JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY, AND SEGUNDO C. MASTRILI, PETITIONERS, VS. ABELARDO SUBIDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, RESPONDENTS.

The specific question in this suit for mandamus is whether
or not respondent Commissioner of Civil Service could render nugatory the
choice by the Mayor of Pasay City of the principal petitioner, Segundo C.
Mastrili, as the City Legal Officer, unless it could be shown that such
appointment was from a list of five next ranking eligible and qualified persons
as certified to by respondent official.^[1]
For reasons to be set forth, we hold that he could not. Accordingly, mandamus lies.

The facts are undisputed. The Municipal Board of Pasay City enacted an ordinance^[2]
creating the position of the City Legal Officer, in accordance with the
Decentralization Act of 1967.^[3]
By virtue thereof, petitioner Mastrili was, on January 6, 1969, duly appointed
to such office by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, the City Mayor. The very next day, he took his oath of
office and began discharging its duties. There is no question as to his being qualified for such a position,
having been a law practitioner for over twenty-five years. Nonetheless, respondent Commissioner of
Civil Service disapproved such an appointment. The basis for such action was explained by him in his fifth indorsement
of July 9, 1969, relying on Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185 which, insofar
as pertinent, reads thus: “In
cases of vacancies in the offices of heads and assistant heads of local
offices, the governor or mayor shall fill them by appointment from a list of
the five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified by the Civil
Service Commissioner: Provided,
That these five persons shall have stated beforehand that they will assume the
position, if appointed.”^[4]
There was no question either that petitioner Mastrili was appointed without
such prior certification by respondent Commissioner.

Hence this suit for mandamus. This Court, to repeat, is confronted with the issue of whether or
not Section 4 of the Decentralization Act could appropriately be invoked by
respondent Commissioner. If he could
not, as is our holding, then petitioner Mastrili has a clear legal right
enforceable by mandamus. We so
decide.

1.  Such a conclusion finds
support both on principle and authority. No legal justification exists for the obstacle thus interposed by
respondent Commissioner. Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 5185 cannot be relied upon by him. That provision of law clearly does not call for application. The position in question, that of City Legal
Officer, is one that requires the utmost confidence on the part of the
Mayor. The relationship existing
between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public
officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter
enter­tains for the counsel selected. So we have declared in no uncertain terms in Besa v. Philippine National
Bank.^[5]

The choice of whom to appoint then is his, and not that of the
respondent. Once exercised, and there
being no dispute about the qualifications of the person appointed, the duty of
respondent Commissioner is clear. In
the emphatic language of this Court, through the present Chief Justice: “When the appointee is qualified, as
petitioner herein admittedly is, then the Commissioner of Civil Service has no
choice but to attest to the appointment.”^[6]

Equally persuasive is this excerpt from Pineda v. Claudio,^[7]
where the contention of respondent Commissioner of Civil Service that the
choice as to who should be Chief of Police of Pasay City should come from a
list of the five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified by
him, was likewise rejected, this Court speaking through Justice Castro: “To construe section 23 the way the
petitioner urges it should be, would be to unduly interfere with the power and
prerogatives of the local executive as reinforced by the Decentralization Act
at the same time that it would frustrate the policy of the Police Act ‘to
achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization,
administration, and operation of local police agencies’ and that of the Civil
Service Act ‘to attract the best qualified to enter the service.’ For it is not
enough that an aspirant is qualified and eligible or that he is next in rank or
line for promotion, albeit by passive prescription. It is just as necessary in order for public administration to be
dynamic and responsive to the needs of the times, that the local executive be
allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and
eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation,
integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment. * * *.”^[8]

2.  Another consideration
equally decisive lends reinforcement to the conclusion reached by us. This Court, in the interpretation of
statutes has adhered, as is but right, to the basic principle that the
legislative objective must be fostered.^[9]
It is in that light that Republic Act No. 5185, intended to assure further
decentralization, is to be construed. There is no question, of course, that where any of its provisions
specifically covers the situation, it must be enforced with undeviating rigidity. It would be to frustrate its purpose,
however, if a condition therein set forth is to be seized upon to nullify the
exercise of the appointing prerogative of a city executive entrusted with
purely local affairs. Unless the
statute then speaks in no uncertain terms, respondent Commissioner, a national
official, certainly cannot be held to be vested with the power to ignore, much
less overrule, a decision reached by the city or provincial dignitary in whom
the com­petence to appoint resides. So
to rule would be to emasculate local autonomy. We should guard against it, as was categorically announced in the
excerpt above-noted from Claudio v. Pineda. Nor should the approach this Court followed in Villegas v. Subido,^[10]
where the choice of the Mayor of the City of Manila as to who its legal officer
should be was sustained by us, be overlooked. The right of petitioner Mastrili to the position of the City Legal
Officer of Pasay City must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the writ of mandamus prayed for is
granted, and respondent Commissioner of Civil Service, or his successor to such
office, is ordered to approve the appointment of petitioner Segundo C. Mastrili
to the position of City Legal Officer of Pasay City. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
Respondent Commissioner relied on Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185 (1967).

^[2]
Ordinance No. 882, Series of 1969.

^[3]
Section 19, Republic Act No. 5185 (1967).

^[4]
Petition, Annex C.

^[5]
L-26838, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 330.

^[6]
Villanueva v. Balallo, L-17745, Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 407, 410.

^[7]
L-29661, May 13, 1969, 28 SCRA 34.

^[8]
Ibid, pp. 46-47.

^[9]
Cf. Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485 (1909); United States v.
Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910) Riera v. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105 (1919);
Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex Phil., Inc., 106 Phil. 829 (1959);
Sarcos v. Castillo, L-29755, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853; Automotive
Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 248; Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs,
L-28463, May 31, 1971.

^[10]
L-29588, December 27, 1968, 26 SCRA 531.