LU LUAN CO, PETITIONER VS. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Lu Luan Co versus Jarencio

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Lu Luan Co against Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. The petitioner had already been admitted to Philippine citizenship by a naturalization judgment, had taken his oath of allegiance, and had received his certificate of naturalization. The respondent judge then set aside that oath-taking and cancelled the certificate, and ordered a rehearing so that the Solicitor General could investigate the petitioner's conduct during the two-year waiting period. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul that order and to stop the rehearing. The case matters because it fixes the procedural discipline that surrounds the final step of naturalization: the oath-taking hearing is not a private ceremony between the applicant and the court, and the State, through the Solicitor General, must be given notice and a genuine opportunity to be heard.

Procedural History

In the early part of 1960, Lu Luan Co filed an application for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Laguna. After hearing, Judge Francisco Arca rendered judgment on April 25, 1961, admitting the petitioner to Philippine citizenship, but providing that the judgment would not become executory until after two years from its promulgation, and until the court, on proper hearing with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, was satisfied that during the intervening period the applicant had met the statutory conditions. No appeal was taken by the State.

On May 3, 1963, the petitioner filed a motion to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance. On May 11, 1963, Judge Arsenio Nañawa, presiding as vacation judge, granted the motion, and the petitioner took his oath the same day. The certificate of naturalization followed on May 17, 1963. On June 3, 1963, the respondent judge, Judge Jarencio, set aside the order of May 11, cancelled the oath and the certificate, and set the motion for rehearing on July 10, 1963. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed with the Supreme Court this original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Facts

The naturalization judgment of April 25, 1961 carried a built-in two-year waiting period. Notice of the judgment was served on the petitioner on April 27, 1961, but the Solicitor General received his copy only on May 8, 1961, and the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna on May 4, 1961. The State did not appeal.

On May 3, 1963, the petitioner moved to be allowed to take his oath. A copy went to the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna, but not to the Solicitor General. The Clerk of Court set the hearing for May 11, 1963, and again the notice was not served on the Solicitor General. At that hearing, Judge Nañawa found that the petitioner had not left the Philippines, had dedicated himself to a lawful calling as an employee earning 1,050 pesos a month, had not been convicted of any offense, and had committed no act prejudicial to the nation. He allowed the oath, which was taken on May 11, and the certificate issued on May 17, 1963.

The Provincial Fiscal advised the Solicitor General of what had happened and recommended that no appeal be taken. The respondent judge, however, motored the matter himself. He found that the Solicitor General had never been furnished the motion or the notice of hearing, that the petitioner and his counsel were too much in a hurry, and that, as far as the Solicitor General was concerned, the two-year period had not yet expired when the motion was filed on May 3, 1963, because that office received the judgment only on May 8, 1961. He set aside the oath-taking and cancelled the certificate, and ordered a rehearing with full opportunity for the Solicitor General to investigate.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the order allowing the petitioner to take his oath and in cancelling the oath and the certificate of naturalization.
• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order complained of, considering that the Solicitor General was not furnished a copy of the motion to take oath and was not notified of its scheduled hearing.

Applicable Provisions

The decision invokes the rule on control of orders not yet final, which the respondent judge relied upon and which the Supreme Court accepted as the source of the power to reopen the proceedings:

Section 5 (g), Rule 124, Rules of Court: The court may amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

This provision bears on the case because it supplies the authority of the trial court to set aside its own order of May 11, 1963, which was not yet final, and to correct a proceeding that had been conducted without notice to the State.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the subject matter was plainly within the jurisdiction of the respondent judge's court. The only remaining question, therefore, was whether he had committed grave abuse of discretion.

On the second issue, the Court answered in the negative. The authority given by the Office of the Solicitor General to the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Laguna covered only the hearing held on April 25, 1961. The lower court itself so understood it, because notice of the judgment was served not only on the Provincial Fiscal but also on the Office of the Solicitor General. It followed that when the petitioner filed his motion on May 3, 1963, he should have served a copy on the Office of the Solicitor General, and he did not. Likewise, when the Clerk of Court sent out the notice of hearing for May 11, 1963, that notice should have been served on the Office of the Solicitor General, and it was not.

The Court also stressed the timing. Since the notice of judgment was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on May 8, 1961, the two-year period had not yet expired, as far as that office was concerned, when the petitioner filed his motion on May 3, 1963. On these facts, the Court concluded that the respondent judge did not commit any abuse of discretion in issuing the order complained of.

Doctrine

A bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the authority of a fiscal to represent the State in a naturalization case is limited to the particular hearing for which it was given; it does not extend to later incidents of the case. Second, the Solicitor General is the proper representative of the State in naturalization proceedings, and the applicant must serve upon the Office of the Solicitor General both the motion to take the oath and the notice of its hearing. Third, the two-year waiting period is counted from the date the Solicitor General receives notice of the judgment, so that the State is not deprived of the full period within which to observe the applicant's conduct. Fourth, an order allowing the oath-taking is not final while the waiting period has not run as to the State, and the trial court may amend or control it under Section 5 (g) of Rule 124 to make it conformable to law and justice. These rules tie directly to the quoted provision: the power to control process and orders is what allowed the respondent judge to cancel the oath and the certificate and to reopen the proceedings.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the writs prayed for were refused, with costs, so the respondent judge's order setting aside the oath-taking and ordering a rehearing prevailed.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the naturalization oath-taking is a proceeding to which the Solicitor General must be given notice, and the two-year period runs from his receipt of the judgment. Examiners like to use this case on the procedural requirements of naturalization, on the limited authority of a fiscal's appearance, and on the trial court's power to control orders that are not yet final.