G.R. No. L-4068. September 29, 1953
BERNABE B. CAOILE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. YU CHIAO PENG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Manila holding that the sale in question is null and void, having been
entered into a violation of the Constitution, but that, said nullity
notwithstanding, plaintiff is prevented from maintaining the present
action either under the principle of pari delicto or under the doctrine of estoppel which creates an illegal impediment to recover property sold to an alien.
On February 23, 1943, Bernabe B. Caoile sold a parcel of land, with the
building erected thereon, situated in Caloocan, Rizal, and covered by
transfer certificate of title No. 36882, to Yu Chiao Peng for the sum
of P6,300. The deed of sale was registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Manila and a transfer certificate of title was
issued in the name of the vendee. Claiming that the sale made to the
vendee, who is a Chinese citizen, was null and void because it has been
executed in violation of the Constitution, the vendor instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the
annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the property in his favor
upon reimbursing to the vendee the purchase price he received therefor.
Defendant set up as special defense that even assuming that the sale is
null and void for the reason that it violates the Constitution,
plaintiff cannot maintain the present action because he cannot avail
himself of the incapacity of the defendant with whom he has contracted
nor recover what he may have given under the contract in whose illegal
execution he had participated, while on the other hand he is estopped
to recover the property sold for the reason that he stood idle for more
than five years and allowed defendant to make improvements thereon
which greatly increased its value.
After trial, at which
both parties presented their evidence, the court decided the case as
set forth in the early part of this decision. From this judgment,
plaintiff has appealed.
The only question involved in this
appeal hinges on the validity of the sale under consideration as well
as the right of the plaintiff to recover the land should it be
maintained that the sale is null and void on the ground that it
violates the Constitution.
We notice that both parties have
taken the view that the law governing the validity of the sale is our
present Constitution, which has been the subject of a ruling in the
case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds,[*] G.
R. No. L-630, while in our opinion the law that should govern the
transaction is Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, (sections 122, 123, 124) which expressly prohibits the
transfer of agricultural lands to aliens in the same way as they are
prohibited from doing so under our Constitution, it appearing that the
sale was executed on February 23, 1943. But we regard this
consideration as of no moment in this appeal considering that the
outcome of the case would be the same whether it be considered in the
light of our Public Land Act or under our Constitution. In this
respect, there can be no doubt that the sale is null and void.
The next question to be determined is whether plaintiff-appellant can
maintain the present action of annulment and recover the property
considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts; or
stated in another way, whether he can recover the property
notwithstanding the share he had in the execution of the sale which is
known to be tainted with invalidity. Our answer must of necessity be in
the negative following the doctrine laid down in the case of Trinidad
Gonzaga de Cabuatan, et al. vs. Uy Hoo et al., 88 Phil., 103, wherein we made the following pronouncement:
“We
can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the
Constitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko case, to set aside the
sale in question, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose
is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because
of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of
the Constitution. They can not escape this conclusion because they are
presumed to know the law. As this Court well said: ‘A party to an
illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his
illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either party to an
illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.’ The rule
is expressed in the maxims: “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio’, and ‘In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.’ (Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210, 216.)”
With the foregoing conclusion, we don not believe it necessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in his brief.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., concurring: I concur in the result, it appearing
that the sale in question took place when the Constitution was not in
force.
[*] 79 Phil., 461.
DISIDENTE
PABLO, M.:
La venta hecha por Bernabe B. Caoile al ciudadano chino Yu Chiao
Peng de una parcela de terreno por P6,300, es contraria a la
disposicion constitucional que prohibe el traspaso a extranjeros de
bienes inmuebles, y dicha venta es nula y de ningun valor (Krivenko
contra Registrador de Titulos, 44 Off. Gaz., 471). El demandante pide
que se declare nula la venta y que las partes devuelvan las cosas que
habian recibido; esto es, que el vendedor devuelva el precio y el
comprador el terreno. El demandado interpone la defensa fundada en el
articulo 1306, regla 1.ª, del Codigo Civil español, y la mayoria de
este Tribunal acepta como buena la defensa.
No estoy conforme con tal criterio. El articulo citado dice que
“cuando la culpa este de parte de ambos contratantes, ninguno de ellos
podra repetir lo que hubiera dado a virtud del contrato.”
“Culpa es falta mas o menos grave, cometida a sabiendas y voluntariamente.” (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española).
No existe ley que castiga la venta de un inmueble a un extranjero,
¿Han cometido culpa el comprador, el vendedor, o ambos a la vez?
Creemos que no, porque la venta de un terreno es la cosa mas ordinaria
del mundo. No hubo causa torpe en el contrato. No se probo que alguno
de ellos o ambos, sabiendo que estaba prohibida la venta, la
realizaron. No habian comotido falta alguna. Ambas partes realizaron el
convenio de venta con la mejor buena fe. Bueno es hacer constar que no
se ha probado que alguna de las partes o ambas haya obrado de mala fe,
ni existe pruebas de que, sabiendo las partes que estaba prohibida la
venta, la efecturaon sin embargo. La mala fe no se presume: debe
probarse. A falta de prueba, la presuncion es que las partes obraron de
buena fe. No es aplicable al caso presente el articulo 1306 del Codigo
Civil.
En el asunto de Bough contra Cantiveros (40 Jur. Fil.,
228), estos son los hechos probados: Matilde Cantiveros era la mas rica
residente de Carigara, Leyte; ella y su esposo Jose Vasquez firmaron un
contrato de separacion conyugal. Basila Hanopol, prima y protegida de
Matilde, y su esposo Gustavus Bough marearon a Matilde con la cantinela
de “que Jose Vasquez estaba en el pueblo y podria impugnar el contrato
de separacion de bienes condiese simuladamente por P10,000 sus bienes
inmuebles que valian mas de P30,000; ella firmo ante notario la
escritura de venta ficticia (Exhibit A). Para convencer a Matilde de
que no tenian el proposito de engañarla y privarla de sus bienes, los
esposos Bough suscribieron otro documento (Exhibit 1), en virtud del
cual donaban a ella todos los bienes que aparecian en el Exhibit A,
“donacion que tendria efecto en el caso de que tanto ellos como sus
hijos fallecieran antes que Matilde Cantiveros.” Matilde, a pesar de la
escritura de venta ficticia, continuo poseyendo sus bienes. Despues de
algun tiempo, los esposos Bough presentaron demanda contra Matilde,
pidiendo que se les restituyera en la posesion de dichos bienes,
fundandose la accion en la venta simulada. Porque el Exhibit A es un
documento ficticio y ha sido obtenido por medios fraudulentos, este
Tribunal confirmo el sobreseimiento de la demanda.
En el asunto de Perez contra Herranz y otros (7 Jur.
Fil., 715) el demandante pedia la posesion del vapor “Alfred”, fundada
la accion en un documento en que la propiedad del buque se hizo constar
“a nombre tan solo del demandante, por razon de que el, como natural de
Filipinas, podia, segun nuestras leyes, aparecer como dueño de las
10/58 partes del buque y el demandado, de las 48/58 partes del mismo.
En los dos asuntos citados, los demandantes pedian el cumplimiento
de unos contratos con causa torpe, unos contratos falsos, simulados,
que no existen ante los ojos de la ley. Por eso este Tribunal aplico en
ambos el principio bien establecido de “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio,”
e “In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.” “La ley no
amparara a ninguna de las partes en un contrato ilicio; les deja en la
situacion en que se han colocado.” Bough y otro contra
Cantiveros y otro, 40 Jur. Fil., 228), o en otras palabras, “los
tribunales no ayudaran ni a una ni a otra parte para hacer cumplir un
contrato ilegal, sino que dejan a ambas alli donde las encuentran.”
(Perez contra Herranz y otros, 7 Jur. Fil., 715.)
Pero en el caso presente, el demandante no pide el cumplimiento de
la venta anticonstitucional; todo lo contrario, pide que sea declarada
nula y que se ordene la devolucion de la cosa que cada parte habia
recibido en virtud del contrato. En la venta no medio engaño, causa
torpe, delito o falta.
Los tratadistas clasifican los contratos en nulos y anulables: los primeros son nulos per se, nulos ab initio,
no tienen existencia legal; los segundos son anulables por haber sido
obtenidos mediante violencia, engaño, dolo, delito o falta, etc.
Un contrato simulado, un contrato en que no concurren los
requisitos que expresa el articulo 1261, son considerados no existentes
ante el Derecho. Los contratos celebrados en contravencion de una
prohibicion legal se consideran tambien contratos inexistentes.
Castan, hablando del origen de la distincion entre actos nulos y
anulables, dice que “La distincion entre dos grandes categorias de
invalidez: la del acto nulo de pleno derecho o inexistente, de una
parte, y la del acto anulable o rescindible, de otra, procede ya del
Derecho romano. El acto inexistente no engendraba ningun efecto
juridico; era nulo de pleno derecho ab initio. * * *. Asi
sucedia cuando del acto no reunia las condiciones necesarias para su
formacion (por ejemplo, venta sin objeto) o cuando estaba prohibido por
la ley (como la donacion entre esposos).” (2 Castan, 640.)
El derecho frances, segun el mismo autor, distingue dos categorias de actos nulos con nulidad absoluta: (a) el acto inexistente (al que falta uno de los elementos esenciales para su formacion) y (b) el acto nulo de pleno derecho (que viola una prescripcion legal). (2 Castan 641.)
Sanchez Roman dice que “La causa que no es licita es como si no
existiera para el Derecho y degenera, por tanto en inexistente y no
verdadera o falsa para el mismo, produciendo el consiguiente resultado
de viciar el consentimiento y anular el contrato.” (4 Sanchez Roman,
207.)
“El contrato supuesto o falso—dice Manresa—en cuanto
lo es y se demuestra destruyendo la apariencia del mismo, es el caso
mas claro de inexistencia, a tal extremo, que en el se identifican el
sentido usual y el juridico de esa palabra.” (8 Manresa, 699.)
En sentencia de 26 de junio de 1903, el Tribunal Supremo de España declaro:
“Que el articulo 1306 del Codigo Civil es
inaplicable cuando no se trata de un contrato real y efectivo, aunque
celebrado con causa torpe, sino simulado:“Que dada tal
simulacion, es perfectamente indiferente que el temor que indujo a los
otorgantes a figurar el contrato fuese mas o menos fundado y mas o
menos licito, puesto que su nulidad e ineficacia no depende de vicio en
el consentimiento, sino de su real y efectiva inexistencia.” (95
Jurisprudencia Civil, 1028.)
Y en 30 de noviembre de 1909 el mismo Tribunal dijo:
“Que
no es dable confundir un contrato simulado con un contrato nulo o
rescindible, toda vez que la simulacion significa indubablemente, por
su propia naturaleza, la inexistencia del contrato, al contrario de lo
que acontece respecto de los segundos, en los que, supuesta su realidad
y certeza, es obligado examinar las condiciones de su celebracion para
resolver acerca de la procedencia de la nulidad o rescision, examen
absolutamente improcedente por contradictorio cuando el contrato no ha
existido, ya que de la inexistencia no se pueden deducir mas
consecuencias juridicas que las que necesariamente se derivan de esta
misma inexistencia, o sean las procedentes cual si no se hubiese
intentado siquiera la celebracion de tales supuestos contratos.” (116
Jurisprudencia Civil, 501.)“Los contratos con causa u objeto ilicitos, dice Manresa, se
deben reputar ante el derecho inexistentes. Para afirmarlo asi nos
fundamos en que si otros defectos de menor gravedad juridica tal vez
son irremediables, no ha de tener mayor eficacia lo ilicito que puede
suponer la oposicion mas abierta al derecho, del que no pueda exigir
amparo lo ilicito. Ademas el interes publico que determina la nulidad,
principalmente en estos casos, no ha de quedar a la voluntad, abandono
o confirmacion de las partes que lo olvidaron infringiendo la ley.” (8
Manresa, 4.ª ed., 715.)
Y en tratando de contratos celebrados en contravencion de la ley,
el Tribunal Supremo de España dijo en su sentencia de 11 de abril de
1894:
“Que todo contrato otorgado contra precepto expreso
de una ley prohibitiva, engendra la accion necesaria para restablecer
la virtualidad de la prohibicion, infringida accion que, teniendo este
origen y alcance, no puede menos de ser eficaz desde el momento mismo
de la celebracion del referido contrato.” (75 Jurisprudencia Civil,
503.)
El articulo 1334 del Codigo Civil español declara nulas las
donaciones entre conyuges durante el matrimonio. Geronima Uy Coque dono
a su esposo Juan Navas L. Sioca todos us bienes, consistentes en la
mitad de los bienes gananciales. Fallecida ella, sus hijos reclamaron
la anulacion de la donacion, y este Tribunal, confirmando la decision
del juzgado inferior, declaro nulas las escrituras de donacion A a F.
(Uy Coque contra Navas, L. Sioca, 45 Jur. Fil., 452.) En dicha
donacion no medio fraude, engaño o causa torpe, violencia, delito o
falta. Marido y mujer por simple ignorancia de la ley efectuaron la
donacion con la mejor buena fe (del modo como obraron el demandante y
el demandado en la presente causa), creyendo que no estaba prohibida la
donacion entre ellos. Se declaro nula la donacion porque esta prohibida
por la ley, porque es contrato considerado inexistente ante el Derecho.
Los herederos de la finada consiguieron la declaracion judicial de
invalidez de la donacion y recobraron los bienes donados por su madre.
¿Que diremos de la venta de un inmueble a un extranjero, cosa que
esta expresamente prohibida por la Constitucion? Es sencillamente un
contrato inexistente bajo la ley y la Constitucion. No debe dependar de
la voluntad de las partes contratantes o de su abandono o ignorancia o
buena fe la existencia de ese contrato anticonstitucional. El interes
publico debe prevalecer sobre el acuerdo de las partes.
Es absurda la teoria de que el vendedor no puede pedir la rescision
del contrato hecho en contravencion de la Constitucion para
“restablecer la virtualidad de la prohibicion” constitucional o
procurar que las cosas vuelvan a su estado normal anterior. Si los
herederos de Uy Coque consiguieron la anulacion de las donaciones
hechas por su madre—porque la donacion entre conyuges es nula—¿por que
el vendedor (demandante en la presente causa) no puede pedir la
rescision de la venta realizada contra la prohibicion constitucional?
¿Por que es rescindible una donacion hecha en contravencion del Codigo
Civil y no es rescindible la venta hecha contra la expresa prohibicion
de la Constitucion?
La nulidad absoluta, segun Castan, “puede ser reclamada mediante
accion o excepcion, por toda persona que tenga interes en ella, porque
no afecta la nulidad de los contratos al interes publico, la accion no
es en nuestro Derecho publica o cuasi-publica, como lo es en otras
legislaciones.” (El articulo 1047 del Codigo Civil argentino dispone
que la nulidad absoluta puede y debe ser declarada por el Juez, aun sin
peticion de parte, cuando aparece manifiesta en el acto, y puede
pedirse su declaracion por el Ministerio publico, en el interes de la
moral o de la ley.) La inexistencia del contrato, segun Castan, “es
perpetua e insubsanable, no pudiendo ser objeto de confirmacion ni
prescripcion, excluyendo sin embargo los contratos que reunen los
requisitos expresados en el articulo 1261.” (2 Castan, 644.)
“Evidente es-dice Valverde-que nuestro codigo admite
tal distincion de nulidad absoluta o inexistencia y nulidad relativa o
anulabilidad; mas para el legislador español, la nulidad solo interesa
a los contratantes, pues aun cuando existen contratos que afectan al
ordern publico y social y en los cuales la nulidad deberia pedirse de
oficio, para el codigo tal accion tiene que ser ejercitada a instancia
de parte.” (3 Valverde, 299.)
Declarar que el vendedor no puede recobrar, a cambio de lo que
habia pagado, devolviendolo previamente, es frustrar el espiritu que
informa la Constitucion; es consentir que los extranjeros continuen
acaparando bienes inmuebles en daño y perjuicio del pueblo, en vez de
juzgar de acuerdo con el Codigo Civil, inspirandose en el elevado
proposito de la Asamblea Constituyente de “conservar y acrecentar el
patrimonio de la nacion” y evitar que, por un error judicial, los
filipinos—al cabo de una generacion—sean simples peones en su propia
tierra. Desatender la demanda del vendedor y dejar que el comprador
continue gozando de la propiedad comprada a pesar de la prohibicion, ne
es cumplir con la Constitucion: es violar su espiritu y minar su
principio fundamental de propia conservacion.
El comprador no puede
acogerse a las disposiciones del articulo 1306 del Codigo Civil español
que es inaplicable, segun el Tribunal Supremo de España, a contratos
inexistentes. Con mayor razon dicho articulo no puede oponerse con
exito como defensa en una demanda en que se pide la declaracion de
nulidad de la venta de un inmueble por ser contraria a la Constitucion
y la devolucion de las cosas que las partes habian recibido.
En mi opinion, la decision debe ser revocada, la venta debe ser
declarada nula y las cosas recibidas por las partes sean restituidas.
(Articulo 1303, Codigo Civil.)
DISSENTING
PADILLA, J.:
The interpretation of the provision found in section 5, article XIII, of the Constitution made in the case of Krivenko vs.
Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471, not having been revoked or
reversed, despite partial change in the membership of the Court, is now
binding. Not only the members who made it but also those who dissented
from it are bound to apply it.
The majority holds that the sale of an urban parcel of land and the
building erected thereon to an alien disqualified to own or hold title
thereto because of the prohibition expressed in section 5, article
XIII, of the Constitution, is null and void. With this pronouncement I
am in accord. I cannot, however, concur in the theory applied in this
case that both, the plaintiff as vendor and the defendant as vendee,
were guilty of a constitutional violation and, therefore, to none of
them the courts should afford protection or remedy, applying the legal
maxims that “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio” and “In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.”[1] Before the decision in the case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, supra,
was promulgated, the prevailing belief had been that urban lots or
property did not come within the constitutional prohibition referred
to. It was thought that the sale of such real estate to an alien
disqualified to own or hold title to private agricultural lands was
perfectly lawful and legitimate. When on 23 February 1943 the plaintiff
sold to the defendant his parcel of land and the building erected
thereon, he could not be deemed to have taken part in the performance
of an illegal act. To hold that he did would be against a fact,
actuality, reality, and truth. It would be fiction that neither justice
and equity nor logic could sustain and uphold. Despite that fact,
actuality, reality and truth the majority brushes it aside by resorting
to a fiction that both parties to such sale were in pari delicto
or guilty of the constitutional prohibition, thereby refusing to apply
the same to it, as construed by the majority of this court in the
Krivenko case, and to carry it to its logical conclusion and ultimate
consequences. How could the parties to that sale be deemed guilty of a
violation of the constitutional prohibition when the prevalent opinion
and belief was that the sale of urban land to an alien disqualified to
acquire private agricultural land was not included therein? Even in the
case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, supra, where the
phrase “private agricultural land” is construed as embracing urban
lands, there are four members of the court who dissent from the
majority opinion. If among the members of this Court, there is a
substantial minority who dissents from the interpretation made by the
court, how could the majority expect from a layman, an ordinary
citizen, to make an interpretation such as that made by the majority of
this Court in the Krivenko case? It is not, therefore, illogical and
unreasonable to hold that before the promulgation of the opinion in the
Krivenko case persons alienating urban lands to aliens disqualified to
acquire and hold title thereto must be deemed to have acted in good
faith. To hold otherwise is to indulge, I repeat, in fiction which runs
counter to a fact, actuality, reality and truth. Perhaps, the in pari delicto
theory applied by the majority in this case would find justification in
alienations of urban lands to disqualified aliens after the
promulgation of the decision in the Krivenko case. But, certainly, it
cannot equitably, justly and logically be invoked and applied to
alienations made before the promulgation of the decision in said case.
If parties to an alienation of an urban parcel of land did not
knowingly commit any violation of the Constitution because the
prevailing belief at the time of the alienation was that urban lands
were not included within the constitutional prohibition, the logical
conclusion is that both parties to the contract acted in good faith. If
they did, then there is no need to look elsewhere for remedy to be
applied to them. Reversion applies to lands that were originally part
of the public domain. Escheat has been brought to this country in a
limited sense only by the enactment of Act No. 190 by the Philippine
Commission and embodied in Rule 92 of the Rules of Court but not to its
full extent as that proceeding is available in England and in the
United States. Escheat proceedings resorted to in some states of the
union against persons disqualified to hold title to real estate are
based on common law. The latter has never been extended to the
Philippines.[2] Escheat of
urban lands transferred or conveyed to aliens disqualified to own or
hold title to such lands pursuant to the provision found in section 5,
article XIII, of the Constitution, as construed by the Court in the
Krivenko case, who in good faith were of the belief that the
acquisition of such lands did not come under the constitutional
prohibition, would be too harsh, unfair and unjust. If escheat
proceedings are to be resorted to by express authority of law the
harshness of the step to be taken by the Government should be mollified
by making provision for compensation to those aliens who would be
deprived of properties acquired by them in good faith. If the
legislative department has not enacted thus far a law which would
afford a remedy to a vendor who sold an urban parcel of land to an
alien disqualified to own and hold it, it is because the Civil Code
expressly, clearly and amply provides for such cases and affords and
points to a remedy to parties who are placed in that situation. Article
1303 of the old Civil Code provides:—
When an obligation has been adjudged void, the
contracting parties shall restore to each other the things which have
been the subject matter of the contract, together with their fruits,
and the price paid therefor, together with interest, without prejudice
to the provisions of the following articles.[3]
These provisions have been reenacted in article 1398 of the new
Civil Code. Article 1304 of the old Civil Code or 1399 of the new Civil
Code provides for nullity arising not from disqualification but from
incapacity of one of the contracting parties. The next article treats
of nullity arising from illegality of the consideration. The in pari delicto
theory is covered by article 1306 of the old Civil Code or 1412 of the
new Civil Code. The appellant, the vendor, is entitled to recover his
property which the appellee, the vendee, cannot lawfully own and hold
and the right to restitution of the property to be made to the vendor
is laden, of course, with the reciprocal obligation to return what was
paid to him by the vendee, together with the fruits or lawful
interests, which may be compensated or set off with what would be a
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property by
the vendee or with what he received in the form of rentals during the
time he held and enjoyed possession of the property.
Another phase of the question that seems to have been considered as
a serious hindrance to the rescission or resolution of the contract, or
reciprocal return of the property by the vendee and of the price by the
vendor, is that the price or consideration to be returned may be less
or lower in value than the price or consideration paid at the time of
the sale. To my mind that does not offer any serious obstacle. In the
exercise of equity jurisdiction courts may increase or reduce the price
to be returned as the circumstances may demand. If the purchasing power
of the money at the time of the rescission had gone up or down a
decrease or increase of the price to be returned to the vendee would be
perfectly lawful and legitimate. Also, the vendee might have improved
the property during the time he was in possession thereof. For such
improvement, of course, he must be reimbursed by the vendor.
For
all these reasons I am of the opinion that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed in so far as it declares null and void the sale of
the urban property involved in this case because it is in violation of
the Constitution, and reversed in so far as it does not rescind the
sale and does not allow the vendor to recover the property and to
return to the vendee the price or consideration paid for it.
[1] Bough et al. vs. Contiveros et al., 40 Phil., 210, 216.
[2] U. S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241; Arnedo vs. Llorente, 18 Phil. 257; U. S. vs. Abiog, 37 Phil. 137; In re Shoop, 41 Phil. 213 and People vs. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825.
[3] See also Oliveros vs. Porciongcola, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Supp., 7, 69 Phil., 305.