🎧 Case Brief Lecture

RTC MAKATI MOVEMENT AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION, COMPLAINANT,VS. ATTY. INOCENCIO E. DUMLAO, ACTING CLERK OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT VALENZUELA, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. P-93-800. August 09, 1995 August 9, 1995

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RTC Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption versus Dumlao

The Case

This is an administrative case brought against Atty. Inocencio E. Dumlao, who served as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, and later as Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The complainant, the RTC Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption, charged him with usurious lending activities, immorality, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and a second complaint added charges of corruption, operating a lending agency using court facilities, and criminal negligence in the performance of his duties. The case matters because it fixes the standard of conduct demanded of every employee of the judiciary, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, and because it holds that ignorance of the Manual for Clerks of Court is itself gross neglect of duty.

Procedural History

The case began as an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court. Because the complaint was treated as an anonymous or movement-initiated charge, the Court applied the rule in the earlier case of Anonymous Complaint Against District Judge Gibson A. Araula, which allows such complaints where the charge can be borne by public records of indubitable integrity. The Court gave the complaint due course and required the respondent to comment. A second letter-complaint was later filed, and the Court consolidated the cases and referred them to Executive Judge Salvador Abad Santos of the Regional Trial Court of Makati for investigation, report, and recommendation. Executive Judge Abad Santos conducted the investigation, received the testimony of complainant Susan Quinto and other witnesses, and submitted his report recommending dismissal from service on grounds of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The matter then returned to the Supreme Court, which resolved it as an administrative proceeding against a court employee.

Facts

In a letter-complaint dated 11 January 1993, the RTC Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption charged the respondent with engaging in usurious activities, immorality, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint alleged that he withheld the salary checks of court employees to compel them to borrow money from him at usurious rates, with the loans evidenced by trust agreements and collected through a certain Piedad Rufo, a clerk in the Cash Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court. He was also accused of demanding money from party litigants and lawyers in exchange for favorable action on their cases. Supporting documents included a petition signed by about ninety employees, a memorandum of the then Clerk of Court directing the release of treasury warrants to payees only, a complaint for sum of money against a certain Nelson Olandesca, an affidavit-complaint for estafa against Adora Balinguit, and a subpoena in an estafa case against Lorie Ann Martinez.

The respondent denied all charges and claimed that since December 1992 he had been on a confidential mission to help the Court Administrator expose corruption in the Makati court, surmising that this was the reason for the complaint against him. On 7 July 1994, the Office of the Chief Justice received another letter-complaint, signed by Susan Quinto, charging him with corruption and dereliction of duty for exacting money from litigants as commissioner's fees, operating a lending agency using court facilities and exacting usurious interest from employees, and criminal negligence as Branch Clerk of Court.

At the investigation, no one appeared for the Movement, but Susan Quinto testified and presented evidence. Executive Judge Abad Santos found that the respondent had charged commissioner's fees in at least two ex parte cases, had asked a certain Atty. Eugenio Macababayao for one thousand pesos to set a case for hearing, had run a lending operation on government time and resources through his runner Arthur Blancaflor, and had filed false monthly reports on pending cases. He recommended dismissal from service for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Issues

  • Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable for demanding and receiving commissioner's fees for the reception of evidence ex parte.
  • Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable for engaging in lending activities at usurious rates of interest using the facilities and resources of the court.
  • Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable for dereliction of duty as Branch Clerk of Court.
  • Whether or not the respondent's ignorance of the Manual for Clerks of Court excuses his conduct.

Applicable Provisions

The Manual for Clerks of Court provides:

No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and or receive commissioner's fees for reception of evidence ex parte.

This provision is the express prohibition the respondent violated when he billed and collected commissioner's fees in ex parte proceedings.

The same Manual provides:

The court shall allow the commissioner, other than an employee of the court, such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant.

This provision confirms that only a commissioner who is not an employee of the court may be compensated, so a Branch Clerk of Court may never collect such fees.

The 1987 Constitution provides:

Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

This is the constitutional standard against which the respondent's conduct as a court officer is measured.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the charge meritorious. Despite the express prohibition in the Manual for Clerks of Court, a bill for two thousand pesos as commissioner's and stenographer's fees for the ex parte presentation of evidence was issued and signed by the respondent. His explanation that he was not the appointed commissioner and received no money was insufficient in view of his categorical admission on two occasions that he signed the bill. The Court held that his claim of unfamiliarity with the Manual did not help him, since his ignorance of its existence and contents clearly demonstrated how grossly remiss he had been in the performance of his duties. He could not rely on thirteen years of experience alone, because the law is constantly evolving and a court officer should keep abreast of its changes.

On the second issue, the Court concurred with the findings of Executive Judge Abad Santos. The testimony of Arthur Blancaflor exposed in detail the method of the lending operations: on payday he would get the salary checks of the respondent's debtors, have them endorsed, return them to the respondent for his second endorsement, and deposit them to the respondent's account with the Philippine National Bank. The Court held that the respondent's reliance on Central Bank Circular Number 905, which suspended the Usury Law, was misplaced. Although he may not be criminally or civilly liable, he remained administratively liable under the Civil Service Law, where lending money at usurious rates of interest is specifically listed as a ground for disciplinary action. Courts are not lending institutions, and by engaging in lending activities the respondent caused dishonor to courts of justice.

On the third issue, the Court likewise concurred with the findings below. One of the duties of a Branch Clerk of Court is to attend all court sessions, and the respondent seriously neglected this duty to the prejudice of public interest. His monthly reports showed only a handful of cases pending decision, yet the inventory submitted by the presiding judge showed about one hundred twenty cases submitted for decision or with unresolved incidents, some as early as 1983. The Court also viewed with skepticism the affidavit of Atty. Macababayao recanting his earlier testimony, noting that the case was set for hearing only two years after it was filed, and only after the respondent had left the branch.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the respondent's ignorance of the Manual for Clerks of Court did not excuse him. It instead demonstrated gross neglect of duty, and his failure to explain the purpose of the money he solicited reflected poorly on his conduct as Branch Clerk of Court.

Doctrine

A Branch Clerk of Court may not demand or receive commissioner's fees for the reception of evidence ex parte; only a commissioner who is not an employee of the court may be allowed reasonable compensation. Ignorance of the Manual for Clerks of Court is not a defense but is itself gross neglect of duty, because a court officer must keep abreast of the law and its amendments. Lending money at usurious rates of interest is a ground for disciplinary action under the Civil Service Law even if the Usury Law has been suspended, since administrative liability subsists independently of criminal or civil liability. Every employee of the judiciary, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must conduct himself with propriety and decorum and, above all else, must be above suspicion, in keeping with the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust.

Disposition

The Court approved the recommendation of Executive Judge Abad Santos and ordered the dismissal of Atty. Inocencio E. Dumlao from the service on grounds of grave misconduct and dishonesty prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts unbecoming a court officer.

Remember This

Remember that a Branch Clerk of Court may never collect commissioner's fees for ex parte reception of evidence, and that ignorance of the Manual for Clerks of Court is itself gross neglect of duty. Examiners use this case to test the standard of conduct of judiciary employees under the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, and to test administrative liability for usurious lending even after the suspension of the Usury Law.