G.R. No. L-17473. June 30, 1964
FERNANDO GOZON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SALUD VDA. DE BARRAMEDA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BENGZON, C.J.:
holding that the demand for liquidated damages of P5,000.00 in a
detainer case came within toe jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court, and that the agreed sum of P5,000.00 as liquidated damages was
not unconscionable.
The complaint against above defendant for detainer was filed in
June, 1958, in the peace court of Caloocan, Rizal. It prayed for the
recovery of the premises described therein, the unpaid rentals thereof
plus the sum of P5,000.00 as liquidated damages, and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction first, to prevent defendant from further
collecting the daily rentals from the various stallholders in the said
property; and second, to allow plaintiff to take over the collection
thereof. The peace court issued the writ accordingly.
In her answer, defendant advised the court that pursuant to its
preliminary injunction, possession of the premises had been transferred
and delivered to Gozon. Then she raised the defense that the court had
no jurisdiction over the claim for the liquidated damages in the amount
of P5,000.00.
The case was submitted for judgment on the pleading; whereupon a
decision was rendered declaring the temporary possession by Gozon of
the said premises permanent, and rentals due up to July 3, 1958,—when
possession was surrendered—plus P5.000.00 as liquidated damages, and
costs.
Barrameda appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal insisting that the peace court had no jurisdiction to award the
liquidated damages of P5,000.00; and as an alternative defense, that
the amount of P5,000.00 was unconscionable.
Answer having been
filed, that court upon Gozon’s motion, rendered the decision now before
us, affirming that of the peace court.
Two questions are at
issue: (1) whether or not the justice of the peace court of Caloocan
had jurisdiction to award the P5,000.00 as liquidated damages; and (2)
whether or not such amount is unconscionable.
”
Relative to the appellant’s theory that the said peace court had no
jurisdiction over the claim for liquidated damages in the sum of
P5,000.00, it is argued:
In the care filed
before the peace court, appellee had joined two actions in one single
complaint for unlawful detainer: one for ejectment and the other for
collection of liquidated damages. The joinder is improper for the
reasons: (1) that an action for collection of liquidated damages
necessitates the filing of an ordinary “action whereas an ejectment
case is summary in nature; and (2) that the amount sought to he
recovered in the liquidated damages is beyond the jurisdiction of the
peace court (at that time P2,000.00 only in civil cases). It is true,
appellant argues, that in action for ejectment, peace courts retain
jurisdiction to award damages even beyond P2 000.00. However, such
damages refer only to value of the reasonable use and occupation of the
premises in controversy, never to any other kind in damages.
”
An alternative grounds of the instant appeal, it is urged that
P6,000.00 for liquidated damages is unconscionable and iniquitous, it
appearing that no actual damage aside from the agreed rentals due on
the premises—but unpaid—was suffered by appellee, the use and,
occupation thereof having been surrendered to appellee immediately
after the institution of the complaint (i.e. upon the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction).
This Court
has often stated that inferior courts have ‘exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and detainer regardless of the value of damages
demanded.[1] It has also
ruled that the damages that may be recovered in actions for ejectment
are those equivalent to a reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises by defendant[2].
Nonetheless, this latter legal proposition is not pertinent to the
issue raised in the instant case because here, the damage sought to be
recovered had previously been agreed to by lessee (in the contract of
lease) and imposed by lessor by way of damages. Besides, nobody can
affirm that the liquidated amount of damage stipulated in the lease
contract, was not due to occupation or loss of possession of the
premises and non-compliance with the contract.
Furthermore,
the act which gave rise to the cause of action in this unlawful
detainer case was lessee’s non-compliance with the terms of the lease
agreement[3] with lessor.
She failed to pay the 4th installment on or before the scheduled date
(of April 20, 1958). As stipulated in the lease contract, failure on
the part of the lessee to pay any of the installments provided therein,
confers on the lessor, the right to terminate the lease contract; and
should a court action ensue pursuant to such non-compliance, appellant
binds herself to pay appellee the amount of P5,000.00 as liquidated
damages. From that breach of contract—a single cause of action—the
appellee derived several enforceable rights against appellant. In
accordance with the rules prohibiting the split of a single cause of
action,[4] the complaint
pronerly included the demand for damages and the peace court correctly
issued jurisdiction over the amount of P5,000.00 as an incident to the
ejectment case.
“* * * Where there is only
one delirt or wrong, there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a
single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have
been violated belonging to one person. And the rule is that all such
rights should be alleged in a single complaint, otherwise those that
are not therein included cannot be the subject of subsequent
complaints, for they are barred forever. For instance, when one’s
property is taken through violence by another, a single delict or wrong
is committed consisting of the illegal taking of the property, and
accordingly there is but a single cause of action. This cause of
action, however, entitles the plaintiff to two claims; one for recovery
of property, and another for damages for its detention by the
defendant. Under the above stated rule, plaintiff may file only one
complaint embracing the two claims. He may not file two complaints, one
for the possession and another for damages, for if he does so, he would
be splitting up a single cause of action into two parts, and the filing
of the first complaint would bar the second.* * *.” (Moran, Rules of
Court [1963 ed.] Vol. 1, p. 95.)“Only one cause of action
as a general rule, arises from a single breach or several breaches of a
single and indivisible contract, and all the damatres claimed by reason
thereof must be secure in a single action.” (Moran, Rules of Court,
[1963 Ed.] Vol. I, p. 96.)
Anyway, this issue has become no more than academic, as justices of
the peace have power in these days, to adjudicate claims not exceeding
P10.000.00 (Republic Act 3828). As to the damages, we say, considering
that the written contract between the parties contemplated a total
amount of P48,000.00 and occupancy for a period of six years, we can
not—without sufficient proof—regard as iniquitous the sum of P5,000.00
awarded by way of liquidated damages, what with the possibility that
the owner could not find a tenant for many months, after the defendant
shall have left the premises, the employment of counsel, etc.
Wherefore, seeing no reason to modify the decision appealed from, we
hereby affirm it with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] Tuason vs. Sellner, 30
Phil. 543; Lao Seng Hian, et., al. vs. Hon. Almeda Lopez, et., al.,
G.R. No. L-1950, May 16, 1949; City of Manila vs. Ebay, G.R. No.
L-15872, April 26, 1961.
[2] F. Castueras, et. al., vs. Hon. F. Bayona, et., al. G.R. No. L-13657, October 16, 1959.
[3] See Annex “A” of complaint.
[4] Sec. 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.