G.R. No. L-23489. March 27, 1968
JULIAN ABANA (DECEASED) SUBSTITUTED BY ARCADIA VDA. DE ABANA, ET AL., PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO QUISUMBING, RESPONDENT.
ANGELES, J.:
Certiorari to review the decision and resolution en banc
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission dismissing the claim of Julian Abana[1]
for compensation benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Stripped of non-essentials, the undisputed facts as found by
Hearing Officer Pedro P. Pelaez of Labor Regional Office No. 4, and adopted by
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, are hereunder retold:
The respondent, Francisco
Quisumbing, is the proprietor of the Dollar Taxi. The petitioner, Julian Abana, had been
employed by him as taxi driver since February 13, 1952.
Before his employment as such, Abana was required to submit
himself to physical examination.
Sometime on August 21,
1958, the petitioner, upon arrival home from work, had a heart
attack. His family brought him
immediately to the Philippine General Hospital where he
was confined for five days. His chief
complaints were difficulty of breathing and chest pains. The resident physicians who treated him
diagnosed his illness as “congestive heart failure,
hypertensive”. After Abana had been
discharged from the hospital, he rested for a few weeks at home, and when his
health had improved, he reported for work again, informing the manager of the
Dollar Taxi that the cause for his absence was that he had been stricken of
heart disease.
Sometime in 1959, Abana had another heart attack while driving
his taxi. Since then, his heart ailment
recurred very often causing him to be checked up and treated at the dispensary
of the Philippine General Hospital from time to time.
It was established that everytime the heart ailment of the
petitioner recurred, it prevented him from doing his task as taxi driver, but,
however, he always reported the matter to his manager, asking either for sick
or vacation leave with pay, which pay, unfortunately, was never granted him. He was given some small amounts, though, in
the form of vales. Despite
respondent’s knowledge, however, of the already weakened or diseased heart of
the claimant (resulting to his permanent total and indefinite incapacity for
labor) and demands for sickness benefits, the former never gave the latter any
benefits nor reimbursed him the amount
incurred for medical expenses.
In view of petitioner’s deteriorating health condition caused by
his heart ailment, he could no longer endure to work as taxi driver. Since January, 1961, he had not been to
resume work, nor could he perform any
kind of work which entails physical and mental fatigue or stress.
On the basis of the above facts, the hearing officer rendered
judgment declaring petitioner’s illness to be compensable under the law, and
thereby ordered his employer to pay him the sums of P3,057.60 and P500.00 as
compensation benefits and medical expenses, respectively; to provide him with
medical, hospital, and surgical services and supplies until claimant’s illness
shall have been pronounced to be medically cured or arrested; and to pay office
fees pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
As indicated in the beginning, the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission reversed the findings of the Hearing Officer and thereby dismissed
the petition.
The question presented is whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to disability benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by reason
of the heart ailment which he contracted during his employment with
respondent.
Apparently, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
dismissing the claim for compensation proceeds upon the idea that the causal
connection between petitioner’s work and his illness has not been sufficiently
established. There is no doubt that
driving a taxicab for long hours in Manila and suburbs, including all its
incidents, such as going through the congested traffic and helping passengers
load and unload their baggage, causes severe strain and tension, and that it
does aggravate a heart condition.[2] Since the record shows that petitioner’s
heart ailment occurred for the first time in 1958, while he was already an
employee of the respondent, we make the conclusion that it was at least
aggravated by his work.
While there is that possibility that factors other than the
employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his
illness, this is not a drawback to its
compensability. For, under the law, it
is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development
or acceleration of claimant’s illness to entitle him to the benefits provided
for. It is enough that his employment
had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the
disease. It has been repeatedly held
that under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not necessary for a claimant
to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of
demonstration. It is sufficient to show
that the hypothesis on which he bases his claim is probable.[3]
Viewing the case from a
different angle, the exact medical cause of the illness, however is not really
significant. For, granting, only for
argument’s sake, that the evidence for petitioner is insufficient to show a
causal link between the nature of his employment and his heart ailment, under
the provision of section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended,[4] it is to be presumed that petitioner’s
illness, which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of,
or was at least aggravated by, said employment.
With this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the employer,
and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation.[5] We fail to find in the record any substantial evidence adduced by
respondent employer tending to disprove causal connection between claimant’s
heart ailment and his employment. The
mere opinion of doctors presented by petitioner as evidence cannot prevail over
the presumption established by law.
The respondent contends, as he did in the Commission, that the
claim of petitioner has prescribed since no notice of the sickness or claim for
compensation within the period fixed by law was filed by the claimant. This defense is not tenable since the
respondent had actual knowledge of claimant’s illness. It is not disputed that “everytime the
heart disease of the claimant recurred, it prevented him to do his task as taxi
driver, but, however, he always reported the matter to the management asking
either sick or vacation leave with pay.”
Under this circumstance, notice of injury or sickness would be
superfluous.[6] Basically a social legislation designed to
give relief to workmen, the Workmen’s Compensation Act must be liberally
construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted.[7]
As the amount to be awarded as compensation has not been the
subject of dispute between the parties, We shall not
disturb the findings of the hearing officer on this regard.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed. The heirs of the deceased
petitioner, who were named substitute in this case, shall be awarded the
amounts and benefits in accordance with the decision of the hearing
officer. Costs against
the respondent.
Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., on leave.
[1]
During the pendency of this appeal, he died and his heirs were named as
substitutes.
[2]
A. D. Santos, Inc. vs. Conchita
Vda. de Sapon, etc., et al., G. R. No. L-22220, April
20, 1966.
[3]
Manila Railroad
Company vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission and Crispin Pineda, G. R.
No. L-19773, May 30,
1964.
[4]
“Presumption. – In any proceeding for the enforcement
of the claim for compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary ?
“1. That the claim comes within the provision of this Act; x x x “
[5]
Justiniano vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-22774, November 21, 1966, citing Agustin vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-19957, September 29, 1964.
[6] National Development
Company vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., G. R. No.
L?21796, August 29, 1966.
[7]
Batangas
Transportation Co. vs. Tomas Perez, et al., G. R. No. L-19522, August 31, 1964.