G.R. No. L-24114. June 30, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114, PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V…
CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled “Appearance” filed
with this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19,
1954, entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U. P. vs. Mencias,
Tiburcio, et al.) as “chief counsel of
record” for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
This act in itself would have been innocuous were
it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the
decision in this case became final.
Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano
was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if not
altogether bizzare, behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade
this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a
late date. He forthwith came with a recital
of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by
the respondents Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week of October, 1969
the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio,
in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him
to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case
entitled “Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C.
Mariano, etc., et al.” (L-30546). At their
conference, Marcelino Tiburcio
supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the precise
status of each of the two cases, thus:
that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on
October 27, 1969, white the present case was still pending and the date of
hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In
addition to Marcelino Tiburcio’s
representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon
the assurance of a mutual
acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan – that
indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano
prepared a letter-contract dated October
8, 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional
services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33
hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two
cases. It was on the same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused
the preparation of his written appearance in the present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent
fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in
the Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the records of which we
are in a position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19 hectares is
involved,[1]
the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been
sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance
to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal
judicial processes. It detracts heavily
from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice,
generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public,
an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final
judicial mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano
grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into
the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar
must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated
or under litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer
is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would
substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give
notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution.[2]
Atty. Soriano’s entry of appearance in the present
case as “chief counsel of record” for the respondents in effect
sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio
Diaz, of the premier control over the case.
Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he
exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from
being convinced that he really did so.
Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention
of such efforts on his part. His
subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere afterthoughts.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano
has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria
as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity
Hills case now
pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even prior to
October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope
of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case.
Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano
accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case, he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates
with another in a pending cause.[3]
He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case,
something which is elementary in the lawyer’s trade. Had he been less precipitate in his actions,
he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present
case.
Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this incident,
that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by
their former lawyer, then that circumstance of itself should have
indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the
present case. Atty. Soriano
cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Dalangpan
that the case was still pending with this Court – which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident, categorically
denied having given. What Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the reasonable
vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification
visit to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly
accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May
Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If his office were
situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme
Court building in Manila, he could
have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by
telegram.
We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of
his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no
less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not
for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the
apology he made to this Court. It is the
sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely
censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be
met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the
present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief
counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record
of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano
on file in the Bar Division of this Court.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., on leave.
[1]
Annex “R-1” of Petition in the Varsity Hills case, entitled
“Memorandum for plaintiffs” (the respondents in this case)
[2]
U.S. vs.
Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189.
[3]
Canons of Professional Ethics, par. 7.