SY OH, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH I OF CITY COURT OF MANILA AND PIVGETH INDUSTRIES & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS-APPE…

These two appealed cases
present an identical question:  In the
event that there are various letters of demand, should the one–year period in ejectment
suits be counted from the first or the last one sent the lessee?  In both cases, the answer of the lower courts
was that it should be the latest that controls in accordance with what has
previously been held by us.  We have no
occasion, therefore, to overrule them. 
These two appeals cannot prosper.

Petitioners Sy Oh^[1] and Lim Chi,^[2] actual occupants of the Arias Building located at the corner of Carriedo
and Estero Cegado Streets, Manila, each under a verbal contract of lease, were
made defendants in ejectment suits by the private
respondent Pivgeth Industries & Development
Corp., owner of such building.  The suits were filed on July 21,
1967 in the Sala of respondent Judge Gregorio N. Garcia of the City
Court of Manila.  Both petitioners, as
defendants, moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
alleging that the first notice or demand to vacate was sent to them as far back
as April 27, 1964.  Such motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction were denied by respondent Judge in view of the
fact that the final letter of demand or notice to vacate was in the case of
petitioner Sy Oh sent on Sept. 30, 1966 and Lim Chi
on September 29, 1966.  It was the view
of the respondent Judge, therefore, in both cases that the suit was filed
clearly within the one-year period.

This conclusion of respondent Judge Garcia was assailed in two
petitions for certiorari filed by each of the petitioners with the Court of
First Instance of Manila.  Both petitions
failed, the jurisdiction of respondent Judge Garcia being sustained, the
decision in the case of petitioner Sy Oh being
rendered on May 10, 1968 by the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno
and of petitioner Lim Chi being rendered by the Hon. Guillermo Santos on July
6, 1968.

Hence these appeals to us by the two
petitioners.  As above noted, we
affirm the respective decisions of Judges Puno and Santos.  The jurisdiction of respondent city court
Judge Garcia is immune from any such attack.

The conclusion arrived at in the above two cases of the lower
court judges finds support in adjudicated cases.  Racaza v. Susana
Realty, Inc.,^[3]
a 1966 decision, was cited by both judges. 
As was there held: 
“Moreover, even if the action were based on non­payment of rent,
the one-year period should be reckoned from the second notice, on the theory
that respondent has the right to waive his action based on the first demand and
to let the lessee remain in the premises.” Judge Guillermo S. Santos
likewise relied on the even later opinion announced in Calubayan
v. Pascual.^[4]
Thus:  “Even assuming, for the sake
of argument, that the various notifi­cations for defendant to see the plaintiff
could be construed as demands upon the defendant to vacate, the length of time
that defendant detained the premises is to be reckoned with from the date of
the last demand.”

Such a view has been
steadfastly adhered to by us ever since the 1913 opinion of Lucido
v. Vita.^[5] What would have been objectionable would
have been a departure therefrom by the lower
courts.  Fortunately, such a thought did
not occur to either Judge Santos or Judge Puno.  They decided the matter before them
correctly.

In the light of the above
indisputable controlling legal principle the assignment of alleged errors in
each of the two above cases made by the same counsel for both petitioners Sy Oh and Lim Chi is distinguished only by its
futility.  No useful purpose would be
served by discussing each of them separately as the alleged grievance made much
of in all four errors assigned could be summed up in the asserted
inapplicability of the above decisions, announcing a principle to which there
has been unwavering adherence on our part. 
The one-year period is to be counted from the last letter of demand.

Necessarily then, any
attempt to distinguish the situation present in each of the above two cases is
far from persuasive.  Moreover, to crown
such an effort with success is to frustrate and defeat the basic objective
underlying the procedural rule on ejectment
suits.  This resort to a technicality so
clearly apparent on its face and thus devoid of merit cannot possibly
succeed.  Otherwise, the summary character
of unlawful detainer
actions, which even now, through maneuvers of the lessees affected, may at
times be set at naught, vanishes. 
It is not for us to give the seal of our approval to any argument, even
if sought to be clothed with deceptive plausibility,
that would contribute to such a far-from commendable result.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the honorable Ricardo C. Puno of May 10, 1968 in L-29328, and the decision of the
honorable Guillermo S. Santos of July 6, 1968 in L-29589 are hereby affirmed.  With costs against
petitioners Sy Oh and Lim Chi in each of the above cases.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., took no part.

^[1]
L-29328.

^[2]
L-29589.

^[3]
18 SCRA 1172 (1966).

^[4]
21 SCRA 146 (1967).

^[5]
25 Phil. 414, 426
(1913).