifiable cause.

Certiorari under Rule 65 lies only where the tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse means capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it is not present where the court merely exercises sound discretion on an interlocutory matter.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the trial court; Soriano lost, and the declaration that his redirect examination was waived stood.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the opportunity to be heard, not the actual use of it, is what due process guarantees, and a party who delays cannot claim he was denied his day in court. Examiners use this case in criminal procedure and remedial law to test the requisites of certiorari against interlocutory orders and the limits of postponements under Rule 30.