G.R. No. L-24951. July 20, 1968
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF JOSE CHUA CHU TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE CHUA CHU, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELL…
ANGELES, J.:
Jose Chua Chu, a Chinese citizen,
applied for naturalization in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. After
hearing, the court granted the petition on the basis of its findings that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor-General has appealed, maintaining: (1) that the petitioner is not exempt from
filing a declaration of intention; (2) that the subscribing witnesses to the
petition are not qualified to become insurers of petitioner’s good conduct; and
(3) that the petitioner failed to state all his places of residence.
The appeal is well taken.
1.
The only evidence presented by
petitioner in support of his allegation that he was born in the Philippines
are his bare testimony and his “native born certificate of residence”
which bears the date March 29, 1961. He did not bring along his parents, who are
still living, to testify, nor did he present any baptismal certificate which
could show his place and date of birth.
His native born certificate of residence cannot on its face be
acceptable as evidence of his birth because the officer who wrote the date
therein contained as merely received them and has no personal knowledge of
them.[1]
With this failure on his part to establish that he was born in the Philippines,
the petitioner should have been required to file a declaration of intention to
become a citizen.
2.
As to the character witnesses for
petitioner, it appears that both are employees of the New Republic Bakery where
petitioner works as sales manager. The
first witness, Pedro Son, is a time keeper therein, while the other, Epitacio Sevilla is the
bookkeeper of the same bakery.
It can be gathered from
the testimony of Pedro Son that although he came to know the petitioner since
birth, they did not see each other during the war and they only met each other
for the first time after the war in 1947, when this witness saw the petitioner
in Tacloban City; that except for occasional business
dealings, they had no other occasion to meet until petitioner came to Ormoc in 1959; that the encounters they had had were only
in connection with the payrolls of the New Republic Bakery. On the other hand, Epitacio
Sevilla testified that he became acquainted with the
petitioner only in 1953, so that he knew him (petitioner) only for ten
years. The associations between
petitioner and Pedro Son, which was not continuous and between said petitioner
and Epitacio Sevilla, which
was only for ten years, do not qualify these witnesses to testify as to the
applicant’s character and demeanor during his entire period of his residence
in the Philippines. Since petitioner claims to have been born in
this country, his attesting witnesses should be persons who have known him
continuously from childhood, because our law requires that one who desires to
be a Filipino citizen must establish that he has observed a proper and
irreproachable conduct during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines.[2]
3. An examination of the
record reveals that petitioner really failed to state in his petition all his
places of residence, present and former.
He only alleged that his present place of residence is Real
St., Ormoc
City and that his former residence
was 39 Salazar St., Tacloban City. In his testimony, however, he declared that
he was born in Valencia, Ormoc City in 1929; that
during the war, he evacuated to Lanao where he stayed
until 1945; that in 1945 he went back to Ormoc City
and stayed there until 1947 when transferred to Wilson St. Tacloban
City; and that after six months, he again transferred to Salazar St., and then
back to Ormoc City.
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for
naturalization state all of petitioner’s present and former places of
residence, which includes all places where petitioner actually and physically
resided. The reason for this is that
information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to
be provided by people who lived in his actual physical surroundings. Petitioner’s omission to state all his former
places of residence is fatal to his application.[3]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed, and consequently, the petitioner’s application is
dismissed. Costs
against the petitioner-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
See De Lara vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-18024, May 29, 1964.
[2] Vy Tian vs. Republic,
L-19918, July 30, 1965.
[3]
Li Siu Liat vs.
Republic, G. R. L-25356, November 25, 1967, citing Qu
vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964; Tan vs. Republic,
L-22207, May 30, 1966; Chang vs. Republic, L-20713, April 29, 1966; Chan
Kiat Huat vs.
Republic, L-19579, February 28, 1966.