THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. HON. DIONISIO VENDIOLA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

On February 3, 1958, a complaint for the complex crime of serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence was
filed against Pedro Capuno before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Sariaya Quezon.

The justice of the peace court, after conducting the first stage of
the preliminary investigation, issued a warrant of arrest and
thereafter set the case for trial on the merits. The provincial fiscal
refused to enter trial alleging that the case does not come within the
jurisdiction of said court but is triable before the court of first
instance in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, so that the only function of said justice of the
peace court was to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation.

The objection of the fiscal having been overruled, he filed with the
Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction wherein he contended that the case did not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Sariaya.
He submitted a memorandum in support of his petition, which was replied
by respondent justice of the peace.

After hearing, the court a quo issued an order denying the
petition on the ground that “the amended complaint is wanting in an
allegation of specific amount of the damage caused to the property
(horse) of Crisanto Alcala which is a determining factor on the
question of jurisdiction raised.” The fiscal has appealed.

The court a quo came to the conclusion that the offense
charged comes within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the
Peace Court of Sariaya because the only damage alleged in the complaint
which was caused to the property is a fracture in one of the legs of a
horse whose value is P320.00, and evaluating the value of one of the
legs as only 1/4 the corresponding damage would be small and would come
within the jurisdiction of said justice of the peace court.

We disagree with this view, for experience has shown that a horse
who has a broken leg is useless for practical purposes as it can no
longer be used in connection with its ordinary occupation. For this
reason, the value of the injury cannot be limited to the fractured leg
but to the animal as a whole. It may, therefore, be said that the value
of the property damaged as alleged in the complaint is the sum of
P320.00. The horse has ceased to be an asset to become a liability to
its owner.

Considering that the damage to the horse amounts to P320.00, the
question that arises is: Is the offense charged within the jurisdiction
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Sariaya, as found by the court a quo?

According to Article 365, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code,
damage to property thru reckless imprudence shall be penalized by a
fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of the damage to three
times such value. And Section 87, paragraph b, of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, provides that the justice of the peace court has
original jurisdiction over all offenses in which the penalty provided
by law is not more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine of not more
than P200.00, or both such fine and imprisonment. Hence, if the accused
were found guilty and a fine is to be imposed upon him, considering the
value of the property damaged, it is clear that the offense does not
come within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court.

It is, however, contended that since the offense charged is the
complex crime of serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence, and under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, it follows
that the offense comes within its jurisdiction because the most serious
offense charged is serious physical injuries committed thru reckless
imprudence which, under Article 363, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal
Code, carries the penalty of “arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period.” This contention is untenable, for even if the
most serious offense charged be within the jurisdiction of respondent
court, since the same is complexed with damage to property, wherein the
fine to be imposed does not come within its jurisdiction, the charge
comes within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.

This is what we held in a case we have recently decided.^[1]
In that case, one Villanueva was accused of the crime of serious and
less serious physical injuries with damage to property in the amount of
P2,636.00 thru reckless imprudence. After the accused had pleaded not
guilty the private prosecutor raised the question of jurisdiction
alleging that the justice of the peace court could not try the case
because the amount of fine imposable, aside from the penalty for the
physical injuries committed, was beyond its jurisdiction. The justice
of the peace court declared itself without jurisdiction, but on appeal
the court of first instance ruled otherwise. And when the case was
appealed to this Court, we held that the lower court was m error in
holding that the case comes within the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace court. The following is our comment on the matter:

“We find the appeal well-taken, for this case comes
squally under the rule laid down by us in Angeles, et a. w. Jose, 96
WL, 151; 50 Off. Gaz. No. 12, 5764, wherein we held that:

“The
above-quoted provision (Art. 365, par. 3, Revised Penal Code) simply
means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein
shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should
be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
split into two; one for the physical injuries and another for the
damage to property, for both the injuries and the damage committed were
caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute what may be
called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property. It
is clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of the court of
first instance.” ‘

“Considering that it is the court of first
instance that would undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only offense
that resulted from appellant’s imprudence were the damage to property
in the amount of P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for the
graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined
with damage to property through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction would
lie in the justice of the peace court. The presumption is against
absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in
such a way as to avoid absurd results. Our system of apportionment of
criminal jurisdictions among the various trial courts proceeds on the
basic theory that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are
more serious than those triable in justice of the peace or municipal
courts.

“Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the
prosecution may not be able to prove all the supposed offenses
constituting the complex crime charged. Were we to hold that it is the
justice of the peace court that has jurisdiction in this case, if later
the prosecution should fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of
the case and establish only the damage to property in the amount of
P2,636.00, the inferior court would find itself without jurisdiction to
impose the fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine
can not be less than the amount of the damage. Again, it is to avoid
this further absurdity that we must hold that the jurisdiction lies in
the court of first instance in this case.”

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No costs.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

^[1] People vs. Villanueva, 111 Phil., 869.