🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. SANCHO R. JACINTO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

G. R. No. L-20340. September 10, 1965 September 10, 1965

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Del Rosario versus Jacinto

The Case

This is a case about lis pendens — the rule that a party may not litigate the same controversy twice in two courts at the same time. Pilar, Mariano and Salvador del Rosario, together with Aniana Deudor, Macaria Fulgencio and Carlos Javier, sued Sancho Jacinto, Domingo Bascara and J. M. Tuason and Company for reconveyance and recovery of a parcel of land in Quezon City. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that an earlier suit over the very same land was already pending in another branch of the same court. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the second suit was barred. The case matters because it states, cleanly and memorably, the three requisites of lis pendens and shows how they are tested when the parties are not identical but merely represent the same interests.

Procedural History

The first action, for reconveyance and recovery of the land, was filed in October 1958 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch. The second action, over the same land and against the same defendants, was filed in March 1962 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch. On motion of the plaintiffs, the Pasay court ordered the second case transferred to the Quezon City Branch, on the reasoning that the land lay in Quezon City.

In the Quezon City Branch, the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action between the same parties for the same cause was pending in the Pasig Branch. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case on the ground of lis pendens. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and sought leave to file an amended complaint that would drop the Del Rosarios and retain only the original owners as plaintiffs, and drop J. M. Tuason and Company as a defendant. The court denied both motions. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal.

Facts

The land in dispute is a parcel of two thousand eight hundred seventy nine square meters, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Numbers 26531 and 26532, situated at barrio Tatalon, Quezon City. The Deudors, Fulgencio and Javier were the original owners. Pilar, Mariano and Salvador del Rosario claim to have bought the land from them. J. M. Tuason and Company held the land under the Torrens titles, and Jacinto and Bascara are alleged to be purchasers from Tuason.

On the sixteenth of March 1953, a compromise agreement was executed between the Deudors and J. M. Tuason and Company. That agreement is the common factual root of both suits: in each, the plaintiffs assert ownership of the same parcel and pray for its reconveyance or recovery, premised on the same compromise.

In October 1958 the Del Rosarios sued Jacinto, Bascara and Tuason in the Pasig Branch. In March 1962 the Del Rosarios, now joined by the original owners, sued the same defendants in the Pasay Branch, which transferred the case to Quezon City. The Quezon City court dismissed the second suit for lis pendens, refused to admit an amended complaint that would have changed the parties, and the plaintiffs appealed.

Issues

  • Whether or not the second suit is barred by lis pendens, there being an earlier pending action between the same parties for the same cause.
  • Whether or not the requisites of lis pendens are satisfied even though the plaintiffs in the two actions are not identical and one defendant was dropped in the proposed amended complaint.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute; it applies the settled requisites of lis pendens as a ground to dismiss a complaint, which the Court states as follows:

The requisites for lis pendens as ground to dismiss a complaint are: (1) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) Identity in both cases is such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

These requisites are the test the Court applies to decide whether the second action must be dismissed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the suit in Quezon City is barred by lis pendens. The plaintiffs themselves admitted that the Deudors, Fulgencio and Javier are the original owners of the land, while the Del Rosarios are allegedly purchasers from those owners. It follows that these parties represent the same interests in both actions. As to the defendants, the elimination of J. M. Tuason and Company does not alter the situation, because the remaining defendants are defendants in both actions and are sued as purchasers from Tuason, so they similarly represent the same interests as Tuason in the litigations.

On the second issue, the Court found every requisite present. The right asserted in both cases is the same, namely, ownership of the parcel covered by the two transfer certificates. The relief prayed for is identical, that is, reconveyance and recovery of the land. And the relief is sought to be premised on the same facts, namely, the compromise agreement executed on the sixteenth of March 1953 between the Deudors and J. M. Tuason and Company. Because of these identities, whatever judgment may be rendered in the pending Pasig case will be res judicata to the Quezon City case. The Court put the governing principle this way:

For it is settled that parties who base their contention upon the same rights as the litigants in a previous suit are bound by the judgment in the latter case.

The Court therefore affirmed the order of dismissal, with costs.

Doctrine

A complaint may be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens when three requisites concur: identity of parties, or at least such as represent the same interests in both actions; identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and identity in both cases such that the judgment in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. Identity of parties is not literal identity: parties who represent the same interests, such as original owners and their alleged purchasers, or a seller and those who bought from it, satisfy the first requisite. Where the right asserted, the relief prayed for, and the facts on which the relief rests are the same, the second and third requisites follow, and the later suit must be dismissed.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order dismissing the Quezon City case on the ground of lis pendens, with costs against the plaintiffs.

Remember This

Memorize the three requisites of lis pendens, and remember that identity of parties means identity of interests, not identity of names. Examiners use this case to test whether a second suit over the same land, with some parties dropped or added, is barred by a prior pending action.