CRISPIN RICAMARA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. NGO KI ALIAS GO SIN SIM, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

In the year 1943 CRISPIN RICAMARA and ROMAN RICAMARA were the
owners pro indiviso of lot No. 1400 in the cadastral survey of
Santa Cruz, Marinduqe, with an area of 138 sq. m. In October and
November, 1943, Crispin and Roman respectively sold their undivided
one-half shares of the lot to Ngo Ki alias Go Sin Sim, a chinese
citizen. The two deeds of sale are marked Exhibits “A” and “B”,
respectively. On March 3, 1949, Ngo Ki sold the whole lot to Placido
Gonzales Yao, a Pilipino citizen as shown by a deed of sale (Exhibit
“C”). On March 17, 1949 Crispin Ricamara in his own behalf and as
attorney in fact of the heirs of Roman Ricamara initiated this case in
the Court of First Instance of Marinduque agains Ngo Ki and the latter’s
vendee Placido Gonzales Yao to annul the three sales, invoking the
prohibition contained in the Constitution (Art. XIII, Sec. 5) as
interpreted by this Court in the case of Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds, 44 O.G. 471. The trial court, holding that the Commonwealth
Constitution was suspended during the Japanese occupation during which
time the sales were made to Ngo Ki, said that since there was then no
prohibition against the sale of lands to foreigners, said sales,
including the last one to Placido Gonzales Yao were not null and void,
and so dismissed the complaint. The case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals which appeal was later taken to this Tribunal.

The legal point invoked here has already been passed upon by
this Court. In the case of Peralta v. Director of Prisons
(1945), 42 O.G. p. 198), we held that the Commonwealth Constitution was
not in force during the period of Japanese military occupation; and in
the mere recent case of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, et al. v.
Uy Hoo, et al., G. R. No. L-2207, promulgated on January 23, 1951,
wherein the validity of the sale of two lots to a foreigner during the
Japanese military occupation was involved, we reiterated the same
doctrine that:

“The Constitution of the Philippines not being in force
when the sale in question was effected, it cannot, therefore, be
invoked. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot invoke in their favor the
doctrine laid down in the Krivenko case.”

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, and Padilla, JJ., no
part.

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CONCURRING OPINION

TUASON, J.:

I am of the opinion that, regardless of the fact that the
operation of the Constitution was suspended during the enemy occupation,
and assuming, as far as the writer is concerned, that Ngo Ki, being an
alien, was forbidden to acquire residential lots, the void sale to this
Chinese did not give the sellers the right to annul the sale and recover
the property sold. The effect of the sale, in my judgment, was simply
the conversion or escheat of the land to the State through appropriate
proceedings, but since no such proceedings were ever instituted, and the
land had passed into the hands of a Philippine citizen without
collusion, the constitutional grounds for forfeiture have disappeared
and the last owner’s ownership and possession should be respected. As
far as the Constitution is concerned, it does not make a bit of
difference whether the land is held by Gonzales, the last purchaser, or
by the original vendors. If anything, the former is to be preferred
over the latter who, at the very least, made the violation of the
Constitution possible.