G.R. No. L-28340 & L-28374. December 29, 1967

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO AND MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SAN JUAN, RIZAL, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 29, 1967 MAKALINTAL, J.:
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MAKALINTAL, J.:


These two cases, although filed separately, were argued by the
parties and submitted for decision jointly.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada and respondent Braulio Sto.

Domingo were contending candidates for the position of
Municipal Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, in the election held on November 14, 1967.

G. R. No. L-28340.  This is an original petition for certiorari
with a prayer for preliminary injunction, directed against an order of
respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch.  The petition
alleges in substance that by order dated September 15, 1967, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch, had authorized petitioner, whose real name is Joseph Ejercito, to use his screen name “Joseph
Estrada;” that his certificate of candidacy for the position in question
carries the name “Joseph Ejercito Estrada;”
that in precinct No. 93 of San Juan, Rizal, the board
of election inspectors, by a vote of two to one resolved not to count in favor
of petitioner ballots wherein he was voted for under the names “Joseph Ejercito Estrada,” “Joseph,” “J.
Estrada,” or “Estrada” on the ground that none of them is his
real name; that pursuant to such resolution at least 36 votes cast for
petitioner were not counted or included in the tally; that subsequently, or on
November 20, 1967, two of the three members of the board of election inspectors
(Josefino A. Bueno and Emilia Suarez) filed with the court of respondent Judge a
petition for correction or amendment of the election return in the afore­said
precinct by adding at least 36 votes to those credited therein to petitioner;
that petitioner herein as well as respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo were allowed to intervene in the proceedings
below; that upon motion to dismiss filed by said respondent the court dismissed
the petition, and denied the motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by
petitioner.

We gave due course to the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order to prevent the proclamation of any of the candidates for the
municipal office of San Juan, Rizal.

The only question here is whether under the allegations in the
petition the correction of the election return in precinct No. 93 of San
Juan, Rizal, is justified and proper and may be judicially
ordered.  Section 154 of the Revised
Election Code provides:

“Section 154.- Alterations in the
statement.  After the announcement of the
result of the election in the polling place, the board of inspectors shall not
make any alteration or amendment in any of its statements, unless it be so ordered by a competent court.”

In a number of decisions this Court has held that there are two
requisites that must concur in order to make out a case for correction of an
election return:  (1) there must be an
error therein; and (2) the members of the board of election inspectors must be unanimous in the fact that such an error
exists and they are willing to rectify the same.  Benitez vs. Paredes and Dizon, 52 Phil. 1;
Board of Inspectors of Bongabong vs. Sison, 55 Phil. 914; Gumpal vs.
C.F.I. of Isabela, G. R. No.
L-16409,
Nov. 19, 1960; Astilla
vs.
Asuncion, et al., G. R. No. L-22245, Feb. 29, 1964.

The reason for the requirement of unanimity is that the proceeding for correction
is a summary one, is not supposed to raise
controversial issues, and does not call for a recount or revision of the
ballots themselves, either of which contemplates a different remedy.

In the instant case the aforesaid requisites are not
present.  In the first place, there is no
error alleged as to the election return itself. 
The error lies in the apprecia­tion of the ballots or, more
specifically, in the decision of the
election inspectors not to count in favor of petitioner those ballots wherein
the names “Joseph Ejercito Estrada,”
“Joseph, “J. Estrada,” or “Estrada” appear.  The return, in other words, re­flects
accurately the result of the tally of votes as read and counted, and
consequently cannot be considered erroneous for purposes of correction under
Section 154 of the Revised Election Code.

In the second place, there is no unanimity among the members of
the board of election inspectors.  In
support of the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Braulio
Sto. Domingo be­fore the court below, there is
attached an affidavit signed by the third inspector (Santiago Cardona) and by the poll clerk (Evangeline
Salgado), stating as follows:  “That
we are not aware of the existence of any error or mistake in said election
statement or returns and we are not giving our consent or conformity to the
correction or amendment of the same.” 
This may not be as categorical
an opposition to the petition for correct­ion as might be desired, but it
certainly shows such a lack of unanimity among the members of the board as to
preclude sum­mary correction and call instead for an examination of the bal­lots
themselves to determine whether or not they tally with the number of votes
credited to petitioner.

Moreover, the petition itself is not even definite as to the
error that is sought to be corrected.  It
alleges that “at least 36 votes validly cast for one or
another of the names hereinabove
mentioned were not counted in
favor of herein peti­tioner.”  The
evidence presented in the lower court and referred to in the instant petition
consists of (a) the minutes of voting, showing that 158 votes cast in precinct
No. 93 were tallied and counted; and (b) the certificate of votes which shows
that at least 156 of the said 158 votes were counted for one or another of four
candidates for Vice-Mayor, while only 122 votes were counted
for one or another of the only
four candidates for Municipal Mayor.  From
this evidence, together with the admitted fact that the inspectors, by a vote
of two to one, had resolved not to count for petitioner the ballots wherein the
names hereinbefore mentioned appear, petitioner draws the conclusion that the
difference of 36 votes (between the 158 tallied and the 122 counted for him)
must be the number of votes to be additionally credited in his favor.  This conclusion, while seemingly logical, is
too tenuous and speculative to justify simple correction of the return.  For to properly consider
those additional 36 votes involves more than mere mathematical computation.
  It would require looking into the ballots
themselves, as­certaining the
names
of the
candidate or candidates for mayor written thereon, their legibility, their
placement, even the very fact that any particular name is written at all.

We are not unmindful of the apparent injustice to petitioner in
the resolution of the board of election ins­pectors of precinct No. 93 of San
Juan, Rizal, considering
that there was already a court decision authorizing him to use the name
“Joseph Estrada.” The resolution assumes more serious implications,
directly affecting public interest, in view of the allegations in the
petitions, both here and below, supported by the affidavit of one of the
election inspectors that they had been threatened and intimidated by men
belonging to the faction of respondent Sto.  Domingo, and or­dered to ignore ballots cast
for petitioner wherein the sur­name “Estrada” was written.  A timely remedy should have been obtained
then and there from the Commission on Elections or its representative so that
the popular will would be accorded free, untrammelled
and legitimate expression.  As it is, the pro­ceeding now resorted
to, namely, correction of the return, is not justified under the facts and
circumstances of this case.  For the
petition assumes the existence of an error in the election return itself –
which is not true – and assumes likewise certain other facts as to the contents
of the uncounted ballots, as to which facts there is no unanimity among the
election inspectors.

G. R. No. L-28374. 
This is a petition for review of an order of the
Commission on Elections involving the elec­tion
return in precinct No. 94 of San Juan, Rizal.  Petitioner applied to the Commission for an
order directing the municipal board of canvassers to reject or disregard the
said return on the ground that it was “clearly manufactured.”  Reliance
is placed on the
decision of this Court in the case of Lagumbay vs.
Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-25444,
January 31, 1966.  The return
in question
shows the following data:

Number of
voters registered in

precinct ………………………                                  Four hundred nine – 409

Number of
voters who actually

voted …………………………                                  Two hundred
twenty nine- 229

Ballots
found in compartment

for valid ballots……….                                              Three Hundred
– 300

 

The same election return shows the following number of votes
received by the various candidates for Mayor, to wit:

NAMES
OF CANDIDATES

TOTAL
VOTES OBTAINED
(In Words)

TOTAL
VOTES

OBTAINED

(In
figures)

 

1. Domingo, Braulio
Sto.        

 

 

One hundred seven

 

107

2.  Estrada, Joseph

Eighty
two

82

3.  Ibuna, Nicanor

One
hundred eight

108

4.  Lenon, Enrique

One

1”

                       

 

It is claimed by petitioner that the return is obviously
manufactured, considering that while there were only 229 voters who actually
voted 300 ballots were found in the box for valid ballots.  Upon its face the claim would seem clear and
irrefut­able, for it is mathematically impossible for 229 voters to cast 300
valid votes, or 298 votes in the aggregate for the four contending candidates
for the position of Municipal Mayor.

However, a conclusion that an election return is obviously
manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass
must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most convincing
proof.  The decision in the Lagumbay case speaks of “inherent improbability”
in the data shown on the return.  Any
plausible explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of
experience and of the pro­babilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid
outright nullification with the resulting disfranchisement of those who
exercised their right of suffrage.  In
this case there
is such an explanation.  The minutes of
voting prepared and signed by the election inspectors in precinct No. 94 show
that the total number who voted is two hundred ninety-nine (299), in both words
and figures, and that of the 300 ballots in the box for valid ballots one (1)
was found to be marked and placed in the envelope for “marked
ballots.” These minutes of voting constitute an official document,
accomplished pursuant to Section 142 of the Revised Election Code.  It is a fair presumption that the number 229
entered in the election return as the number of those who actually voted is a mere clerical
error, and that the correct figure is 299 as shown in the minutes of voting.  The correctness of this figure is supported
by the other entries in the return, and by the fact that the sum total of the
votes counted for the four candidates for Municipal Mayor is 298, with one
ballot rejected and placed in the envelope for marked ballots.

Everything considered, we find no
justifiable ground on which the return in question may be annulled.

Both petitions are therefore dismissed, and the
restraining orders we issued in the two cases are lifted.  No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Fernando, JJ., took no
part.

Sanchez, J., concurs in a
separate opinion.


Clean
Clean

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CONCURRING OPINION

SANCHEZ, J.:

I fully agree with the Court’s opinion so ably presented by Mr.
Justice Querube C. Makalintal.  I would want, though, to make the following
observations:

Moulding the controversy in this case
is the lack of unanimity on the part of the inspectors to amend the election
returns for Precinct No. 93.  The mere
fact that votes cast for Estrada, J. Estrada and Joseph
Ejercito Estrada were excluded from the
counting, would not shape up a compelling reason for the abandonment of the
doctrine of unanimity so steadfastly adhered to by this Court.

It has been said that the rationale of the remedy under Section
154 of the Revised Election Code is to make way for the correction of honest
mistakes in the preparation of the returns.[1]
Unless therefore all the inspectors concur in the court petition for
correction, the veracity or the extent of the mistake becomes doubtful and
controversial.  Deter­mination thereof
would require another proceeding.

Refusal by an inspector and the poll clerk to consent to the
correction is their own privilege.  The
law, however, creates sufficient safeguards against such human frailties as
those that constitute violations of Section 150 of the Revised Election Code.  Under this codal
provision, the inspectors are required to certify that the returns prepared by
them are correct.  By Section 183 of the
same code, violation of the provisions of Section 150 is a serious election
offense, which prescribes in two years under Section 188.

In the situation presented, petitioner is not really left
adrift.  A protracted and expensive
election protest is not the only recourse open to him.  And, unless absolutely necessary, we should
be reluctant to push petitioner into the hazards of an election protest.  Because the consequences
are so grave.
  Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon aptly said in Lagumbay vs. Climaco:[2]

“The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests
often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic
victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire, or has expired.  And so the notion has spread among candidates
for public office that the ‘important thing is the proclamation; and to win it,
they or their partisans have tolerated
or abetted the tampering or the ‘manufacture’ of election returns just to get
the proclamation, and then let the victimized
candidate to file the protest, and spend
his
money to work for an empty
triumph.

It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in all
previous elections.  Never was the point pressed upon us in
a more clear-cut manner.  And without, in
any way, modifying our stand as out­lined in the Nacionalista
Party vs. Commission deci­sion, we feel the mores of the day require
application – even extension – of the
principle in the Mitchell deci­
sion, which is realistic and commonsensical even as it strikes a blow at such pernicious
‘grab–the–proclamation– prolong–the–protest‘ slogan
of some candidates or parties.”

A glaring fact not denied by any of the inspectors,
as reflected in the certificate of challenge, does not escape notice.  Several ballots cast for Joseph Estrada
were not accredited to petitioner.  He has filed his certificate of
candidacy under the name Joseph Ejercito
Estrada.  At least two members of
the board of inspectors had knowledge of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dated September 15, 1967 – long before the November 14 elections
– authorizing petitioner to use his stage or screen name Joseph Estrada
in addition to his real name of Joseph Ejercito.[3]
Those ballots have been validly cast under Section 149 of the Revised Election
Code, which sets forth the rules for appreciation of ballots.  No justifiable reason exists why said ballots
should not have been so considered.  The
action of the inspectors was clearly
unwarranted.  The prejudice to petitioner
is patent.  And yet, Section 154 cannot
apply.

Petitioner should have resorted, in the first instance, to the
Commission on Elections to set aright errant election officials who are wont to
commit flagrant
violations of the election laws and make a mockery of the will of the
voters.  The Commission possesses
abundant powers respecting the maintenance of free, honest and orderly
elections as
well as
the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.  The Commission, I am confident, would not
close its eyes to such an unbridled display of arbitrary authority.  It could have very well issued the proper
directive to the board of inspectors, and enforced it.  Indeed, this Court has upheld actions of the
Commission as
coming within the latter’s general adminis­trative and supervisory
powers defined in the Constitution and in the Revised Election Code.

Citing parallel cases may not be out of context.  In a number of instances, this Court has been
consistently hesitant in unduly delimiting the powers of the Commission, a
constitutional body charged with the essential objective of preserving the
integrity of our elections.  Thus, this
Court has confirmed the authority of the Commission to investigate irregularities accompanying a
canvass, annul an illegal canvass and order the board of canvassers to hold another canvass.[4] For, as emphasized by this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar, in Cauton vs. Commission on Elections:  “The
purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular
government.
  The Commission on
Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure
a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections.”[5]
This is an echo of the earlier case of Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections,[6]
which pronounced that the Commission “should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created – free, orderly and honest
elections.”

I believe that had the Commission been seasonably asked – during
the counting in the precinct concerned – to give proper instructions to the board
of inspectors, the situation now before us could have been obviated.


[1]
Dizon vs. Board of Canvassers of Laguna, 52
Phil. 47, 54.

[2]
L-25444, January 31, 1966;
underscoring supplied.

[3]
Par. II and Annex “A” of the petition; par. 1 of answer of re­spondent Sto. Domingo.

[4]
Mintu vs. Enage,
L-1836, December 31, 1947; Ramos vs. Commis­sion on Elections, 80 Phil.
722; Abendante vs. Relato,
94 Phil. 8; Lacson vs. Commission on
Elections, L-16261, December 28, 1959; Santos vs. Commission on
Elections, L-16413, January 26,1960; Chiongbian vs.
Commission on Elections, L-19202, December 11, 1961; Albano
vs. Arranz, L-19260, January 31, 1962; Olano vs. Ronquillo,
L-17912, May 31, 1963; Javier vs. Commission on Elections, L-22248,
January 30, 1965; Cauton vs. Commission on
Elections, L-25467, April 27, 1967; Espino vs.
Zaldivar, L-22325, December 11, 1967.

[5]
1967B Phild. 248, 255.

[6]
73 Phil. 288, 294.